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Editor's Note:
This article explores the theoretical and practical bases of the
Conflict of Laws, or as it is perhaps more generally called, Private
InternationalLaw (PIL). Professor Nagan attempts to describe the
jurisprudentialassumptions of diverse theories of law in their relation to the theories of PIL. The central point of the article is that the
new configurative jurisprudence of the policy-sciences is better
equipped to provide a relevant, realistic and comprehensive theory
about PIL, a theory that will enable rational decisionmakers and
scholars to give effect to a more rationaldecision process for the law
of multi-state (or group) problems. Moreover, the theory proposes to
secure a greater appreciationof the potentials of PIL to make a positive contribution to the establishment and maintenance of a world
public order committed to human rights and dignity.
PIL is viewed as a response to problems (claims) over which control is concurrently or sequentially shared by politically organized
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"groups" or "states." Professor Nagan seeks to show that because PIL
is an outcome of the interaction of multiple groups and states, and is,
in its most fundamental sense, charged with the allocation of lawmaking (prescriptive) and law-applying (applicative) competencies
between relatively discrete bodies politic, PIL shares coordinate but
important functions of law-making and law-applying with public international law in the transnationalcontext. Indeed, Professor Nagan
urges that private and public international law are, in reality, complementary and indispensible components of what he conceptualizes
as a larger "world process of authoritative decision" which, though
highly pluralistic and decentralized, nevertheless responds effectively
to claims for the assertion of primary and secondary prescriptive and
applicative competencies across group, state and national lines. Professor Nagan challenges the soundness of the prevailing orthodoxy
owed to theories of dualism concerning the nature of public and private international law; he rejects the working assumption that these
subjects "exist" on different conceptual planes and that PIL is undifferentiated from municipal law and the "sovereign's validating
imprimatur."
Professor Nagan argues that because both private and public international law deal with prescriptive and applicative competencies
across state and group lines, the criteria which had been used to evaluate past trends in theory about public international law may be
readily adapted to appraise and evaluate past trends in theories
about PIL; he suggests an alternative theoretical framework that he
believes to be more consonant with the criteria of a comprehensive,
realistic and goal-oriented theory about PIL.
Professor Nagan first seeks to delimit the problem concerning the
adequacy of theorizing about PIL. This is accomplished by stressing
the nature of the context from which problems requiring a PIL response emerge and by providing a simple illustrationof the pitfalls of
mechanistic formalism. ProfessorNagan stresses the salience of power
and its accomodation in the processes of prescriptionand application
of law across state lines; he urges that since law-making in the transnational context is such a broad ranging, richly engaging task involving a wide variety of actors and institutions, its diversity cannot be
ignored in PIL. The focus is, nevertheless, on those agencies of decision that have more directly influenced the development of doctrine
in this area: the courts. Professor Nagan believes that when a court is
confronted with a claim invoking the authoritativesymbols of PIL, a
decisional response Involves a dual law-making function. The threshhold law-making function requires the accomodation of power. Here
the assurance that the foreign or transstateperspective will be a seri-
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ous component of the decision process in turn assures the principle of
reciprocal tolerances. The second function of law-making is designed
to secure a result reasonably in accord with the expectations of the
parties and the larger community. Hence, the second level of lawmaking should aspire to a reasonable allocation of prescriptive competence in the common interest. ProfessorNagan suggests that a contemporary configurative jurisprudentialperspective might serve as a
better theoretical vehicle to realize that aspiration.
The article proceeds to set forth the core criteria associated with
the configurative jursiprudence of the policy-sciences and evaluates
the adequacy of past theories against these standards. Particularattention is given to the importance of the observational standpoint
and the salience of distinguishing between theories of and theories
about law. Professor Nagan criticizes the analytical perspective for
denying the utility of this distinction and suggests that the ordinary
language analysis of this school seeks to estop the generation of new
concepts and forms of discourse seeking to make sense of changes
about law in the real world. In short, Professor Nagan holds that the
analytical views deny the utility of behavioral science in law. The disabilities of such a perspective for law generally, and PIL in particular, are acute as Professor Nagan contends that law cannot be scientifically viewed as a function of decisional behavior of actual
decisionmakers except through the lens of the "observer." Moreover,
to preclude a concern for decision-making from any theory of or about
law that aspires to realism is, according to Professor Nagan, hardly
sensible.
In his critique of modern theories, Professor Nagan seeks to shed
light on the jurisprudentialbasis of the Legal Process paradigm. He
does this by comparing and contrasting the core differences between
this perspective and that of the policy-sciences focusing specifically
on the former's assumptions concerning the epistemological basis of
the nature of inquiry, objectivity and normative standards. An appraisalof the shortfalls of past theories follows and the outlines for a
configurative theory about PIL are suggested.
The final section sets forth the social process context of PIL
through use of a phase analysis of participants,perspectives, bases of
power, situations, conditions and outcomes-the traditionalapproach
of the policy-sciences. Professor Nagan suggests that the adoption of
a phase analysis to delimit both the general and specific factual background of a particularproblem is an important aspect of a comprehensive theory about PIL. Implementing this suggestion, Professor
Nagan describes the outcomes of the social process context in terms
of claims and decision; he outlines the general contours of the process
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of claim and the process of decision that respond to claims in this
field. In particular,it is noted that the model of decision seeks to
underscore the idea that decision involves choice; disciplined decision-making, if it aspires to rationality,must encompass several interrelated decision functions, some of which may be more central to
the nature of the PIL problem than others in their realization.
The article also deals with the clarificationof the basic policies of
PIL and includes an effort to apply principles of content and procedure, as developed in the policy-sciences, in an effort to relate particular problems to general abstract norms, such as human rights prescriptions. It is suggested that these tools may be useful in resolving
PIL problems by enabling decisionmakers to systematically connect
specific problems to preferred normative standards associated with
internationaljustice and human rights perspectives.
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INTRODUCTION

Private International Law [PIL], or Conflict of Laws, as it is generally known in common law jurisdictions, is a difficult subject. Practical problems of the most commonplace variety can be transformed into
a complex configuration of difficult issues simply by the addition of
what traditional PIL scholars call a "foreign element.", Although find1. The term "Private International Law" was coined in 1834 by Justice Story in his
pioneering Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. The phrase "Conflict of Laws"
originates from a seventeenth century tract by Ulricus Huber, De Conflictu Legum
Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis. A. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 n.1 (1937); A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 (1943). Story used the term PIL to denominate the law governing the "very complicated private relations and rights" which necessarily arise between the citizens of a nation which is composed of distinct "and in some respects independent states." J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 9-10 (8th ed. 1883 & photo. reprint 1972) (1st
ed. Boston 1834). Since this law "is chiefly seen and felt in its application to the common
business of private persons," id., it is to be distinguished from public international law
which traditionally governs the relations between sovereign nations. See, e.g., P. NORTH,
CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (10th ed. 1979). Beale suggested that "[i]n the phrase 'private international law' the word [international] means
having extra-national elements, as in the phrase 'international society.'" J. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 14-15 (1935). Other alternative
phrases include: "the international treatment of private persons," "local limitations of
the rules of law," "relations of the co-ordinate sources of law," and "extra-territorial
recognition of rights." See L. BAR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7-8 (G. Gillespie trans. 2d ed. 1892).
The phrase "Conflict of Laws" has been criticized as "misleading" since "the very
purpose of private international law is to avoid conflicts of law." P. NORTH, supra, at 12.
If an English court decides that the assignment must be governed by French
law, it does not do so because English law has been worsted in a conflict with the
law of France, but because it is the law of England, albeit another part of the
law of England, i.e. private international law, that in the particular circumstances it is expedient to refer to French law.
Id. A genuine conflict arises when "two territorial systems, differing in themselves, both
seek to regulate the same matter." Id. For example, English law and Greek law might
each claim to govern the bequest of a Greek subject dying while domiciled in England.
Id. at 12-13.
2. See, e.g., M. WOLF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1950). This foreign or
"extra-national" element may consist of an event which occurs in a foreign jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
(New York residents involved in automobile accident in Ontario, Canada). A foreign element may also be the relationship between a foreign jurisdiction and one of the parties
to the action. See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (England, as
the jurisdiction of the marital domicile and residence of the wife and children, has the
most significant relationship to a separation agreement contested in an action brought in
New York. English law therefore governs the action). The foreign element may be the
relationship between a foreign jurisdiction and some object involved in the action. See,
e.g., In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd on rehear-
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ing solutions to problems of this complexity requires that both scholars8 and practitioners 4 use a broad range of skills, PIL is far from esoing, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950) (action involving disposition of real property located in
Switzerland by testamentary act of naturalized American citizen of Swiss origin who died
in the United States).
3. The contributions that scholars have made to this field warrant its being designated scholar dominated. The glossators of the eleventh century, who added explanatory
notes or glossae to the text of the Corpus Juris,had done much for the revival of Roman
law. It was, however, "the post-glossators or commentators of the thirteenth century, the
jurists attached to the law schools of Bologna, Padua, Perugia, and Pavia, who made the
first serious attempt to apply a scientific mode of reasoning to the reconciliation of conflicting laws . . . [and thus] wrote upon what we should now term private international
law ....
" P. NORTH, supra note 1, at 19. There are many great contributions from this

era. See, e.g.,

BARTOLUS, BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(J. Beale trans. 1914 &

photo. reprint 1979); Bartolus, Bartoli A Saxoferrato Commentariae in Codicem, in F.
VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STAT-

app. I (W. Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880 & photo. reprint 1972) (1st ed. London 1869);
Huber, Ulrici Huberi de Conflictu Legum in Diversis Imperiis, in F. VON SAVIGNY, supra,
at app. IV; Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 Nw. U.L. REV. 375 (1918); Voet,
Pauli Voetii de Statutis Eorumque Concursu, in F. VON SAVIGNY, supra, at app. III; J.
UTES

STORY,

supra note 1.

Modern theorists who by means of their scholarship have shaped conflict of laws
include: J. BEALE, supra note 1; D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); W.
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1967 & Special Part with E. Jayme 1973); A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962); H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.
1964); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977); E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947); E. RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1958); RE-

(1971); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE
(1965); R.WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (2d ed. 1980); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE
L.J. 468 (1927). Other modern American theorists of note include: Baade, CounterRevolution or Alliance for Progress?Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice of Law
Process, 46 TEX. L. REV. 141 (1967); Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1972).
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

Some of the leading foreign writers include: H.

BATTIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PRIV9 (6th ed. 1974-76); I. BAXTER, ESSAYS ON PRIVATE LAW (1966); A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (J. Morris 10th ed. 1980); R. GRAVESON,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (7th ed. 1974); 0. KAHN-FREUND, THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONALISM
IN ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
ed. 1980); J. NIBAUM, TRAIT9 DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 FRAN4;AIS (2d ed. 1947-51);

P.

NORTH,

AUSTRALIA

supra note 1; A.

(3d ed. 1976); C.

NUSSBAUM,

supra note 1; P.

NYGH, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN

SCHMITTHOFF, ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAWS

SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW

THE AUSTRALIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1972); F.

(3d ed. 1954); A.

(1970); E. SYKES, A

TEXTBOOK ON

VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

(W. Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880 & photo.
reprint 1972) (1st ed. London 1869).
4. Distinguished jurists, past and present, who have sought to develop in a more sophisticated manner the theory of PIL through the cases include Story, Traynor, Fuld,
AND THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES

N.Y.J.
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teric. On the contrary, the rules, policies and practices of international
law, whether private or public, perform the historic function of all law;
they seek to secure a myth and a set of operational indices whereby the
valued things in transnational life are allocated. PIL deals, at least in
form, with allocations of values relating to individual justice among
parties who are mainly private rather than public.5 It is an outcome of
Kenison, and Keating. See, e.g., Justice Traynor's insightful analysis in Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657 (1959). See also Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (Kenison, J.); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781
(1966) (Kenison, J.); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969) (Keating, J.); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963) (Fuld, J.).
5. In functional terms, the concepts "public" and "private" are overly dichotomized.
The distinction omits from the focus of inquiry, in both qualitative and quantitative
terms, important problems of international concern. Of course, these concepts classify
doctrines rather than problems. As such, they fall prey to all the criticisms that modern
jurisprudence has directed toward abstracted formalism.
PIL is greatly concerned with, among other things, the control and regulation of the
global economy. Differentiating between distinctly public and distinctly private roles in
the world economic order would appear to be astigmatic in the extreme. The following
list, comparing the annual profits of large United States multinational corporations with
the gross national product of nations, shows the relative economic weight private multinational corporations, such as American Telephone & Telegraph (A.T.&T.) and International Business Machines (I.B.M.), may exercise compared to public actor states:
A.T.&T., 6,888; Sudan, 6,458; Burma, 6,416; Ghana, 6,084; Vietnam, 6,000; Exxon, 5,567;
Qatar, 5,508; Uruguay, 4,990; Sri Lanka, 4,803; Kenya, 4,597; Zaire, 4,140; Ethiopia,
3,846; Zimbabwe, 3,784; Bolivia, 3,704; Jamaica, 3,631; Tanzania, 3,532; Uganda, 3,505;
I.B.M., 3,308; Luxembourg, 3,221; Panama, 3,212; Afghanistan, 3,115; Zambia, 2,654; Jordan, 2,592; Gabon, 2,470; Mobil, 2,433; Standard Oil of California, 2,380; Texaco, 2,310;
Albania, 2,160; Standard Oil of Indiana, 1,922; Shell Oil, 1,701; Atlantic Richfield,
1,671; General Electric, 1,652; Iceland, 1,600; E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 1,401; Mongolia,
1,324; Gulf Oil, 1,231; Ford Motor, 1,060. See THE HAMMOND ALMANAC 199, 201 (M.
Bacheller ed. 1983) (figures are in millions of United States dollars). See also Meeker,

Toward a Fade-In Joint Venture Process,
86-92 (June 1974).

PAPERS OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOP-

MENT PROGRAM

The international landscape of economic organizations is in great flux, not only as a
consequence of the emergence of national multinationals such as the Ford Motor Company and the Mitsubishi Group, but also of "international" multinationals such as Air
Afrique, a multiple nationality entity created by treaty which is under unified management and is headquartered in the Ivory Coast.
The future of international business enterprises appears to be flowing in the direction of even larger economic aggregates outside the framework of the state. An indication
of this trend is the EEC Commission's draft statute for a European Company, which was
presented to the Council of Ministers in 1970. The European Company (Societas
Europaea, S.E.) is envisioned as the first supranational enterprise that would consciously
ignore national boundaries. The basic objective of an S.E. will be to give medium and
smaller size corporations access to international economic markets. See generally THE
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW

(C. Schmitthoff ed. 1973); Cheris & Fischer,

The European Company: Its Promise and Problems, 6 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 113, 127-30
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the world social process in which participants interact and value exchanges take place. In the contemporary system of international relations, outcomes result from a social process centered around the concept of the "group," regardless of the complexity with which that term
may be defined.6 Component members of the international community
interact with one another, not only within "groups," but also across
"group" lines.
The key consequence of the present system is an incredibly
voluminous flow of capital, people, goods, services, commodities, technologies, skills, armaments, and exchanges covering every demanded
(1971); Mann, The European Company, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 468 (1970).
The prospect of an enlarged version of the S.E., the "World Company" or "Stateless
(Cosmo Corp.) World Company" is another projected development, although it is conceded that such corporations already exist de facto in the field of global communications.
See generally R. TINDALL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1975).
The legal structure of multinational enterprises suggests the need for urgent development of the techniques and processes associated with private international law. For
example, complex problems may emerge because the structure of a multinational may be
predicated upon contract-type linkages, or linkages predicated on cross-share holdings,
or within the framework of a jointly-owned holding company, or a jointly-owned operating company, or through an equalization agreement with common directors and a unified
management, or several other complex legal economic structures.
6. See generally J. FALKENBURG, KIN AND ToTEM: GROUP RELATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN
ABORIGINES IN THE PORT KEATS DISTRICT

(1962); C.

FORD,

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF

HUMAN REPRODUCTION (Yale U. Publications in Anthropology No. 32, 1945); R. FORTUNE,
OMAHA SECRET SOCIETIES (Colum. U. Contributions to Anthropology vol. 14, 1932); N.
GIST, SECRET SOCIETIES: A CULTURAL STUDY OF FRATERNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES (U.

Mo. Stud. vol. 15, 1940); L. TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1969); Evan, Dimensions of Participation in Voluntary Associations, 36 Soc. FORCES 148 (1957); Hertz, Rise and Demise of
the TerritorialState, 9 WORLD POL. 473 (1957); Jourard, Privacy: The Psychological
Need, 9 NEW Soc'y 757 (1967); Kaplan, Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models
of InternationalSystems, 51 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 684 (1957); Komorovsky, The Voluntary
Associations of Urban Dwellers, 11 AM. Soc. REV. 686 (1946); Landau, Prolegomena to a
Study of Secret Societies in Modern Egypt, 1 MIDDLE E. STUD. 135 (1965); Latham, The
Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 376 (1952); Little,
The Role of the Secret Society in Cultural Specialization, 51 AM. ANTHROPOLIGIST 199
(1949); Little, The Role of Voluntary Associations in West African Urbanization, 59
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 579 (1957); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisalof Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1959); Reynolds, Open
Groups in Hominid Evolution, 1 MAN 441 (1966); Ross, Control and Leadership in
Women's Groups: An Analysis of Philanthropic Money-Raising Activity, 37 Soc.
FORCES 124 (1958); Scott, Membership and Participationin Voluntary Associations, 22
AM. Soc. REV. 315 (1957); Smith, A Psychological Model of Individual Participationin
Formal Voluntary Organizations:Application to Some Chilean Data, 72 AM. J. Soc. 249
(1966); Sommer, Studies in PersonalSpace, 22 SOCIOMETRY 247 (1959); Wedgwood, The
Nature and Functions of Secret Societies, 1 OCEANIA 129 (1930); Zimmer & Hawley, The
Significance of Membership in Associations, 65 AM. J. Soc. 196 (1959).
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value7 by members of groups comprising the world community. This
7. The problems which can arise with respect to domestic relations in both the federal and international contexts are numerous. During 1974, for example, 2,229,667 marriages were performed in the United States. III U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SEEVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1-5, Table 1-1
(1974). Of this total, 279,000 involved at least one individual who was not a resident of
the state of celebration. A total of 143,486 marriages were performed in that same year in
which neither party was a resident of the state of celebration. Id. at 1-34, Table 1-33.
Problems of validity and capacity are inherent in a transstate marriage. For example, what will be the result of a marriage between two first cousins in a state which
allows such a marriage if the couple returns to their state of domicile where the marriage
is considered incestuous? Likewise, what is the probable outcome of a marriage outside
the domicile when one or both parties are not of legal age to marry within the domicile?
With respect to dissolution of marriages, during 1974, there were 977,000 divorces,
id. at 2-6, Table 2-2, and 11,080 annullments, id. at 2-7, Table 2-3, granted in the United
States. In a survey of thirty states, representing 571,794 or 58.5% of all divorces, it was
found that 190,059 or 33.2% of the divorces occurred in states outside the state where
the marriage was originally performed. Id. at 2-11, Table 2-11. Although familial migration may account for a large percentage of this statistic, it may also be presumed that
many of these domiciliary changes were for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. The
transstate problems created by divorce are several. For example, what law governs when
one spouse moves from a community property state to one adhering to common law
divorce? Will the common law state accede to the law of the marital domicile in the
making of economic adjustments or apply its own law?
The problems of transstate divorce have a special significance in the area of child
custody. Of the estimated 1,099,000 children involved in divorce proceedings in the
United States in 1974, id. at 2-10, Table 2-9, it may be assumed that a reasonable number were involved in situations where they and the custodial parent moved to another
state or the non-custodial parent moved out of state. The problems of custody and support which are bound to arise in such a situation will necessarily involve the laws of more
than one state. As an example of these problems, what will be the result of a contractual
agreement for child support which is valid and binding in one state but inherently unconscionable in another? Or, what will be the outcome when a non-custodial parent abducts his or her child from a state having a strong state policy against such unauthorized
activities and transports the child to a state having no such policy?
Regarding the area of education, in 1975 there were 11,179,610 students in the
United States enrolled in colleges on a full or part time basis. Of this total, 1,892,786

were residing outside of their state of domicile. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 87 (1974). In this context, it is inevitable that
conflicts between the laws of two or more states will arise. The potential for conflicts
within the framework of torts, contracts and family law is awesome. The likelihood of
conflicts problems becomes more pronounced in light of the number of foreign nationals
attending United States colleges and universities. During the 1971-72 school year,
146,097 foreign students were enrolled in American institutions of higher education. Id.
at 143. During this same period, 34,218 American students were studying abroad along
with 6,552 faculty and administrative personnel. Id. at 142.
International business transactions involving the United States give but an idea of
the magnitude of private international commercial relationships existing throughout the
world. For example, in 1976 the total value of United States assets abroad was 347.2
billion dollars. Of this total, 282.4 billion were private assets. During the same period,
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process of value-exchange has brought to the fore at least three fundamental characteristics of contemporary world order: interdependence,
interdetermination, -and interstimulation.
Consider first the fact of interdependence.8 This fact is underthe total value of foreign assets located in the United States was 159.1 billion dollars, of
which 30.8 billion dollars was the result of direct investment. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1981, at 833, No. 1495. The direct foreign investment of other nations in 1978 included, in millions of United States dollars: Canada,
1,269.4; France, 228.1; United Kingdom, 1,470.2; Saudi Arabia, 130.3; Israel, 5.5; Australia, 51.4; India, 7.5; Mexico, 9.6; Panama, 8.5; and South Africa, 42.3. INDUS. & TRADE
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMM. NEWS (Aug. 23, 1979).
The value of the international trade of various nations of the world further demonstrates the staggering amount of transstate economic relations. The values of the exports
and imports in 1976, in millions of United States dollars, for the following states were:
Algeria, 5,061 exports and 5,852 imports; Belgium-Luxembourg, 32,846 exports and
35,354 imports; Brazil, 10,126 exports and 13,622 imports; West Germany, 101,846 exports and 87,570 imports; Iran, 23,525 exports and 13,809 imports; Japan, 67,225 exports
and 64,799 imports; Saudi Arabia, 36,086 exports and 6,886 imports; United States,
113,378 exports and 128,872 imports; USSR, 37,169 exports and 38,151 imports. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 102 (T. Dolmatch 32d ed. 1978).
The activities of multinational corporations contribute greatly to this flow of transnational trade and investment. For example, in 1978 a leading Taiwan corporation had
the following foreign investments, in thousands of United States dollars: in Japan, 102.8;
in the United States, 1,353.0; in Hong Kong, 108.3; in Singapore, 1,143.5; and 100.0 in
the Phillipines. W. Ting & C. Schive, Direct Investment and Technology Transfer from
Taiwan, in MULTINATIONALS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 101, 109 (K. Kumar & M. McLeod ed. 1981).
In the field of transportation, United States carriers collected 937 million dollars
from the 4.456 million foreign travelers who came to the United States during 1976.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS, supra, at 239, No. 413. During this same period 6.897 million
Americans traveled to foreign countries. They paid 1.444 billion to United States carriers
for transportation. The total of all United States expenditures in foreign countries was
10.868 billion during 1976. Id. at 240. In 1976, 447.3 million dollars in revenues was received by the United States Postal Service for transporting international mail. These
revenues were generated on the 933 million pieces of international mail handled. Id. at
558. During 1976, 75.8 million overseas phone calls were placed generating income of 664
million dollars. Id. at 560. 24 million telegrams were sent overseas generating 238 million
in income. Id.
One can only speculate as to the volume of private international litigation produced
by these extensive commercial relations. Only upon consideration of the broad spectrum
of activities involved in these relationships can the diversity and enigmas of such litigation be fully appreciated. To name only a few: what law is applied to a breach of contract
between a foreign and domestic party? Under what law do foreign assets in this country
pass upon the owner's death? What law applies when an American is injured aboard a
foreign cruise ship? The decisional problems facing the courts in such disputes are
apparent.
8. For a discussion of interdependence, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); see generally H. LASSWELL, WORLD
REVOLUTIONARY ELITES (1965).
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scored by the commonplace observation that our security, well-being
and capacity for attaining a just society are intimately tied up with the
security, well-being and ability to deliver justice not only to ourselves,
but to others as well. It is typically observed, for example, that the
failure of a wheat crop in the Soviet Union might directly or indirectly
affect the price of bread for the average consumer in the United States.
The second characteristic is interdetermination.9 Here again, it is
an obvious datum that the decisions we make, purposely or otherwise,
may determine the future not only of ourselves but of others as well.
Likewise, their decisions may determine the kind of future world order
we might anticipate. For example, a decision to increase the level of
arms production in the Soviet Union may determine what percentage
of the United States' Gross National Product should be devoted to security, rather than to expenditures concerned with domestic living
standards. To the extent global security systems demonstrate an aggregate security commitment that exceeds commitment of limited resources to human and social development, the global system may be
but a reflection of complex decisional patterns that determine the
scope and quality of both human security and justice.
The final characteristic highlighted by our contemporary system of
world order is interstimulation. The term interstimulation signifies the
processes that serve the generation, compression and communication of
creative intelligence for the solution of common problems in a pluralistic world. As never before, world society is being conditioned by change
that occurs in many contexts. The predominant elements of change
have been triggered by technological advances, particularly in the areas
of international communication.1" The collective capacity of the inter9. For a discussion of interdetermination, see H. LASSWELL, supra note 8.
10. Examples of technological advances range from the direct dial telephone and the
television to the telex system. See Angell, InternationalCommunity and World Society,
in THE WORLD COMMUNITY 145 (Q. Wright ed. 1947). See also Resolution on an International Programme for the Development of Communication, UNESCO, Records of the
General Conference, 21st Sess., vol. 1, UNESCO Resolutions, Resolution 4.21 (1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 451 (1981).
For a study that connects microlevels of communication with law and public order,
see W.M. REISMAN, LOOKING, STARING AND GLARING: MICRO-NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND
PUBLIC ORDER (Sept. 8, 1980) (unpublished draft). See also Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,
Europ. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981); Council Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD (523rd mtg.), OECD Doc. C/80-58 (1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422
(1981); Fishman, Introduction to TransborderData Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
These international advances are applied to new international problems. As early as
1974, the need to protect personal privacy was recognized on the international level.
Upon a suggestion by the Secretary General of the United Nations, advanced countries
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national community to respond to crises and problems has been enhanced by the rapidity with which crises and other problems are effectively communicated to the world as a whole. The actual ability of the
international community to respond decisively to these issues has been
correspondingly heightened. For example, scientists from temperate regions have played a decisive role in the world food crisis by developing
new food strains in tropical regions. Clearly, the influence of technological advance has the potential for greatly homogenizing functions of
human life without necessarily destroying the rich cultural diversity of
the global society.'
International law, as an outcome of the world social process, has
concerned itself with the allocation of political 2 and economic power,18
adopted minimum standards of privacy protection. Id. at 11.
11. See generally Mead, World Culture, in THE WORLD COMMUNITY 47 (Q. Wright ed.
1947).
12. See generally R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975); M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM
AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1957); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
OF MANKIND (1954); THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS
(C. Black & R. Falk ed. 1969); Lasswell, The Interrelation of World Organization and
Society, 55 YALE L.J. 870 (1946); McDougal, International Law and the Future, 50
Miss. L.J. 259 (1970); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process
of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDuC. 253 (1969); Reisman, Private Armies in a
Global War System, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 22 (1973).
13. One of the great instruments of contemporary economic order is the multinational corporation. The capacity of multinationals to move capital, technology, managerial skills, enterprise, and information serves to increasingly homogenize the production
of goods and services across state and national lines. The fundamental problem posed for
the world economy is what principles of content and procedure should control and regulate the production and distribution of resources on a global basis. The world economy is
highly decentralized, remarkably pluralistic, and is sustained by strongly held ideologies
and doctrines about the precise relationship between the private and the public control
over the means of production of all economically relevant goods and services. The three
main economic "blocs" that characterize the diverse nature of the world economy are: (1)
the developed, market oriented Western economies; (2) the centrally planned socialist
economies of the eastern bloc; and (3) the economies of the underdeveloped and developing world. In such a diverse world economy, the problems of rational allocation of global
resources in the common interest of mankind are substantial, if not intractable. The
importance of a field like PIL for structuring economic institutions, processes, and expectations for an increasingly interdependent world cannot be gainsaid. See Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190, U.N. Sales No.
E.73. II.A.11 (1973); Multinational Corporations:Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL

FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR

U.S.

TRADE AND LABOR (Comm. Print

1973). United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Other dimensions of the international economic order, especially those that encom-
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with the allocation of the common resources of the earth-space community, and in a more explicit way today,14 with allocations relating to
individual justice (human rights). A central and pervasive question
lawyers have been concerned with has been the identification and manpass conditions of underdevelopment, suggest an important role for PIL in the near future. The literature on the international economic order and the North-South complexi-

ties is vast. See generally M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1979); 0. DE RIVERO, THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW (1980); J. INGRAM, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1978); P. JESsup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); A. KOUL, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UNCTAD IN
WORLD TRADE (1977); R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND
POWER (1979); J. TINBERGEN, SHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY, (1962); Agrawala, The
Emerging InternationalEconomic Order, 17 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 261 (1977); Bautista, The
New InternationalEconomic Order and Christian Charity, 25 CATH. LAW. 171 (1980);
Blair, Commentaries, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 348 (1976); Borgese, The New International
Economic Order and the Law of the Sea, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 584 (1977); Brian, International Law and the Developing Countries: The ABA Workshops of 1977, 12 INT'L
LAW. 265 (1978); Brower, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the

American ConstitutionalTradition, 10 INT'L LAW. 701 (1976); CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (R. Amacher, G. Haberler & T. Willett ed. 1979); Dawson, The Role of the Private Banker in the New InternatinalEconomic Order, 16
INT'L

L. 298 (1976);

VA.

J.

ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

(R. Lillich ed. 1976); Fatourod, The International Law of the NIEO: Problems and
Challenges for the U.S., 17 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 93 (1980); Ferguson, The New International Economic Order,3 U. ILL. L.F. 693 (1980); THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (R. Gardner
& M. Millikan ed. 1968); Haight, The InternationalEconomic Order and the Chapter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 597 (1975); Khan, The Normative
Characterof the NIEO: The Framework of Inquiry, 18 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 294 (1978);
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Hossain ed. 1980); Lillich, Commentaries, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 291 (1976); THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszio ed. 1978); A REORDERED WORLD: EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (R. Cooper ed. 1973); Richard, The United Nations Seventh
Special Session: Proposals for a New World Economic Order, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

601 (1976); Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the
New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309 (1976); Ryan, Towards a New
InternationalEconomic Order, 9 U. QUEENS. L.J. 135 (1976); Schaehter, The Evolving
InternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976); Shukla, New
InternationalEconomic Order, 18 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 290 (1978); Simmonds, The Home
Convention and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315
(1976); THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E.
Laszlo & J. Kurtzman ed., Pergamon Policy Studies No. 51, 1979); Van Themaat, Some
Basic Legal Issues of a New InternationalEconomic Order: A Western Point of View,
24 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 509 (1977); Vanzant, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties
of States: A Solution to the Development and Problem, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 446
(1974); White, New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1976); White,
New InternationalEconomic Order, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 542 (1975); Zaphirou, An
InternationalCode of Conduct on Transfers of Technology, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 210
(1977).
14. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 8.
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agement of central structures and processes shaped by the social, economic, and political conditions of world society. It has traditionally
been the lawyer's task to shape those processes in ways that secure
outcomes most compatible with maintaining the conditions of peace
and security, while at the same time stimulating the generation of
ideas and practices that promote traditional and emergent ideals of
universal justice.
Much doctrinal effort has been spent on the theoretical and practical bases of PIL.'5 Past theories, however, have been culled from studies viewing PIL as an outcome separate and distinct from public international law. From a functional point of view, the distinction between
public and private international law would appear to be at best artificial, as both public and private international law ultimately deal with
the myth and practice of responding to claims for the allocation of the
good as well as the undesirable things in the world social processes.
This article urges the perspective of recognizing that public and private international law are in reality complementary and indispensable
components of a larger and more inclusive conception of world public
order."0 When public and private international law are viewed as coor15. See supra notes 3-4.
16. For an effort to bypass the sterile dualism of inherited theories about public and
private international law, see Falk, InternationalJurisdiction:Horizontal and Vertical
Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295 (1959). See also Katzenbach, Conflicts
on an Unruly Horse: Recipirocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956); McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for
Policy Purposes: Value Clarificationas an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61
YALE L.J. 915 (1952); McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power and Policy, 82 RECUEIL DES
COUES 137 (1953). Several leading casebooks sustain a similar perspective. See, e.g., M.
McDouaL & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1976); J. SWEENY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1981); B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1980).
It should be noted that in the sphere of economic relations,
local remedies must be exhausted means that a vast number of
PIL. See Greece v. Bulgaria, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1389, 1419
Shippers (Finland v. United Kingdom), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
AND WORLD ORDER

the well known rule that
problems lapse over into
(1933); Claim of Finnish
1479 (1934). See also F.
DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 156-58 (1932); D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 583-

89 (2d ed. 1976); L. SOHN & R.

BAXTER, CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 577 (1961). Art. 19 reads as

follows:
Article 19. When Local Remedies Considered Exhausted
1. Local remedies shall be considered as exhausted for the
purposes of this
Convention if the claimant has employed all administrative, arbitral, or judicial
remedies which were made available to him by the respondent State, without
obtaining the full redress to which he is entitled under the Convention.
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dinate processes of law-making in the international legal arena, that
broad conception of the law reflects all of the processes concerned with
authoritative and controlling decisions in the largely decentralized and
heterogeneous global system. A distinction between public and private
international law is reflected in scholarly writings where books are
clearly designated as either public or private international law. 17 The
Restatements of the ALI in the United States clearly reflect a further
acceptance of the distinction. Thus, the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws' s appears to be distinct from the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.1 9 If one views what is called public and what is called private international law as coordinate and complementary responses to
problems that are factually comparable and involve coequivalent policy
dimensions, one will have increased his or her understanding of how
transstate law is made and applied and how it might be managed so
2. Local remedies shall be considered as not available for the
purposes of this
Convention:
(a) if no remedy exists through which substantial recovery could be obtained;
(b) if the remedies are in fact foreclosed by an act or omission attributable to
the State; or
(c) if only excessively slow remedies are available or justice is unreasonably
delayed.
Id.
The law of state succession also encompasses the problem of international obligations, particularly economic obligations that have PIL overtones. See D. O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1976). The principles gov-

erning the treatment of alien property are still another area of interpretation of public

and private international economic law. See R.

LILLICH

CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§

& B.

(1975);

WESTON, INTERNATIONAL

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

165-66, commentary at 502-09 (1965);

Weston, "Constructive Takings" Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the
Problem of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975).
17. The literature regarding PIL is abundant. Many texts introduce PIL by comparing it to public international law. Minor says that PIL can be distinguished from public
international law first as to the persons on whom it operates, second as to the transactions to which it relates and third as to the remedies applied. R. MINOR, infra note 63, at
2. Castel speaks of the need for rules that
co-ordinate the incidence of the legal systems involved in cases containing relevant foreign elements. Rules which deal with the rights and obligations of states
and international organizations inter se are called public international law rules.
On the other hand, rules that apply to cases arising between private persons, or
states, engaged in private transactions with contacts with two or more legal units
are called private international law rules or conflict of laws rules.
J. CASTEL, INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (1978).
18. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(1965).
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that its potentials for securing a just and humane world public order
might be better approximated.
One way to underscore a functional integration of public and private international law is to focus on the concept of international jurisdiction. The term jurisdiction is not used here to signify its use under
the much excoriated Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 20 The term is
used after the fashion of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,
which suggests that implicit in the concept of jurisdiction is the principle of competency." Viewed in this manner, since time immemorial
organized bodies politic have sought to make and apply law concerning
their fundamental bases of power; viz., land and people. (There are, of
course, other bases of power that over time are of importance to a particular body politic). The exercise of jurisdictional competence viewed
historically has tended to be rationalized in doctrines drawn from territorial considerations or considerations of group affiliation.2" In contemporary context, the principles conventionally used to allocate the competence to make or prescribe law in so-called public international law
reflect not simply principles of territoriality and nationality, but also
include doctrines designed to more realistically cope with the complex
facts and problems of international life. These doctrines include the
principle22 (including impact terrtoriality), passive personalprotective
ity,24' and principles of universal jurisdiction. 25

20. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42 (1934). The Restatement defines "jurisdiction" as "the power of a state to create interests which under the principles of the
common law will be recognized as valid in other states." Id.
21. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (Ten. Draft
No. 2, 1981). The Restatement defines "jurisdiction" as "the capacity of a state under
international law (a) to prescribe, or (b) to enforce rules attaching legal consequences to
conduct, including rules relating to property, status or other interests." Id. In order for a
state to have jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce rules governing conduct, "there must
exist between the state and the conduct and its author relationships which are recognized as sufficient to validate the action of the state." Id. at 11. Several situations will
give a state jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing conduct; among others, conduct taking place within the state's territory, personal presence within the state and domicile
within the state. The Restatement adds that "though a state does not have jurisdiction
over particular conduct on the basis of territory or nationality it may have jurisdiction to
deal with such conduct if there exists between the conduct and the state a relationship
• . . which is recognized under international law as a valid basis of jurisdiction." Id.
22. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905). See also infra note 62. See generally E. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 245-46
(1963).
23. A state may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect interests vital to its existence. C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1971).
24. A state may maintain extraterritorial jurisdiction over aliens who allegedly have
committed crimes against its nationals outside its jurisdiction. Id. at 118.
25. Jurisdiction is conferred upon any state to prosecute and punish those commit-
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The fundamental policy base of all of these principles of international jurisdiction is to secure a reasonable or rational allocation of
competence to prescribe in the common interest. Traditional PIL doctrine reflects a similar evolution, starting with the classification of real,
personal, and mixed statutes by the early glossators. The concrete
emergence of the state system saw the evolution of theories that have
sought to mediate between territorial and personal principles in the
search of doctrines that would more consciously and rationally secure
the allocation of law-making power in the common interest.
The developments that have occurred in the law of international
jurisdiction to prescribe have moved the technical doctrines of public
and private international law of the jurisdiction to prescribe much
closer together. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,2 the
court stated: "[I]t is quite true that we are not to read general words
such as those in this [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.' "" The reference to limitations fixed by "Conflict of
Laws" in Alcoa was meant to reflect upon the notion that the limitations imposed by the principles of conflict of laws help to refine reasonable applications of the competence to prescribe. This idea is reflected
in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 40: "Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent
conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction ....
,,28 Modern trends have subsequently
evolved a principle of reasonableness to guide the assertion of competence to prescribe law in the international system. For example, one
attempt lists eight factors that guide the determination of what is reasonable and what is not:
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is
judged by evaluating all the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within
the regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreting certain crimes such as piracy on the high seas, war crimes, or destruction of submarine cables. Id. at 116-17.
26. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (antitrust action alleging monopolization of interstate
and foreign commerce in the manufacture and sale of aluminum).
27. Id. at 443.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
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seeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed
to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to
which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other
states.29
The jurisdictional rule of reason reflected in the Tentative Draft of the
Restatement has been applied in many recent cases and in many different contexts.8 0 It is tempting to compare and contrast the significant
relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws with
the evolution of the jurisdictional rule of reason of the Tentative Draft
of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. Viewed functionally, the differences should reflect variances in the calculus of reasonableness that are an inherent reflection of different factual
contingencies.
A doctrinal connecting link regarding the jurisdiction to prescribe
in public and private international law is reflected in the practice of
the United States Supreme Court itself. For example, in Home Insurance Company v. Dick,"1 the Supreme Court used the due process
29. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981).
30. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Assoc.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (antitrust suit alleging action based on illegal control of
Honduran lumber export business was improperly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
although the activities took place in Honduras and concerned foreign citizens); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over American litigants contesting antitrust activity abroad).
31. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment to limit the power of Texas to
prescribe the conditions of an insurance contract entered into in Mexico. 32 The fundamental idea of due process is the principle of reasonableness, although the concrete indicia of reasonableness differ from
case to case. In Home Insurance, reasonableness simply reflected territorial considerations. The most recent important Supreme Court decision dealing with constitutional limitations on choice of law is Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague.3 3 Allstate involved a fatal car-motorcycle accident that occurred in Wisconsin. Minnesota law provided for the
"stacking" of insurance contracts.3 4 Decedent's $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of his three automobiles could be "stacked" to
provide total coverage of $45,000. Wisconsin law did not allow stacking.33 In this case, Minnesota had attenuated contacts with the plaintiff and the question emerged as to whether Minnesota could prescribe
its own law to the problem.3" The Supreme Court of Minnesota applied
its own law as the "better rule." The constitutional question ultimately
involved was whether the use of this "better law," joined with attenuated contacts, would result in an arbitrary and unreasonable prescription by Minnesota.3 7 The Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the Minnesota Supreme Court, but it used, rather artificially, the language of contacts as an index of reasonableness, ostensibly avoiding the
question of whether a "better rule" should be the core index of reasonableness, fairness, and possibly, even substantial justice. 8 The technical doctrinal problem is how a rule that better serves as an index of
justice (the better rule concept) might be viewed as unreasonable for
due process purposes. The significance of Allstate is that, by implication, it seems to tie modern conflict of laws doctrines like the better
32. Id. at 407.
33. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
34. Id. at 306.
35. id.
36. Id. at 306-07.
37. Id. at 313.
38. The concept of substantial justice was invoked to relax earlier rigid standards of
personal jurisdiction. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property outside its territory) with
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (nonresident defendant must
have minimum contacts with the forum so that suit does not offend notions of fair play
and substantial justice); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant does not satisfy minimum contacts); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (parent's consent
to his child living in California does not support California's assertion of jurisdiction);
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (in products liability action,
foreseeability that a product will enter the forum is not enough to sustain personal jurisdiction over the regional distributor).
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rule39 or the most significant relationship to a standard of reasonableness. In this sense, Allstate may serve as a precedent that functionally
integrates the jurisdictional rule of reason of the Tentative Draft of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and the reason and rationality presumed to repose in modern conflict of laws doctrine in the
United States.
One can therefore agree with the position taken by McDougal and
Jasper that the recurrent problem of jurisdiction in both public and
private international law is "allocating among states of the world the
competence to make and apply law to the transnational events that
effect them." ' In this view, the competence to make law and apply law
"requires a nice calculation of the differential impact of transnational
activities, irrespective of the state or non-state character of the actors,
upon the members, resources, and institutions of different states.""'
One might add that the fundamental objective of such a system would
hardly be defensible if it did not aspire to rational allocation in the
common interest. One then may appreciate not only the significance of
private international law in its world order context,'" but also generate
39. For examples of the use of the better rule concept, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (court willing to apply more progressive rules
concerning insurance warranties); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (refusal to apply a New York statute which would bar plaintiff's recovery). See generally A.
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

100-03 (1967 & Special Part with E. Jayme

1973).
40. McDougal & Jasper, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Some Sug-

gested Amendments, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS
NATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1981, at 6 (M. Landwehr ed. 1982).

AND SOLUTIONS IN INTER-

41. Id.
42. The role of PIL in economic and social development is still little understood or
appreciated. The late Professor Otto Kahn-Freund speculated on the interdependence of
particular rules of PIL and the particular environmental conditions in the United States
and the United Kingdom and emerged with some interesting insights. For example, the
United Kingdom, a state with a growing population, could maintain the supremacy of
the lex domicilii in determining the validity of a multistate marriage and thus retain
doctrinal symmetry over the PIL rules governing marriage. In the United States, the
internal migratory patterns, "as a normal mode of existence for millions," would have
placed on American judges "insuperable difficulties if they tried to find out where the
thousands of immigrants and internal migrants had been domiciled at the time of their
marriage." 0. KAHN-FREUND, SELECTED WRITINGS 322 (1978). Again, we find in the area
of PIL and torts that the United States rule owed its development to conditions of "the
age of industrialisation, of the motorization of transport, of mass media communication."
Id. at 323. As for English law, the English courts played an insular role, resulting in great
difficulties later "for industry, for transport, for liability insurance." Id. Professor KahnFreund found that in the area of PIL business transactions, the English contracts rule
was more coherent and functional than the American rule because of the size and complexity of English international commerce and its preeminence in international trade. Id.
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ideas about its potential for an even greater contribution to the realization of a world order committed to justice under law. This perspective
furthers the pacific settlement of multigroup disputes; it also moves
towards a deparochialization of many of the agencies of national decision that make and apply so-called PIL by focusing on the transnational character of decision and by bringing to bear on those decision
that condition the deprocesses prescriptions of international society
43
dignity.
human
and
rights
human
of
livery
This article seeks to establish that one can develop a coherent,
unified, comprehensive, and realistic approach to PIL problems. Past
theories of PIL will be examined and compared toward that end. As
both public and private international law are deemed in this study to
be complementary and indispensible parts of a more comprehensive
process of authoritative decision, the standards used to appraise past
theories about PIL are basically the same as those used to evaluate
theories about international law in general. 4 It will be seen that past
theories, while perhaps at one time progressive in nature, are now limited in both their perspectives and utility, for these individual schools
fall short of a comprehensive theory about PIL.
Contributions of past theories have sought to localize PIL
problems and their solutions by directing theory construction to connecting links between problems, parties, and groups. Past theories have
all contributed to a deeper understanding of the subject. For example,
theories have focused on territoriality, personality, political and cultural affiliation, political authority (sovereignty), reciprocity (comity),
and international obligation (vested rights) as guides to understanding
and justifying the formulation and application of PIL. Modern theories
have concentrated more on the nature and role of those charged with
judicial decision-making and have been concerned about why a judge
should ever displace the law of the forum. Such theories have directed
attention to the relationship of the courts (the legal process approach)
and, grudgingly, other mechanisms of decision to social, political, and
economic interests involved in decisions about PIL. Yet these individualistic boons constitute only pieces of a comprehensive theory of PIL.
As a counterpoint to the piecemeal attempts of the past, this article
will present a comprehensive analysis of PIL and the choice of law
problems through the application of policy-oriented jurisprudential
43. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
44. See supra note 43. See also McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188
(1968).
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concepts. Before reviewing these existing theories and offering a contextual alternative, the following section will set out in preliminary
form the broad structural outlines of a PIL paradigm.
II.
A.

FACTUAL OUTLINE OF A

PIL

PARADIGM

The Relevant Social and Political Background

A seemingly innocent PIL problem can be transformed into conundrums of almost limitless complexity by the mere addition of "foreign elements." A simple hypothetical will serve to illustrate both the
simplicity of a conflict of laws problem viewed factually and the complexity of analysis it might encompass when seeking its resolution.
Consider the case of In Re Schneider's Estate.4" A naturalized American citizen of Swiss origin died in New York County leaving real property located in Switzerland as an asset in his will. This disposition of
the property by testamentary act was contrary to Swiss internal law, as
that law conferred a right on the "legitime," the legitimate heir, to a
specified fraction of the decedent's property. 46 The disposition of an
"immovable" is ordinarily adjudicated by the lex situs. The realty,
however, had been liquidated and the administratrix of the probate
proceedings transmitted the proceeds to New York. 47 These proceeds
were subsequently included in the accounting of the estate assets.48
Switzerland apparently would apply the law of the domiciliary.
Viewed in factual terms, the problem is a simple one. The administratrix wants to execute the decedent's will. Particular state laws may
differ on the character and scope of such a proceeding. A decisional
response might be formulated to accord with community policies of the
different states ostensibly "interested" in the problem. These policies
might, for instance, prescribe what the nature of state intervention
ought to be with respect to the decedent's autonomy in matters of testate succession.
A New York court seized of the problem presupposes a number of
things in its disposition of the matter. First, it implies that the American forum had "judicial jurisdiction" over the parties and the subject
matter, and second, that the court had "law-making jurisdiction" to
adjudicate the claims with the result that the decision would be
45. 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd on rehearing,100 N.Y.S.2d 371
(1950) (the court held that under Swiss law the proceeds of the sale of the Swiss realty
would be distributed according to the internal law of New York, and that under New
York law no impediment existed to disposition described by the will).
46. Id. at 1019, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
47. Id. at 1020, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
48. Id. at 1025-26, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
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honored or deferred to by the state in which the realty was situated or
by the state of the decedent's nationality or domicile. Thus, one is concerned with two kinds of power related competences: law-applying
competence involving jurisdiction and judgments; and law-making or
prescribing competence concerned with the substantive criteria of
choice to determine who wins and who loses.
The court in this case first asserted judicial jurisdiction, or a lawapplying competence because the decedent had died within an arena
over which New York courts traditionally claim judicial jurisdiction.
The New York court did not defer to the jurisdictional authority of
Switzerland. In addition, the New York court entertained a claim to
law-making jurisdiction; the court chose not to honor Swiss policy but
to prescribe its own "choice of law" policy. An initial stratum of analytical complexity is encountered because New York law requires the
New York court to defer to the law-prescribing competence of Switzerland. Further complicating the problem,
Swiss law would defer to the
49
prescribing competence of New York.
The case represents an example of the doctrine of renvoi, as the
New York decisionmaker is trapped in a circular rule requiring him to
defer to the law of another forum, which in turn refers him back to
New York law. What are his options? First, if he applies New York
law, he is formally violating Swiss law. To make matters worse, he
could formally violate his own law, as well as that of Switzerland, by
applying internal Swiss law."0 If such a problem is at all instructive, it
is because it illustrates how the complexities of a PIL problem can result in the dangers of both mechanical jurisprudence and of excessive
formalism. 51 A mechanical honoring of prescribing competences can
have theoretical and practical drawbacks, since honoring a prescribing
competence ostensibly avoids the question of the content of prescription and its impact upon a multistate social process.
1. The Social Process Context
The Schneider case provides a convenient example for setting out
in brief preliminary form the social and political context of PIL. The
key societal bases of PIL can be derived from the obvious assumption
that a PIL outcome presupposes the existence of society, i.e., a social
process. In order for such a process to function at all, an assurance of
49. Id. at 1026, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 661.

50. Id.
51. Creation of harmony of law is one of the ultimate goals of PIL. For examples of
excessive formalism, see Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288,170 A.2d 726 (1961); Brook
v. Brook, [1861-73] All E.R. 493; Hyde v. Hyde, reprinted in [1861-73] All E.R. 175.
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basic security is required for the participants. The condition of basic
security may be described as the "minimum order" dimension, a dimension that can only be established and maintained by the collective
action of, or control by, human aggregates. The power required to establish and maintain the integrity of any human aggregate invariably
requires the formation of a "group." Power is then mainly a function of
group behaviors.
The essential precondition of PIL might be conceptualized in
terms of a model of the world social process generating the power outcomes necessary for the minimum conditions that buttress collective
security and the pursuit of basic social objectives in groups. The exercise of group power may be observed in terms of power-actors defined
mainly by reference to the interrelated notions of group, community,
functional community, nation, state, tribe, clan, or family. The family
may be seen as a functional group in the sense that it is a power instrument whose principal goal value is specialized, in part, to effectuate the
allocation of affective sentiments. The social and power preconditions
of PIL may be vividly abstracted from the case of inheritance across
state lines. In effect, the claimants are making competing demands as
to whether the law of the New York "group" or the Swiss "group"
should control the disposition of the property. The power complexities
of this problem are readily apparent.
It will be seen from the above model that the rules of PIL, viewed
functionally, allocate law-making and law-applying competencies between concerned jurisdictions. Fundamentally, this allocation is a function of control and authority-of group power in a broad sense. Empirically, power is an outcome of social process, and world power
outcomes similarly result from the nature of the world social process.
Indeed, it may be said that one of the significant outcomes of the world
process is the claim to power made by elites who largely control and
regulate groups, formed by them from bases of power, in which group
related behaviors loom large. These claims usually concern control over
people, events, or land and other resources. When allocations relating
to such claims are reciprocally honored with a high degree of frequency
and the expectations of various power-brokers are stabilized in patterns of recurring practices, we refer to this process as a constitutive
process.52
52. See Jenks, Some Structural Dilemmas of World Organization, 3 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1, 11 (1974). "The decentralized structure of world organization has become far
more complex than could then have been envisaged." Id. (referring to the framing of the
Charter of the U.N.). According to Jenks, the decentralized system "is the outcome of
deliberate decisions of policy at the highest level ... among governments .... " Id. at
12. See also McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12. The constitutive process is

N.Y.J.

INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 3

The factual predicate of any workable theory of or about PIL must
ultimately reflect relative stability in expectation about the allocation
of power or competence to make and apply law to events, persons, and
values over which control is shared by more than one state. This is the
factual background for the legal myth and operational basis of the outcome of social process called PIL. Because of the "group" nature of the
processes of interaction that make for PIL outcomes, the process may
be described as being composed of consociational elements, 3 one in
which humans functioning mainly through "groups" as individuals and
aggregates seek values through institutions based on resources. These
processes cut across group lines. As has been stressed, one of the salient value processes in these interactions concerns the power or competence of authority structures to prescribe and apply policy for the allocation of values between all groups whether they be territorial or
part of a more inclusive concept: the public order. The public order embraces all value
patterns and institutions of social process. The process that formalizes and ritualizes
expectations about value patterns and institutions specialized to power is designated as
the constitutive process. Id. at 277.
53. On the notion of consociation, see generally Lijphart, Consociational Democracy,
21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969). See also Daalder, The ConsociationalDemocracy Theme, 26
WORLD POL. 604 (1974). The two key themes in the notion of consociational democracy
are (1) group dynamics and (2) allocation of power. The idea incorporates probably all of
the following: "vertical pluralism," "segmented pluralism," "social fragmentation," "ideological compartmentalization," "verzuiling" (pillarization) and more. Id. at 606. The
model of consociational democracy tends to "show a curious mixture of ideological intransigence on the one hand and pragmatic political bargaining on the other. Separatism
makes for a dogmatic, expressive style of politics within ideological families. But relations among subcultures are settled by a .process of careful and businesslike adjustments." Id. at 607. See generally L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE
THEORY (1971). Daalder continues:
[C]onsociational democracy tends to have an extensive network of functional organizations within ideological families, which allows a means of controlled representation for special interests. The prevalance of myriad ideological organizations is therefore not necessarily a sign of impending battle. Rather, it provides
the organizational infrastructure on which elites can operate in an atmosphere of
discretionary freedom, coupled with a fair guarantee of consensus. In the view of
some authors, such ideologically separate groups also help to minimize opportunities of conflict: "good social fences," in Lijphart's words, "may make good political neighbors."
Daalder, supra, at 608.
A major weakness in the typological model of consociational democracy is its reticence on why and how such consociational systems develop. Major exponents of its development have included such scholars as Arend Lijphart. See, e.g., A. LIJPHART, THE
POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS

(1968).

The most refined answer is proffered in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12;
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Process of Effective Power (available in the
Offices of the New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
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functional. It is the group basis of global political society that is accordingly emphasized. As Earl Latham put it: "The conclusion emerges
from an inspection of the literature dealing with the structure and the
process of groups that, insofar as they are organized groups, they are
structures of power. They are structures of power because they concentrate human wit, energy, and muscle for the achievement of received
purposes. '" 5i He went on to add that the group and the state were of
"the same genus"55 and that "the state as an association (or group) is
not different from other associations, like churches or trade unions.
That which puts both state and nonstate associations in the same category of forms is the common factor of power.""
If there is a key structural dimension that aids in understanding
the social process background of PIL, it is the concept of the "group"
at whatever level of simplicity or complexity it is defined. The location
of any discrete group in space and through time, in proximity to other
groups, it is suggested, is a consociative process. This makes PIL a politically important outcome with far-reaching potentials for a just and
humane world public order.
The microcomponent of any group process through time is the primary self and all that it includes. When a number of primary selves
succeed in including diversified perspectives and operations into 5 a7
more inclusive definition of the self, we have a "group" formation.
This means the individual may have a multiplicity of group lives engendering identifications that vary in degrees of inclusivity or exclusivity, identifications that vary in frequency, intensity, and duration of
the pattern through time. The expansions and contractions of the selfsystem withdrawing from and associating with different groups are reproduced at every level of social organization."8 The structural dimen54. Latham, The Group Basis of Politics:Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
376, 382 (1952).

55. Id.
56. Id. "The chief social values cherished by individuals in modern society are realized through groups." Id. at 376. See also D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
(1951); V. KEY, PoLrrCs AND PREssuRE GROUPS (1958); Nagan, The Black American Re-

action to Apartheid, 4 IssuE 25 (1974). Groups may, of course, be complex or simple.
57. See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIETr 29-51 (1963). "Groups are
formed by integrating diversified perspectives and operations. The effect of a group on
values is determined in part by morale, which in turn is affected by permeability and
circulation in the group." Id. at 29. "A group is an organized aggregate. An associationis
a highly organized group, a demigroup one with a lower degree of organization." Id. at
31.
58. The dynamic fluidity of components of the global constitutive process is well defined in Hertz, Rise and Demise of the TerritorialState, 9 WORLD POL. 473 (1957). This
article emphasizes, in particular, those changes in the global process that have affected in
some degree the conditions of power related outcomes. "Now that power can destroy
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sions of multiple identification outcomes have shaped what Pospisil"s
has called the multiplicity of legal systems within social systems of
whatever level of inclusivity and complexity. 0
The microcomponent of any group is the individual. Just as individuals identify and affiliate with multiple groups, individuals and associations of individuals advance their objectives through specialized
institutions cutting across and impacting upon other group-based
processes. Such institutions may specialize in the shaping and sharing
of power outcomes. Such institutions include wealth generating associations like multi-national corporations, affection generating units
like the family, knowledge generating institutions like international
universities, rectitude purveying institutions like the church, and
health-generating institutions like the modern hospital.
Generally, when the pursuit of values through institutions becomes highly structured, and when resort to them is a recurrent outcome of the social process, such a set of patterned and specialized
practices may be designated an operation. The comparative law component of PIL outcomes is apparent when one discerns that such operations may be usefully compared and contrasted cross-culturally, or
across group lines, according to the degree to which they facilitate the
shaping and sharing of demanded values in the common interest. A
decisionmaker in PIL, seized of a claim having a foreign element, inevitably makes choices that directly compare and weigh the relative effipower from center to center, everything is different." Id. at 489. See also Kaplan, Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of InternationalSystems, 51 Am. POL. ScI.
REv. 684 (1957). Kaplan notes that within the structure of the international system:
Functional lines of organization are stronger than geographical lines. . . .Functional cross-cutting makes it most difficult to organize successfully against the
international system or to withdraw from it. Even if the constitution of the system were to permit the withdrawal, the integration of facilities over time would
raise the costs of withdrawal too high.
Id. at 694. It is this "integration of facilities over time" that is the core subject of the
PIL dimension. Id.
59. Pospisil, Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies, 11
J. CoNFLicT RESOLUTION 2 (1967). Pospisil's basic thesis is that "[e]very functioning subgroup of a society has its own legal system which is necessarily different in some respects
from those of other subgroups." Id. at 9. Pospisil concludes in this regard that:
Consequently, law in a given society differs among groups of the same inclusiveness (within the same legal level); thus different laws are applied to different
individuals. Law also exhibits discrepencies between legal systems of subgroups
of different inclusiveness (between different legal levels), with the consequences
that the same individuals may be subject to several legal systems different in the
context of their law to the point of contradiction.
Id.
60. See generally A SOCIOLOGICAL READER ON COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (A. Etzioni 2d
ed. 1969).
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ciency of institutional practices by which values are principally realized
in transgroup contexts. Such decisions also have impact upon net value
gains and losses of the public order as a whole.
The social process background of PIL contains, therefore, the operation of power-conditioned behaviors across group and state lines.
The "constitutional" design" of such power-group perspectives and
practices, in a world-wide sense, encompasses the central characteristics about how law is made and applied in the international society.
Viewed in this light, PIL represents outcomes of the larger world process of authoritative decision concerned with the allocation of lawmaking and law-applying competencies across group and state lines. In
this sense, PIL is not a body of law distinct from international law. It
is an indispensible and complementary component of the larger world
process of authoritative decision called international law. It should be
noted again that this focus of inquiry belies the distinction often made
between the so-called internal conflicts problems of pluralistic states
and those of the international system. As both internal and international conflicts problems deal with factual claims for the allocation of
values cutting across group and state lines, the demands concerning
power and justice maintain essentially the same generic constitutive
and public order dimensions.
The Schneider case, then, is about international law. The case
shows the complexity that must inevitably engulf a decisionmaker who
endeavors to account for transgroup power arrangements and still tries
to honor demands for individual justice. The problems that may be
encountered in the manipulation of doctrine (renvoi in this case) often
reflect an excessive, if not irrational preoccupation with power accommodations (mechanical reciprocal tolerances). Less concern is sometimes accorded to an estimate of the net gains and losses to the parties
and the larger public order in the exercise of choice.
2.

The Basic Political Context

PIL then is a response to claims in which a particular state, whose
decision apparatus is not formally seized of the problem and does not
have immediate de facto control over the relevant participants or subject matter, nevertheless maintains a demand through a claimant that
some other state, which is seized of the problem and does exercise control over the parties and subject matter, should yield its competence.
Such a claim implies an expectation, under certain conditions, that reciprocal tolerances be part of the criteria of decision. Reciprocal toler61.

See generally M. McDouGAL & W.M. REISMAN, supra note 16, at 1271-1551.
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ances enhance conditions of stability of expectation in the exchange of
goods and services across state and national lines.
When a state defers to the law-making and law-applying competencies of another state, such deference is influenced greatly by the
expectation of reciprocity in the event that the pattern of control is
reversed in the future. The exercise of mutual restraint implies that
the expectation of reciprocal tolerances is meant to avoid the parochialism of prospective retaliation which could have a detrimental effect
on value exchanges impacting across state and group lines. Expectations of restraint and reciprocal tolerances are crucial factors in the
authority component of transnational or transgroup decision. Indeed,
the predominant trend of decision in PIL has entrusted an extraordinary sensitivity to the accommodation of power realities 62 in the interstate and international system. Moreover, if PIL were simply to underwrite retaliatory practices, the losses to vast sectors of transnational
interaction could be staggering in this interdependent world.
In the aggregate, PIL can be seen to represent an important outcome of the world process of authoritative decision. 63 The importance
62.

The literature on power in the international environment is extensive, although it

does not advert to PIL. See generally J. BURTON, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A GENERAL
THEORY (1965); I. CLAUDE, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1962); R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1970); D. EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1965); D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1979); W. Fox, THEORETICAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1959); R. GOLDWIN, READINGS IN WORLD POLITICS
(3d ed. 1970); S. HOFFMAN, CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1960);
S. HOFFMAN, THE STATE OF WAR (1965); K. HOLSTI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1967); E.
KIRNAN, THE LORDS OF HUMAN KIND (1972); K. KNORR, THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
(1961); H. LASSWELL, POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935); H. LASSWELL, POLITICS:
WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, AND How

(1936); R.

MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE

(1962); M.

MCCLELLAND, THE THEORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1966); R. MERRITT & S. ROKKAN, COMPARING NATIONS (1966); H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (4th ed.
1967); N. PADELFORD & G. LINCOLN, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2d ed.
1967); L. RICHARDSON, ARMS AND INSECURITY (1960); R. ROSENCRANCE, ACTION AND REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS (1963); B. RUSSETT, TRENDS IN WORLD POLITICS (1965); B. Russgrr, H. ALKER, JR., K. DEUTSCH & H. LASSWELL, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL INDICATORS (1965); J. SINGER, THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF HUMAN CONFLICT (1965);
H. SPROUT & M. SPROUT, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2d ed. 1962); 0.
YOUNG, SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1968); Carniero, A Theory of the Origin of the
State, 169 SCIENCE 722 (1970).

63.

See McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw upon National Law: A Policy

Oriented Perspective, in

STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

157, 185 (M. McDougal ed.

1960). McDougal states:
For regulation of the claims asserted by the various states to authoritative control over particular values changes, both within and beyond their territorial
boundaries, the general community of states prescribes an elaborate set of flexible and complementary doctrines, designed both to allow any particular state
substantially affected by events to assert its authority over such events and yet
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of PIL to the public order of the world community can be more fully
appreciated when its international significance is considered.6 4 Linked
as it is to global interdependence and interdetermination, PIL performs an important function in facilitating the exchange of goods and
services and the movement of human beings across state and community lines." From an observer's point of view, PIL encapsulates value
to achieve a compromise between conflicting claims in a public order which will
permit the world's work to get on. One set of prescriptions, sometimes called the
"bases" of jurisdiction-the principle of territoriality, the principle of nationality, the principle of universality, and other principles-authorizes states which
have secured a degree of effective control over persons or resources to exercise
their authority, under stipulated conditions of significant impact upon national
values, to make and apply their law to certain particular events in which such
persons or resources have been involved. A second set of prescriptions requires
states, despite the fact that they may have acquired effective control over the
persons and resources involved, to yield that control in deference to the "acts of
state" or "immunities" of other states and to permit such states to make and
apply their law to the events in question. Still other prescriptions seek to individualize and make applicable the policies embodied in both sets of prescriptions, both those expressing the primary assertions of authority and those requiring deference to others, in a way to take into account the special
characteristics of the various spatial domains: land, the oceans, air space, and
outer space. The function of all these various prescriptions is not arbitrarily to
dictate decision but rather to focus the attention of decision-makers upon all the
significant features of a context in controversy and to assist in assessment of the
varying relevance and importance of such features in determining degree of impact upon national values. The overriding policy infusing all prescriptions is that
of creating a stability in the expectations of state officials that the aggregate flow
of controversies will be handled in the "agreed" ways and, hence, that the officials may make their power, wealth, and other value calculations with minimum
disruption from arbitrary and unrestrained coercion and violence. The net effect
is, in sum, that a state substantially affected by any particular event is authorized to make and apply law for that event, upon condition that it take into account the degree of involvement of the values of other states in the same or
comparable events, and that the community of states as a whole achieve a measure of subordination to public order of other participants-individuals, -private
associations, pressure groups, and parties-in a relatively ordered exploitation of
the world's resources, sharable and nonsharable.
Id. See also R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAW; OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1901). Minor
suggests that PIL is an "answer to the demands of justice and an enlightened policy." Id.
at 5.
McDougal briefly analyzes PIL from his policy orientated perspective in McDougal,
The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarificationas an Instrument of Democratic World Order, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 947, 967 (M. McDougal ed. 1960).
64. See P. KALENSKY, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). Kalensky asserts that "internationality" is an essential component of PIL without which "this law
would lose the raison d'etre of its existence." Id. at 16.
65. The need for PIL was not recognized in Medieval Europe; a time of slight eco-
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exchanges encompassing various phases of every value process.
3.

The Salience of Multi-State Power and the Constitutive Process

When people make claims that cut across group lines, they entertain an expectation that they may appeal to structures of authority, at
whatever level of formality, to respond to those claims. This means
claimants have expectations that some kind of lawful response will derive from decision-structures that are established and maintained by
some kind of transgroup constitutive process. Indeed, this in fact is a
major purpose of what Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman
call an unwritten and thoroughly decentralized world constitutive process."6 An essential social process condition of a PIL outcome is that
control over people, events, and resources through space and time is ex
hypothesi shared. Shared controls sensitize power-brokers to the limits
of coercion or naked power, because in the crudest sense, the prospect
of retaliation usually reduces the cost effectiveness of its utilization."
nomic intercourse between nations. The need for such rules arose with "the revival of
commerce, the surer guaranties offered for the safety of travelers by reason of the more
orderly condition of the European States, the more frequent intercourse between nations, and the advancement of conceptions of justice and order .... " R. MINOR, supra
note 63, at 1. See also J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916).

[A]nd now that our whole manner of life is based upon exchange of products
between nations, a body of legal principles to regulate international judicial relations is as supremely needed as a similar body of principles to give effect to
ordinary contracts or protect ordinary property. International commerce is necessary to modern civilization; and "international commerce would be impossible
if there did not exist a law which has for its object and effect to favor the international extension of human activity."
Id. at 5.
66. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12.
67. PIL as an outcome of the global social process may usefully be viewed as being
concerned with responding by control and regulation to several major features of human
behavior in groups. Professor Boulding conceptualizes these in terms of threats, bargains
and integrated relations. See Boulding, Toward a Theory of Peace, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (R. Fisher ed. 1964).
In a threat situation, groups are organized around a deterrent and retaliatory
relationship: Do what I wish (or forbear from activity which I disapprove), or I'll
do something nasty to you. In a bargaining relationship, groups are organized
around an agreement as to what each party shall give and take, or perform and
receive, in a transaction: You do something nice for me, and I'll do something
nice for you. An integrative relationship entails the incorporation of parts into a
new whole, with ends and characteristics separate and distinct from the parts. In
such a situation, the parts, while generally retaining their differences, are so
structured as to function as a coordinate, harmonious unity. Integration in this
sense is often compared to the Biblical concept of a marriage, in which the part-
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When, however, a decisionmaker seeks to honor such a claim, the
challenge to transgroup law-making becomes acute. If he were to ignore
the multistate aspect of the problem and prescribe law identified with
his own "group," he runs the risk that the other group sharing a concurrent or sequential competence to prescribe may respond in kind: lex
talionis. The power process may establish and maintain structures of
transgroup authority that support the ideology of unilateralism. Often,
however, workings or outcomes of the system have, in the aggregate,
been significantly different. The avoidance of parochialism and chauvinism in PIL appears, on the whole, to have been an influential and
important community expectation in a decentralized world decisionmaking process. Indeed, an elaborate superstructure of symbol and
myth has been established in PIL and other allied fields that enables
groups having formal and effective control over claim precipitating
events to honor each other's law-applying and/or law-prescribing
competences.
B. Nature of Prescriptive Process in PIL
1. Claim, Decision, and the Choice of Law Process
PIL claims always involve the assertion of applicative and prescriptive competencies. Hence, in responding to a PIL claim, a decisionmaker has to give particular attention to the prescribing and applying decision functions. When a claimant makes a demand on a state
to honor another state's prescribing competence, the decisionmaker
should be aware that the existence of a foreign element does not mean
that he has an obligation to honor that demand. A distinction should,
in the first instance, be drawn between a claim for competence and a
decisional response thereto.
Judges and scholars have long struggled with the problem of
"choice of law," viz., when, why, and how a decisionmaker should or
should not honor the law-making competence of another state. Various
theories have been advanced to explain the nature of such a decision,
such as comity, territorial sovereignty and vested rights, and the local
law theory, to name a few. 8 These theories were often question-begners, while retaining their individuality, achieve a union the source and animating principle of which seems shrouded in mystery.
Wood, Public Order and Political Integration in Contemporary InternationalTheory,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 423, 423 (1974).
68. See infra Section IV. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). According
to Chief Justice Warren, the applicative competence of a state court "is limited by the
extent of its power and by the coordinate authority of sister States." Id. at 246. See also
the cases cited in this connection: Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942);
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ging and told little about the who, how, when, why, and which of the
choice of law process. Under the traditional approach, the choice of law
problem did not adequately inform decisionmakers about the conditions under which they should honor another state's law. These questions go to the nature of the choice of law process itself: Why should a
court honor the law-making competence of another state? What methodologies of decision, informed by what criteria of choice, should a
decisionmaker embrace to honor law-making and law-applying competencies in the most desirable way?
To answer these questions one must recognize that what is called
PIL is in reality a response to certain types of claims that are outcomes
of the social process. It will be shown that maintaining a distinction
between the processes of claim and decision enables one to share
deeper insights into the nature of PIL, and more particularly, the
choice of law process, or more broadly, the prescribing process.
2.

Process of Claim

The process of claim in PIL encapsulates all phases of all value
processes. For example, claims may be made for wealth, power, respect,
affection, rectitude, skill, well-being, and enlightenment. As an illustration, claims relating to the affection process may be made with reference to participants, perspectives, base values, situations, strategies,
outcomes, and effects. The structure of a PIL claim invariably involves
greater complexity than a claim in which anticipated satisfaction is
confined to the internal value processes of a single state. This complexity is highlighted by the fact that PIL claims may involve both primary
and secondary assertions about the allocation of applicative and prescriptive competences.
a. Claims relating to applicative competencies
Claims are made for and about applicative competencies in PIL.
These claims broadly cover demands relating to the allocation of adjudicatory competencies such as judicial jurisdiction, judgments, and the
honoring of foreign judgments. In the PIL context, claims relating to a
law-applying competence usually emerge as claims for the assertion of
primary and secondary competencies. A claim relating to a primary applicative competence is a demand that a law-applying competence be
directly exercised. Those relating to a secondary assertion of a law-applying competence demand that a state honor or defer to the law-applying competencies of another state, or that such a competence be
Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1900); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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indirectly exercised.
b. Claims relating to prescriptive competencies
Claims relating to a competence to prescribe policy cover essentially the law-making function and in PIL are roughly equivalent to
claims associated with the choice of law process. Claims relating to a
prescriptive competence also have a primary and secondary character.
Primary prescriptive competencies contain the demand that the decisional forum itself exercise a direct law-making competence. Those relating to a secondary competence demand that deference be given to
the law-making competencies of another state.
3.

The Process of Decision Relating to Prescriptive Competence

PIL claims require decisions of extraordinary complexity. A detailed decisional model based on the decision functions distilled by the
New Haven School of International Law is set out in the following
chapter.6 9 At this time, a provisional overview of this model is given in
order to more fully illuminate the context and the character of one
aspect of PIL, the choice of law process.
The decision-making process in PIL represents a complex of three
types of decisions germane to almost any PIL problem. First, there are
the basic public order decisions determining how substantive values
are allocated across state lines. Second, there are the constitutive decisions which deal with the establishment and maintenance of structures
of authority on the transstate level. In PIL, these decisions deal mainly
with the expectations of reciprocal tolerances. Third, there are the
civic order decisions in which "individual" claims to the shaping and
sharing of values receive high deference in public order and constitutive process priorities. 0
69. See infra Section IV.
70. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 8, at 465-66, 799802, 801 n.5, 815-60.
By civic order ...
we refer to the features of social process that are cultivated
and sustained by recourse to relatively mild rather than severe sanctions. It is
the domain of social process in which the individual person is freest from coercion, governmental or other, and in which a high degree of individual autonomy
and creativity prevails. Civic order thus includes all of the.processes and institutions of private choice, as distinguished from public decision. The core reference
of civic order is ... to freedom of choice for participation in each of the value
processes ....
[T]he focus here is upon a freedom of choice not involving immediate and particular public decision; our concern is for the larger flow of decision protecting aggregate patterns of freedom of choice for all individuals and
groups. The distinctive reference of civic order is to the totality of freedom of

N.Y.J.

INT'L & COMp. L.

[Vol. 3

All critical decision functions are relevant to the making and the
applying of law in PIL. They embrace all relevant intellectual tasks
such as clarification of policy, trend studies, analysis of trends, prediction of trends, and alternative scenarios, in addition to specialized decision functions of intelligence, promoting, prescribing, invoking, applying, terminating, and appraising. 7 Of these important decision
functions, the applicative and prescriptive functions perform unique
constitutive and public order functions in PIL.7s A fuller appreciation
of how these functions are discharged in this area is the key to understanding the conceptual basis of PIL.
Traditional theories in this area have sought to avoid an overt concern for substantive results by giving little weight to all of the complex
phases of the prescribing process of PIL. Here, judges and theorists
have often subscribed to the myth that judges "find" law. Indeed,
judges often purport to "find" the law by giving an exaggerated significance to decision functions more closely allied to the applicative deciof PIL decisionsion function. Professor Cavers described this method
73
making as the "jurisdiction selecting formula.
C.

The Nature and Challenge for Decision in the Choice of Law
Process
To truly understand the choice of law decision in PIL, one must

choice achieved or achievable in a community.
Id. at 815-16.
71. See, e.g., Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L.
REv. 362 (1971); Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1 (1972); McDougal,
Law as a Process of Decision, 1 NAT. L. F. 53 (1956); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman,
supra note 44; McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12; Reisman, A Theory About
Law From the Policy Perspective, in LAW AND POLICY 75 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976).
72. The prescriptive function "Ipiroject[s] authoritative policies," Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 385 (1971), and "is the
crystallization of general policy in continuing authoritative community expectations,"
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 192. The applicative function has been
defined as the "final characterization of concrete circumstances according to prescriptions," id., and the "[flinal characterization and execution of a prescription in a concrete
situation," Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv.
362, 387 (1971). For an example of the application of human rights prescriptions, see
McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387 (1974). See also
McDougal, The Application of Constitutive Prescriptions: An Addendum to Justice
Cardozo, 33 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 255 (1978). The terms prescriptive and applicative competence are also used in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 17-20 (1965).
73. See D. CAvES, supra note 3.
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consistently maintain the perspective of an observer. One must attempt to distinguish between the interactor's perspectives (including
those of observers), claimants, and decisionmakers. In dealing with
PIL's choice of law aspects, it should be noted that the outcomes of the
interaction process lead to claims. PIL is a decisional response to these
claims. It should be first noted that when one deals with what is traditionally called choice of law he is dealing with prescription, and more
specifically, prescription by essentially one agency of decision: the
courts. One should be fully aware at the outset that prescription is a
broader, richer notion in this field, and that an accurate description of
prescription would include both the formal and the living law. This
means, in practical terms, that many participants at multiple levels of
decision participate in the making and, indeed, application of multistate law. The focus of the courts in the analysis that follows underscores only that the formalized doctrines have been most visibly expressed in that arena.
When a party has a claim, in this context, what is demanded in
judicially controlled arenas is that a state, or group other than the
forum state, has the competence to prescribe policy relative to the
claim. For instance, the demand may be that State A honor a contract,
which is against its policy, because State B has the competence to prescribe whether the contract is enforceable and would regard such an
agreement as enforceable. The claim that a contract be honored has a
two-fold aspect. First, it is a claim relating to competence or power.
What is communicated is a claim that the decisionmaker in State A
does or does not have a direct law-making competence to prescribe policy. Second, the claim involves a demand for wealth-that a contract is
or is not enforceable. KnQwing what is demanded is important to decision-making, because it assists the decisionmaker in limiting the scope
of the decisional response to the actual demand.
Constraints upon how claims for value are communicated to a
decisionmaker have had a significant influence upon the scope of the
choice of law problems presented for adjudication and upon the comprehensiveness of decisional responses. Consider, for example, constraints placed on pleadings, which are essentially a form of communicating demands. Traditionally, a claim had to be molded in such a
manner as to fall within a writ, or form of action, provided by the "sovereign." This formulary system gave way to more flexible modes of
communicating a claim to a decisionmaker, and the phrase "form of
action" was replaced by the idea of a "cause of action." While an improvement, this latter concept was insufficiently flexible to enable a
decisionmaker to focus on the factual aspect of a claim. New rules of
procedure in the United States and many other countries have sought
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to avoid these medieval ghosts by adopting a new system of procedure,
notice pleading, which merely demands that the claimant communicate
a short statement of claim showing that he is entitled to relief. 4 This
overview of pleadings simply demonstrates that the more formalistic
the process by which a claim is communicated, the less leeway a decisionmaker has to focus on the claim's factual dimensions. Thus, in
choice of law, this has often meant that the problem was inadequately
delimited as presented for a decisional response to claims reflecting a
demand that the court select jurisdiction A or jurisdiction B to supply
the rule of decision.
Basically, a scientific observer would seek to understand problems
in empirical terms. The influence of the formulary system of pleadings
in Anglo-American jurisdictions would have made this a more difficult
undertaking. PIL problems in the courts appear in the past to have left
undifferentiated the distinctions between claim and decision, making it
difficult to get an adequate description of the process. It should be recognized that the claim emerges, inter alia, as a demand for reciprocity.7 5 The decision represents the making and application of transgroup
74. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain . . . (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief
75. The concept of reciprocity is considered by some anthropologists to be a foundation of social interaction in any social process. The most influential exposition of this
idea is found in M. MAuss, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAFiC
SOCIETY (I. Cunnison trans. 1967). According to Professor Evans Pritchard, this book is
the "first systematic and comparative study of the widespread custom of gift exchange
and the first understanding of its function in the articulation of social order." Id. at ix.
The fundamental problem addressed by Mauss was to explalin why "presentations which
are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous" turn out to be "in fact obligatory
and interested." Mauss continues: "The form usually taken is that of the gift generously
offered; but the accompanying behavior is formal pretense and self deception, while the
transaction is itself based on obligation and economic self interest. . . . What is the
principle whereby the gift received has to be paid? What force is there in the thing given
which compels the recipient to make a return?" Id. at 1.
The idea of reciprocity implicit in the answer to the above questions gains social and
political significance because in reality there is a deeply rooted concept of cooperation in
the folkways of the masses, who "know their own interest and the common interest better than their leaders do." Id. at 76. Mauss concludes that reciprocity is the fundamental
basis of social order within groups and across group lines. "Societies have progressed in
the measure in which they, their sub-groups and their members, have been able to stabilize their contracts and to give, receive and repay. In order to trade, man must first lay
down his spear. When that is done he can succeed in exchanging goods and persons not
only between clan and clan but between tribe and tribe and between nation and nation,
and above all between individuals. It is only then that people can create, can satisfy their
interests mutually and define them without recourse to arms. It is in this way that the
clan, the tribe and nation have learned-just as in the future the classes and nations and
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law. When a claim is made demanding a decisional forum to assert priindividuals will learn-how to oppose one another without slaughter and to give without
sacrificing themselves to others. That is one of the secrets of their wisdom." Id. at 8.
Practical illustrations of Mauss' theme are found in the institutions of potlatch
among the American Indians in the Pacific Northwest. The recipient was obligated to
take the gift and under an obligation to give something more in return at a potlatch of

the receiver. See id. at 3-5; P. Druker, The Potlatch, in TRIBAL AND PEASANT
READINGS IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 481-93 (G. Dalton ed. 1967).

ECONOMIES:

The modern literature on social exchange theory illustrates two basic approaches
that seem to represent an artifical polarization of the key ideas. The first perspective
influenced by Mauss and Durkheim, emphasized ideas of social solidarity and sees ex-

change as a function of social structure. See generally P. EKEH, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY: THE Two TRADITIONS (1974). The second basic approach argues for a more individualistic theory of social exchange. See generally P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL
(1967). These two basic approaches are mirrored in the conflicts about conflict of
laws theory. The most important dimension of this conflict is reflected in the mediation
between state power and individual rights (party autonomy) in the making and application of law across state lines.
Because of the importance of the concept of reciprocity to social process, some theorists regard reciprocal tolerances as representing a preemptory norm of social process.
According to Alan Gouldner, reciprocity is "a universal moral demand." Gouldner, The
Norm of Reciprocity, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 161-78 (1960). Cf. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 37, 37-57 (1971). A form of reciprocity reposes in
the doctrine of similarity of the conditions of liability. See, e.g., The Halley, 16 Eng. Rep.
514 (1868). The doctrine was rejected in the United States by Justice Cardozo in Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
The doctrine of renvoi, also incorporating policies implicit in reciprocity, has had an
active life in PIL. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1961); University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936); In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc.
1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd on rehearing, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950). See also P.
NORTH, supra note 1, at 61-76; Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938).
The role of reciprocity in the institutions of private law is ubiquitous. It forms the basis
of certain species of fiduciary relationships, the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, trusts
and the equity of redemption. Reciprocity permeates the "original" basis of contracts in
Germanic and Roman Law. See Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial
Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 619 (1954). Lenhoff includes many other examples from the
domain of Private Law institutions, including examples from such modern fields as Labor Relations Law. Examples of reciprocity in PIL abound, sustained in modern law in
part by the myth of the equality of states and in part by conditions of power. Id. at 622.
Schwarzenberger describes the principle of reciprocity as the foundation not only of international law but indeed of all law. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121
(1957).
The capacity of reprisal and retaliation under traditional international law is a well
established datum and the courts have been sensitive to these features of international
legal process. For example, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, Justice Jackson speaking for the
Court concerning the application of the Jones Act to a foreign seaman, stated the
following:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we forget
that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a
LIFE
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mary policy prescribing competence, or to honor the prescribing cornforeign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). In the United States the Constitution
provides many answers for securing reciprocal tolerances. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the fourteenth amendment all provide a fundamental law predicate to reciprocity. Additionally, there is a domain of state power that enables states within the
union to reciprocate or retaliate with respect to interests of a multistate character. See
Starr, Reciprocal and RetailiatoryLegislation in the American States, 21 MINN. L. REV.
371, 372 (1937).
Principles of comity in addition to the prescription implicit in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause have a respectable historical pedigree in federal-state PIL. The concept of
comitas gentium was widely accepted in both theoretical circles as well as in the judicial
process of 19th Century America. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). Story and
Wheaton made principles of reciprocity a major component of their theories. See J.
STORY,

supra note 1; H.

WHEATON, ELEMEsTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1936). Federal

statutes of the United States provide for international reciprocity in the following ways:
reciprocal elimination of duties on tonnage, 46 U.S.C. § 141 (1976); increase of taxes on
citizens of countries that impose "burdensome" or discriminatory taxes on our nations,
I.R.C. §§ 891, 896 (1976); reciprocal exclusion of earnings derived from foreign aircraft
and vessels from the gross income of foreign corporations, I.R.C. § 883 (1976).
State legislation that embodies the idea of interstate reciprocity seeks to deal with
questions such as admission of other states' citizenry to professions such as law or accounting, permission to engage in bonding or insurance businesses, and enforcement of
support orders or extradition demands. Some states deal directly with alien activity. The
Supreme Court considered a California statute in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947),
which provided that nonresident aliens could inherit personal property if a United States
citizen had a right to take property in the country where such aliens were inhabitants or
citizens. The Court upheld the statute because it did not conflict with any national
treaty, despite an incidental effect on foreign affairs. Cf. Justice Douglas' decision in
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down an Oregon inheritance statute
which in part required reciprocity before a nonresident alien could inherit real or personal property. The opinion distinguished Clark v. Allen).
On reciprocity, see Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function:A Problem of Conflict of Laws,
ConstitutionalLaw and internationalLaw, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 44 (1953); Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a PerennialIdea, 49 N.W.U. L. REv. 619 (1954); Russell,
Fluctuationsin Reciprocity, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 181 (1952); Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 371 (1937).
The classic study done on the role of reciprocity in American foreign trade is that of
Laughlin and Willis, J. LAUGHLIN & H. WILLIS, RECIPROCITY (1903). Other early works on
reciprocity in the area of international trade include G. BECKE'rr, THE RECIPROCAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (1941); P. BIDWELL, OUR TRADE WITH BRITAIN: BASES FOR A RECIPROCAL TARIFF AGREEMENT (19381. Professors Lasswell and Kaplan use the concept of
sanction within the framework of the law, science and policy conception of the power
process. See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 32. That is, the conception of sanction policy is seen in terms of both negative and positive sanctions. The objectives of
sanction law are formulated as those of prevention, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 345-46 (1961).
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petence of another state, that claim isolates a complex response by specifically referring to the prescribing function in the decision process.7 6
Community expectations about a decisional response to such a
claim would anticipate a policy projection formulated by decisionmakers for communication to a transgroup target audience, including the immediate participants. This would involve all phases of the
prescribing process, including: (1) initiation of the process; (2) exploration of potential transgroup facts and policies; (3) projection of policy
choices and their formulation as authoritative for the larger community; and (4) communication of prescriptive content and expectations
about authority and control.7
76. This analysis seeks to explain the relationship between law-making and the conditions of power in a multi-state, multi-national or multi-group world. When the level of
analysis shifts to the multinational or transnational context, the problem of law and
power becomes acute. Theorists who define law in terms of sanctions often use the notion of "sanction" as a synonym for "power," and view the concept of sanction and,
therefore, power in terms of the idea of "negative sanction." The more refined version of
the sanction theory and the nature of transnational law is based on the capacity for
retaliation. In this view, PIL would therefore be based on the notion of vengeance. Cf.,
W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970). These
authors view the idea of retribution as more accurate than either the ideas of retaliation
or vengeance, and it is clear that the notion of retribution is closer to the concept of
power than they appear to imply. They illustrate the many dimensions of power, viewed
here as retribution, as the following indicates:
Retribution
Reward
Benefitsfrom
Compliance

-

Sanction
Trade

Deprivation-of
Reward

Reparation

Penalty

These writers derive from this model the principle of reciprocity as one of the central ideas of modern international relations. This conclusion is meant to parallel Malinowski's concept of reciprocity as the key principle of law and life in primitive society.
See generally MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926). In H. LASSWELL & R. ARENS, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING FIELD OF SANCTION LAW
(1961), the authors have investigated the employment of "intellectual tools" and "modes
of practical action" with which to align sanctioning with the ideals of a democratic social
order (which is concerned with the individual).
77. See McDougal & Reisman, The PrescribingFunction in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 249
(1980). The problem of law making in public international law poses an equally difficult
problem in the domain of private international law. PIL theorists under the influence of
"dualism" have sought to radically dissociate its "law making process" from that of public international law. The objective here was to preserve PIL from the Austinian "nonlaw" wasteland. To this extent PIL theorists have been more successful than their public
international law counterparts. At least PIL has been able to avoid the stigma that it is
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The relationship between claimant and decisionmaker in the judicial process is more dynamic than an abstract notion of claim and decision might suggest. Although the concepts of claim, power, decision,
and prescription all intersect, each performs distinct functions in a
transgroup claim and bear upon the relationship between power and
reciprocity. Understanding this interplay in a transgroup context provides the key to understanding the choice of law process, which may be
illustrated as follows. The pleadings contain a demand that deference
be given to the prescribing competence of another state. These pleadings may be challenged, for example, by a general demurrer or its functional equivalent. 78 At the instant a preliminary challenge is made to
the substantive sufficiency of the pleadings, the decisionmaker's response involves exercising a law-making or prescribing competence of a
limited nature. Parenthetically, although the pleadings may also involve motion challenges to the court's jurisdictional or applicative competence, here the only concern is prescribing competence, or choice of
law. If the pleadings or the pretrial record survive, there is assurance
that decisional weight will be accorded the reference to "foreign law."
mere "positive morality." This has had the disadvantage, however, that less theorizing
has been done about the "prescriptive" basis of PIL and its relationship to public international law.
Once it is conceded that law-making across state and national lines is law-making, it
then becomes totally untenable to assume that the vast aggregate outcomes of PIL is not
part of an extremely complex prescribing process in the international legal arena. The
plain fact is that no recorded theorist has ever said that PIL law is not law. The private
and public spheres of the international legal arena share the same conceptual underpinnings and the same conditions of law-making of the international system, so that a fruitful and realistic focus of inquiry about the prescribing process may be established. Indeed, the great intellectual challenge has been to accurately describe and explain the
nature of law-making in the international legal system as a whole so that those charged
with the making and application of law in what is conventionally called the PIL arena
might better appreciate both the potential and the limitations of what they do. Reisman
and McDougal see all law-making in terms of communication strategy designed to instill
three basic expectations about the process of prescription. These co-axial expectations
may be set forth as follows:
(Policy Content)
Communicators (Authority Signal)
Target Audience
(Control Intention)
See also W.M. Reisman, International Law Making: A Process of Communication, Lasswell Memorial Lecture (delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, April 24, 1981).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6):
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . .
claim upon. which relief can be granted ....

.

(6) failure to state a
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This assurance accommodates a number of low visibility policies that
are rationally related to the entire prescription process, and are also
vital to the transgroup power process .7 If the decisionmaker formally
accepts the potential relevancy of foreign law, he makes the foreign
law, in effect, a component of the decision process. This preliminary
prescriptive outcome has important consequences for the transgroup
power process. By giving assurance that the foreign perspective will be
a serious component of decision, the decisionmaker avoids both the
problem of acquiring effective power to effectuate its decision and the
institutionalization of retaliation. This advances transgroup interests
in reciprocal tolerances and lays the groundwork for honoring the rational allocation of prescriptive competence across state lines.
A provisional prescriptive outcome that assures decisional weight
will be given to the foreign perspective leaves open the question of
what the content of the law-making function will actually be for communication to the parties and the transgroup audience. The key issue
for decision must therefore focus on the range and quality of decisional
indices a decisionmaker utilizes to make transgroup law."0
A great many writers have struggled with the choice of law problem and have emerged with some quite unclear formulations of decisional indices, in part, because they were wedded to the dualistic myth
of the transnational legal structure. Walter Wheeler Cook provides an
example. Cook claimed a court never formally honored foreign law, although practically it did.8 ' Paradoxically, he formulated this novel
79. These phases of prescription are generally determined after the pleadings are
filed, e.g., motion for judgment on the pleadings, or during, or after discovery, e.g., summary judgment.

80. Compare the formulations of L. PospisuL,

ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW:

A COMPARATIVE

(1971). Pospisil captures the complex accentuations and attenuations of intergroup power relationships in more general terms:
In the long perspective the center of power, of course, is not a static phenomenon. The relative amount of power at the various levels within a society (in the
different types of groups of varying inclusiveness) may diminish or increase, with
the result that the center of power (defined by the relative amount of control of
the various societal segments) may shift its position to another level.
Id. at 118. The number and kinds of legally significant social groupings is never constant.
From a PIL perspective these are continuously structured and restructured according to
the dynamics and scope (level of exclusivity and inclusivity) of the multiple arenas of
decision and the way in which the social and power process is structured in preferred
ways by decision outcomes. Pospisil's theoretical formulation on this is weak because he
does not clearly connect the notions of "group,". "power," and "decision." He states:
"The number and types of legal levels in a given society is, of course, not constant." Id.
at 119. But this inconstancy is not clearly located in the flow of decision itself. This is
the weakest analytical aspect of an otherwise brilliant formulation.
81. See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OP THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
THEORY
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monument to the juridical fiction on a commitment to superrealism
and empirical science. His local law theory runs as follows:
[T]he forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so
adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical,
or at least highly similar though not identical, in scope with a
rule of decision found in the system of law in force in another
state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements
are connected. The forum thus enforces not a foreign right but
a right created by its own law. 82
Cook's formulation is incomplete and partly erroneous. The statement
makes no clear-cut distinction between the complex phases of the prescribing process; it makes no clear reference to the nexus between the
process of claim and threshold decision in the prescription of policy-the phase involving the initiation and exploration of potentially
relevant community policy, whether of an exclusive or inclusive character. Cook was indubitably right in identifying the forum as making law;
he was wrong in not seeing that the forum, in making and applying law
for a more inclusive decisional arena, was transcending the dualistic
idea of state sovereignty, which he embraced.
Professor Yntema emerged with a more flexible, if somewhat eclectic, formulation. He was hardly able to avoid Cook's fiction, but his
commitment to internationalism led him to perceive that claim, decision, and policy were more complex than the local law theory seemed
to concede. Yntema thought a court, in honoring a foreign state's prescribing competence, was doing something that resembled what it
thought the other forum might do in similar circumstances.8 3 He explained this theory in the following manner:
[I]n the last analysis, it is a simple question of convenience and
equity, roughly controlled by the traditions of the forum, as to
how far a court will, can, or should relax its domestic habits of
decision to give a judgment more or less remotely resembling
that which might be secured in the court of another jurisdiction. The basis of departure is the practice of the forum and
the equities of the instant case, and not universal principle or
vested right. In the field of conflict of laws, as in other
branches of law, the problem is essentially one of the adjust82. Id. at 20-21.
83. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 478
(1927).
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ment of actual interests and not of formal logic.""
Yntema also explained PIL in terms of decision. He recognized
that decision is often determined by the "adjustment of competing interests" and the "equities of the instant case."8 8 Yet Yntema, for all his
urbane internationalism, could not extricate himself from the omnipotence of the dualistic myth. No doubt both Cook and Yntema were on
the right track. Their latent or patent commitment to an Austiniantype of dualism, however, prevented them from properly locating the
PIL decision in its transnational setting; their seemingly cavalier approach to the procedural features of a lawsuit and the phases of the
prescribing process led them to incomplete and partial formulations.
Scelle, on the other hand, has been able to formulate a more appropriate perspective without an elaborate theory of claim or decision:
When the legislator of a state or when national jurisdictions
establish rules governing conflicts of laws or conflicts of jurisdictions, they lay down rules of internationallaw. . . . [W]hen
a national judge delivers a judgment in a case between nationals and foreigners or between foreigners, he ceases to be a national judge and becomes an international judge. 86
Mr. de B. Katzenbach has declared he would "prefer to conceive all
authoritative decisions which affect the international community as international law. . . . ,,8 These positions readily demonstrate why the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 5 (1956).
87. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in
Interstate and InternationalLaw, 65 YALE L.J. 1987, 2110 (1956). These ideas are also
brilliantly illuminated by Lord Mansfield and Lord Stowell in setting out the cultural
paradigm for the maritime law of 18th century England. Compare the following per Lord
Mansfield:
[B]y the law of nations and treaties every nation is answerable to others for all
injuries done, by sea or land, or in fresh water, or in part. Mutual convenience,
eternal principles of justice, the wisest regulations of policy, the consent of nations; have established a system of procedure, a code of law, and a court of the
trial of a prize. Every country sues in these courts of the others, which are all
governed by the same law equally known to each.
Lindo v. Rodney and Another, 2 Dougl. 613, 616 (1781). In In re The Recovery, 6 C. Rob.
341, 348-49, 165 Eng. Rep. 955, 958 (1807), Sir W. Scott said:
[I]t is to be recollected that this is a Court of the Law of Nations, though sitting
here under the authority of the King of Great Britain. It belongs to other nations as well as to our own; and what foreigners have a right to demand from it,
is the administration of the law of nations, simply, and exclusively of the introduction of principles borrowed from our own municipal jurisprudence . . ..
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dynamics of claim and decision have a significant bearing on the character of PIL: the various prescriptive phases of domestic decision actually beget transgroup ramifications.
Extrapolating from these positions, the analysis presented here
provides a useful framework for clarifying the theoretical basis of PIL.
First, one can account for the satisfaction of transstate expectations
about law. Second, one can appropriately locate a PIL decision in its
transnational context. Third, one can more clearly understand the interconnection between claim and decision and preferred community
perspectives.
The pivotal features of this description can now be briefly restated. In traditional nomenclature, a claim for honoring the prescribing competence of a foreign jurisdiction creates a choice of law problem. When processed, such a claim is closely bound up with a
preliminary phase of the prescribing process, and here, it performs a
distinctive and unique function in the decisionmaking process. It injects into the decision process perspectives and expectations concerning both foreign law and the common interests of the larger society
viewed through the lens of an observer. At this level (initiation and
exploration of facts and potential policies), due deference is given to
perspectives associated with foreign law, since such pbrspectives create
and sustain expectations about deference and reciprocal tolerances
where control over claim precipitating events is concurrently or sequentially shared. These perspectives are given "serious" consideration
in the prescribing process. The structural parameters of decision,
therefore, are more inclusive in character at this phase of the prescribing process, and the shared perspectives evidence a concern for advancing and facilitating the interdependence and interstimulation of relevant groups and states. By making the "foreign perspective" a
component of interest of the decision process, the potentials for
counterproductive retaliations are minimized.
At this phase of the prescribing process, a decision on the merits
would be premature, because due deference cannot be equated with
unreasonable deference. In order to establish when deference is due, all
of the complex phases of the decision-making process relevant to prescription should be considered. This includes both the choice and formulation of policy projected as authoritative for the relevant communities and the communication of that prescription to the target audience.
These are functions that are of extraordinary complexity in a non-PIL
case. In the PIL case, a decisionmaker is dealing with a target audience
that is more inclusive and is essentially transgroup. Thus, ascertaining
expectations about authority and control often demands that a decisionmaker identify with a multitude of perspectives transcending the
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parochial. It demands a more sophisticated appreciation of the genesis
of public order and of the inclusive and exclusive components that sustain and shape such a concept in preferred ways. In ascertaining due
deference, therefore, the first task is to determine what shared expectations concern authority and control. Other prescribing functions would
include supplementing ambiguous or partial prescriptions with reference to more generally acknowledged community policies that address
value exchanges. This would include the recognition that in a PIL
claim, the decisionmaker is accountable to a more inclusive community
for the formulation and projection of policy, and he is charged with the
management of total policy, in context, for a larger aggregate of interests. In the PIL context, integrating expectations about reciprocal tolerances with basic community policy viewed from the perspective of
another becomes a critical decision function.
D.

Summary

In the choice of law context, a claim has a dualistic character. It
can be both a claim about the allocation of a prescribing competence (a
claim to power) and a claim to a value other than power. Transgroup
community expectations about the power claim are partially satisfied
when the decisionmaker accounts for the exploration of the potential
transgroup factual and policy phase of the prescribing function. Ideally, the focus of decision ought to shift from power to the aspect of
the claim concerning value allocation, which commands competency
over a more inclusive area of concern. Therefore, when a claim is made
that a forum seized of a problem honor another group's prescribing
competence, major power dimensions must be accounted for in the prescribing process. When these accounts have been squared, the key decision questions posed are as follows: What range of indices should inform a decisionmaker in allocating substantive values across group
lines? What goals should inform a decisionmaker in making such a decision? How much creative choice rests in discharging this function?
How "should" this choice be responsibly exercised in the creation and
recreation of "transgroup" law?
The decision to honor or refuse a claim to prescriptive competence
demands some realistic and contextual criteria for choice. An attempt
has been made here to set out realistically and comprehensively the
broad structural outlines of a PIL paradigm. The viability of such a
model depends on its capacity to secure a balanced emphasis between
perspectives and operations through time. The value of such a model
may be illustrated by posing a simple series of questions: Should a
decisionmaker be concerned with results in prescribing choice of law
policy? Does his responsibility extend only so far as "meeting the nice-
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ties of procedural fairness in context?" Is it the "legitimacy" of the
process or the concern for a good result that matters? Is the decisionmaker's prime function the cultivation and structuring of processes
dedicated to benign disinterest often leading to institutional indifferrence, or, is it to be conditioned by an abiding concern for common
decency associated with public order and human dignity? In other
words, should the framework for choice in PIL solely concern the efficacy of the process, or should it acknowledge the process' latest potentials for structuring the public order in a preferred way?
The theorists mentioned above have been forced to recognize the
inevitability of choice in structuring the distribution of values. This
problem has stimulated the invention of a broader range of intellectual
tasks within the confines of the existent paradigm, and it has compelled a formulation of some preferred features of social process, however poorly distilled or articulated. It is therefore necessary to develop
a comprehensive and realistic approach to PIL problems and systematically specify the salient intellectual tasks relevant to that end.
If the phases of the prescribing process involving claim and decision are an accurate estimation of the dynamics of decision in choice of
law, the implications for the existing paradigm of PIL are highly significant. The prevailing myth operates from a dualistic-positivistic perspective. An a priori distinction is, therefore, drawn between private
and public international law.88 The rules of PIL are located structurally as rules of positive law of various state participants who are
deemed to be near exclusive actors or sovereigns, in public international law. This structural distinction is irrelevant to a policy-oriented
perspective because it has no relevance to policy outcomes. By contrast, this article deems both public and private international law as
complementary and indispensible parts of a more comprehensive pro88. "That part of English law known as Private International Law comes into operation whenever the court is seized of a suit that contains a foreign element." P. NORTH,
supra note 1, at 3. "Private International Law is not the same in all countries. There is
no one system that can claim universal recognition ....
"Id. at 9. Cheshire provides the
classical positivist-formalist definition of public international law. He argues that public
international law deals essentially with the relations of competing sovereign states
whereas PIL disputes are really private in character. Thus PIL consists of binding rules
"imposed" on all civilized states whereas each state has its own internal system for handling private problems impacting transnationally. Id. at 12. Cheshire does, however, concede that PIL and public international law are not unrelated. Some principles of law
such as the maxims, audi alteram partem and ut res magis valeat quam pereat are
common to both; some rules of PIL, as for example, the doctrine of the law of contract,
are adopted by a court in the settlement of a dispute between sovereign states, equally,
some rules of public international law are applied by a municipal court when seized of a
case containing a foreign element. Id. at 13.
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cess of authoritative decision. 8 ' Thus, as before mentioned, the standards used to appraise past theories about PIL are basically the same
as those used to evaluate theories about international law in general.' 0
E.

Towards a Configurative Theory about PIL

Past theories of PIL have been characterized by both ultra-conceptualist perspectives at the expense of social facts and nominalism
rooted in microdetailed particulars, but lacking in theoretical sophistication. The configurative approach aspires to preempt and go beyond
the perspectives of these orientations in a more comprehensive and realistic framework.
A configurative approach must, therefore, reflect the following:
First, it must be contextual and comprehensive, in that all relevant
problems must be located in the context of an appropriate phase of the
social process. Second, it must be problem-oriented and rooted in social facts. Third, a set of intellectual tasks for the formulation of issues
and the making and application of policy must be performed. 9'
A policy-science approach to PIL must provide a comprehensive
analytic framework which includes "a conceptual technique for delineating the relevant aspects for power and policy of any interpersonal
89. Consider Judge Jessup's statement that:
Without suggesting that existence of "world law" the problem can be seen to be
whether there is any unity in the international interests of all members of the
international society of states, as to induct cooperation in law enforcement without strict adherence to what may be outmoded precepts of private international
law.
P. JEssuP, THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 341 (1973). What Judge Jessup
urges is, in effect, the construction of a new paradigm in one's perceptions about public
international law and PIL; a reconceptionalization of the whole institutional superstructure. Thus, says Jessup, "[T]he basic thesis of a plea for the evolution of a transnational
law is the desirability of eliminating distinctions between different branches of law which
have been compartmentalized in judicial practice." Id. at 342.
90. A realistic and comprehensive theory about PIL must essentially be contextual,
problem-oriented, and goal guided. Additionally, it must be technically informed by the
multiple methodologies of all relevant knowledge generating disciplines required to guide
and inform decision. In short, it must be configurative. As has been suggested, the context of the world social process is diffuse, the world process of effecting power is in disarray, and constitutive and public order decisions are often highly decentralized. These
features of context bear witness to both pluralistic and universalizing characteristics of
the relevant context from which PIL outcomes emerge. To use Yntema's phrase, it is
"unity in diversity." The events which characterize the processes of claim and decision,
when stripped of the formal categories of symbolic rectitude and disinterest, are often
reflective of the complex context from which they arise. How a decisionmaker and
scholar orients himself to the social process is a crucial feature of the factual context. Cf.
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 188.
91. Id. at 196.
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interaction,"92 since decision shapes the nature of the social process in
desirable and sometimes undesirable ways. The procedure followed is
that of locating a decision, i.e., "choosing the phase at which a sequence of interactions appear to culminate in choices enforced by sanctions and deprivation of indulgence."" s The great innovation of the policy-science school has been the invention of the phases analysis
designed to cover every salient aspect of behavior94 pertinent to the process of claim formulation as well as of decision.
F.

Criteria for Evaluating Past Theories About PIL

Given that PIL is a complementary and indispensable part of the
world process of authoritative decision, the standards by which past
theories can be meaningfully evaluated include essentially those criteria that other policy scientists have used to assess past theories of international law. These criteria include the following: (1) the establishment and maintenance of a clear observational standpoint; (2) the
articulation of a sufficiently comprehensive and realistic focus of iihquiry; (3) the specification and performance of all relevant intellectual
tasks in context; and (4) the clarification of basic community policy
and postulation of preferred public order goals. 95
1.

The Observational Standpoint

The location of an appropriate observational standpoint", for the
discharge of the intellectual tasks associated with scholarship in international law is gaining increasing acceptance. 97 Clarity in observational
standpoint, it is submitted, lends greater precision to what is being
studied, how it is to be studied and the purposes of the study.
One of the most difficult issues of contemporary jurisprudence is
the problem of the standpoints of the different participants involved in
the process. From the perspective of the policy scientist, no human being can claim to be outside of the social process. The scholar is no
92. Id. at 198.
93. Id. This means that PIL or any particular PIL outcome ought to be seen in relation to the entire social process. Hence, the importance of an adequate form of inquiry.
94. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 227 (1977).
95. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 198. See also Lasswell &
McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 379-94 (1971).
96. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 199.
97. See generally Falk, On Treaty Interpretationand the New Haven Approach, 8
VA. J. INT'L L. 330 (1968); Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law, 21 WORLD POL. 109 (1963); Young, InternationalLaw and Social Science:
The Contribution of Myres McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1972).
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exception. Within the social process the scholar performs a unique
function in the pursuit of enlightenment; he develops and adumbrates
intelligence about the social process, and promotes the perspectives of
a special interest group. Like the work of all other international law
scholars, the enlightenment process for the PIL scholar must cover a
broad arena of social interaction.
It is submitted that the scholar occupies an extraordinarily important position in the PIL framework. The enlightenment"8 the PIL
scholars have communicated has carried enormous weight in power
arenas with direct impacts on the ordering of the social process. For
these reasons, it is recommended that a scholar's identification in PIL
be no different in scope or intensity than that recommended for other
international law scholars.99
Since the PIL scholar studies in a context where more exclusive
and parochial perspectives can, and often do, become a tempting predisposition, the important preliminary task of the scholar is to develop
his pattern of primary identification. Realistically, this identification
should be with the whole of mankind because the problems, claims,
decisions, preferred outcomes, and indeed, the whole PIL process deals
with a comprehensive flow of value exchanges. These exchanges reflect
the primary demands of people in society.100 They encapsulate a society comprising a complex, pluralistic amalgam of territorial and functional groups and other modalities of affiliation. In the contemporary
PIL arena, the patterns of interaction of all participants reflect a growing sense of interdetermination and interdependence in the shaping
and sharing of all important values. The demands for global integration and respect of diversity in different societies are two "dominant
features of modern culture."' ' Therefore, it is evident that the scholar
who identifies completely with a particular local law or social group to
the exclusion of others, brings a parochial vision to a context which
realistically covers mankind.
The distinctive limitations inherent in the traditional paradigm of
PIL have created a unique and important role for the scholar. PIL is a
98. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 passim (1973). "Intelligence is a critical function at all
levels of decision-making, yet its very ubiquity seems to have obscured it from visibility
to scholarly inquiry." Id. at 366. "The importance of intelligence for goal realization at
the community level is readily observable in every value process." Id. "Broadly conceived, intelligence is concerned with knowledge: statements and propositions confirmed
by experience, or to which a degree of probability can be assigned." Id. at 367.
99. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 199-200.
100. See generally supra note 7.
101. Yntema, The Historic Basis of Private InternationalLaw, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L.
297, 298 (1953).

N.Y.J. INT'L & CoMp. L.

[Vol. 3

scholar-made and scholar-dominated field that has, on occasion, attracted the attention and philosophical sensibilities of brilliant, active
decisionmakers. Because the PIL scholar has been so influential in the
intelligence and promotion functions, there has been a distinct tendency to identify closely with decisionmakers, to concentrate much intellectual energy and material resources developing models of rather
than theories about PIL.
a.

Jurisprudential implications of the observational standpoint and
PIL

The basic problem posed by standpoint is disarmingly simple in
the area of jurisprudence: What influence does the standpoint of the
scholar have on the perspective communicated to a target audience?
For many scholars, the issue of standpoint is not deemed significant.
The perspective assumed by such writers is that if a phenomenon exists objectively, that is to say, if it is totally extrinsic to the self, what is
communicated is simply, "what is." If a fundamental jurisprudential
postulate viewed law as a closed, logical system, the system would require no special complication of standpoint other than technical skill
in description. If, however, law is viewed in behavioral terms, the problem of standpoint becomes critical. Consider the following insight of
the late Professor Lasswell:
Now it is impossible to abolish uncertainty by the refinement of retrospective observations, by the accumulation of historical detail, by the application of precision methods to
elapsed events; the crucial test of adequate analysis is nothing
less than the future verification of the insight into the nature
of the master configuration against which details are constructed. Each specific interpretation is subject to redefinition
as the structural potentialities of the future become actualized
in the past and present of participant observers. The analyst
moves between the contemplation of detail and of configuration, knowing that the soundness of the result is an act of creative orientation rather than of automatic projection. The
search for precision in the routines of the past must be constantly chastened and given relevance and direction by reference to the task of self-orientation which is the goal of
analysis.1 02
The nature of standpoint in discourse on jurisprudence is a com102.

H. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 17 (1935).
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plex and convoluted affair. Holmes suggested an aspect of significance
in standpoint when he implicitly recommended that legal education
would benefit when students are sensitized to the "bad man's" perspective."0 3 An additional significant feature of the bad man's perspective is that it was meant to clarify legally relevant behavior, because we
can use his perspective to "wash law in cynical acid."' 1 4 The standpoint of the bad man enables one to separate law from morality. It
should be remembered that "prediction" for the bad man is not the
same thing as prediction for the scientific observer. The bad man
wants prediction because he is egocentric, and the value premises of
this kind of egocentricity mirror the moral basis of the laissez-faire
man. The bad man is, indeed, "Herbert Spencer." An element of confusion seems to emerge when we read Holmes as saying the prophecies
of what judges in fact do, is law, because this statement derives its core
meaning from the context and standpoint of the bad man. Holmes' bad
man is, of course, a claimant-an adverse party in the context of litigation. The bad man's predictions are those of one actively involved in
influencing the system.
The same article by Holmes gives us a different standpoint, one
that is olympian if not magisterial. Here Holmes assumes a position
that can only be described as being "outside" or "above" the system.
Holmes examines conditions that influence judge-made law: logic, historical perspective, jurisprudence and science. These comments are
about law, and the standpoint is that of an observer. The observer's
main impact on what he purports to describe and explain is a function
of description and explanation. This is the extent to which this standpoint impacts on the legal process.
It is unclear whether the position taken by many legal realists in
describing law as a function of judicial behavior, or more generally of
official behavior, was from the standpoint of the bad man or the observer. The more sophisticated realists, however, entertained no doubt
about the matter. Their rule and fact skepticism were conditioned by a
perspective "external" to the system. This perspective was avowedly
"scientific." The observer in law was much the same as the anthropologist's perspective in that discipline. Arnold described it colorfully as
the standpoint of the little man from Mars. 10 5 The important point
here is that our Martian friend's statements about earth-law are preHolmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
Id. at 462.
See generally T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); T. ARNOLD, THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). See also Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories
About Law: Maintaining Observational Standpoint and Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
103.
104.
105.
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cisely that: statements about earth-law.
Professor H.L.A. Hart seeks to use the "ordinary language" analysis identified principally with J.L. Austin to explain the nature of lawconditioned communication. 0 6 One of the questions Hart seeks to explain is the meaning of words like "right" or "duty." Hart explores the
meaning of statements like "A has a right to be paid £10 by B" in
terms of his well-known game analogy. 07 Such statements "silently"
assume major contextual features. Hence, to say, "He is out," silently
assumes the existence of rules and that decisions or claims are made
with reference to these rules. But, says Hart, the statement: "He is
out" is "not a statement about the rules to the effect that they will be
enforced or acted on in a given case nor any other kind of statement
about them."' 08 Hart then concludes that
the analysis of statements of rights and duties as predictions
ignores these distinctions, yet it is just as erroneous to say that
"A has a right" is a prediction that the court or official will
treat A in a certain way (or in the game analogy). .

.

. No

doubt when someone has a legal right a corresponding prediction will normally be justified, but this should not lead us to
identify two quite different forms of statement.' 0 '
The fundamental point that Hart is trying to make is that statements like "X has a right to be paid," or, drawing from the game analogy, "He is out," are expressions that presuppose, from the point of
view of the ordinary user of language, the pre-existence of prescriptions, which he technically designates "rules." In ordinary language
analysis, these expressions "appeal to rules to make claims, or give decisions under them ... ."o Such statements are not "about rules to
the effect that they will be enforced or acted on in a given case nor any
other kind of statement about them.""' This criticism is a fundamental attack on American Legal Realism for it seeks to show that from
the perspective of ordinary language analysis, statements about law
cannot be meaningful to the ordinary user of language because the ordinary user of language for this purpose must presuppose the pre-existence of legal rules. There is an obvious "chicken and egg problem"
regarding the postulation of a pre-existing set of rules, assumed by the
106.

J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 35-37 (1961); Hart, Definition and Theory in

Jurisprudence,70 L.Q.REv. 37, 38 (1954).
107. See Hart, supra note 106, at 42.
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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ordinary language communicator. A person may truly believe that such
"rules" exist, but this cannot deny the utility of a scientific observer
describing the ordinary language communicator's belief that there
must be a structure of rules to govern his condition of being or indeed,
that there must be a God who does so. Whether, of course, one can
show from an observer's perspective that the rules scientifically exist,
or that God is not dead, is a question of a different order, for this
question seeks to advance understanding and punctuate the misconceptions of the ordinary user of language and his understanding of
phenomena as expressed through language.
The idea of prediction that Hart seems to be attacking, it should
be noted, is the prediction associated with the "bad man." The bad
man is a participant and not an observer. The observer's statements
about law have their fundamental basis in the description of behavior;
forecasting into the future reflects inferences drawn from the conditions that influence behavior. In this view, pre-existing myths like the
assumption "rules exist" may, of course, influence behavior as much as
a hurricane or earthquake.
The fundamental point Hart attacks by making this distinction is
that law conditioned communication must be shaped by ordinary language analysis, for only through such a lens can law approximate the
certitude and stability in expectation that the ordinary citizen anticipates. A fundamental criticism of this position is that ordinary language would seem to deny the generation of a "metalanguage," a scientific language that would explain legal phenomena more accurately and
realistically than would the ordinary language symbols of the lay person. The language of science is meant to generate new knowlege, to
create concepts to account for change in the phenomenal world. It
would seem that the ordinary language analyst would deny the creation
of organizing concepts and methodologies that might scientifically explore law as a function of behavior rather than a function of assumed
rules of uncertain origin and uncertain content.
It may be fairly said that the limitations existing in theories of
PIL are a reflection of the inadequacies of conventional jurisprudence
in predominant legal cultures. The problem of standpoint in PIL contains other difficulties too. 112 While working within the confines of a
"theory of law," PIL doctrine seemed to effect a metalanguage within
the confines of the prevailing juridical myth. Indeed, it might be more
accurate to describe the symbology of PIL as a legal subculture with
112. On the functions of the observational standpoint and the functional designation
of role structure (observer, participant-observer, participant), see H. LASSWELL, THE
ANALYSIS OF POLTIcAL BEHAVIOR 261-78 (1948).
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distinctively unique lexical qualities. According to the late Dean Prosser: "The realm of conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors, who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and
entangled in it."1 1 3 Prosser did not explain why PIL lent itself to a
"strange and incomprehensible jargon." The answer is not easy; it
seems rooted in the nature of the subject.
The typical PIL problem has never provided an easy fit for preexisting juridical models of law. In fact, the metalanguage about PIL may
have been a necessary adjunct to a formal myth that had to account
for power realities transcending discrete groups in a more inclusive
frame. These efforts represent the tentative gropings for a
metalanguage about, rather than of, law and illustrate how scholars
were searching for a legal paradigm to account for the transgroup allocation of values." 4 PIL has been the testing ground of legal theory. In
practical terms, PIL seems to have exhausted the ability of traditional
legal theories to answer the question of what is a good reason for an
authoritative decision where transgroup power variables are salient.
This makes the distinction between a theory of and a theory about law
even more crucial.
The problem is a pronounced one in PIL. The active decisionmaker has had to live with his outcomes and has sought guidance
from or reliance on metalegal symbols. The scholar has creatively
sought to refine and expand them. The utility of a theory about law,
therefore, has been most directly relevant to both scholars and decisionmakers. in the PIL framework.'" Hence, there has been an extraordinary convergence of perspectives about PIL between active
decisionmakers and scholars" and this has had both a positive and
negative influence on the PIL framework. Active decisionmakers have
been receptive to the contributions of scholars; scholars, however, feel113. Prosser, Interstate Publication,51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
114. See generally supra notes 1-2.
115. But see Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 362, 376 (1971). This article notes that:
[W]hat the scholarly observer requires is a theory about law, designed to facilitate performance of the pertinent tasks in inquiry about decision, as distinguished from the theories of law which are employed by decision makers and
others for obtaining and justifying outcomes within the decision process and are,
thus, among the variables about which the scholar seeks enlightenment. Good
theory about law may of course on occasion be found useful by decision-makers
and, hence, also become in the course of time a part of theories of law ....

Id.
116.

Id.
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ing perhaps that their work is influential in the practical arenas of decision, have been reluctant to be more innovative in developing the
PIL framework in more social scientific terms. This point lends weight
to the importance of the observational standpoint in this area.
Fully aware that in different contexts human beings assume multiple identifications, emphasis should be given to the distinction between
the scholar and the active decisionmaker. Role inversions take place all
the time, and in diverse contexts, multiple identifications can be easily
manipulated to accommodate the diverse role-demands implicit in
community expectations and emerging public order perspectives. The
scholar's role epitomizes the pursuit of enlightenment as a scope
value, 11 7 although the outcomes of the enlightment process can be used
to realize other value-based outcomes as well. Thus, the "intelligence"
and "promotion" functions are acknowledged in most scholarly efforts
in the PIL context, and have had a direct impact upon decision and an
11 8
indirect impact upon the structuring of the global social process.
The decisionmaker occupies a role specialized to power and authority; by deciding cases he makes and applies policy. What he does is
critical to the allocation of all values in society. In theory, the difference between the standpoint of the scholarly observer and the active
decisionmaker in PIL is relatively clear. The scholar observes, records,
and recommends while the decisionmaker adjudicates and decides.
This does not mean, however, that both decisionmaker and scholar are
not part of a social process. It does mean that the scholar must be
explicit about his "own" identifications, and his "own" objectives.
The conditions that have served to reinforce confusions about developing and maintaining a clear observational standpoint for the
scholarly focus are as follows: First, PIL began as a university-centered
subject established by the early Italian glossators.11 University-based
scholarship in PIL can be traced consistently through the continental
legal tradition which remains itself, to a large extent, university centered. Leading common law figures in the early development of conflict
of laws borrowed heavily from this scholarly tradition,1 20 which is even
117. Id.
118. For a discussion of the intelligence function, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman,
The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TsEMPLE L.Q. 365 (1973); Lasswell, Research in Policy Analysis: The Intelligence and Appraisal Functions, in 6
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1-22 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby ed. 1975).
On the promoting function, see M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWLL & L. CHEN, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 256-61 (1980).
119. See supra note 3 (reviewing how the scholarly tradition has shaped the conflicts
of law from the post-glossators of the thirteenth century through leading modern American and foreign scholarship).
120. See E. RABL, CONFLCT OF LAWS 7-8 (2d ed. 1958). "The territorial realm of the

N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 3

more important today. The second salient condition relates to the extraordinary complexity of the PIL problem, which usually involves a
multiplicity of both group perspectives and details about social
processes. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that theories of law
stand or fall on their capacity to account for the PIL problem. The
third reason relates to the second. Scholastic preemption of the field,
due to the complexity of the PIL problem, has been further accentuated because scholars are removed from the process of decision and
thereby insulated from the power complexities of transstate decision.
Scholars are not pressed to make decisions within a limited time frame,
or within the confines of a power process that defines a range of complementary expectations, which is not always free from parochialism.
Scholars in PIL have had the advantages of a contemplative, rather
than action-oriented, milieu. Moreover, they have been united in Europe by a common scholar's language (Latin), by a relatively common
universalistic set of legal symbols from the Roman-Italian legal culture,
and a common core of religious inspired myth associated with ecclesiastical universalism.
The cross-cultural perspectives about PIL, transcending the more
homogeneous and perhaps culture-bound Eurocentric reference frame,
demand that the scholar heed the venerable Socratic maxim: "Know
thyself." The plea is for intellectual honesty and candor and the
method recommended is self-analysis. This method is particularly apt
for the scholar in establishing a procedure which can account for the
problems of culture, class, personality, and crisis in the framing of the
primary "I" and the contingent "we." In short, to be effective, the
scholar in this field must clarify just who he is and what his objectives
are.
2. Delimitation of the Focus of Inquiry: Global and Cross-Cultural
Aspects of Social Process
PIL problems involve cross-group and cross-cultural perspectives
in ostensible conflict. The model of social process, in which group dynamics associated with consociative characteristics are given promidoctrines of the postglossators exceeded even the boundaries within which the canon and
Roman laws were received .... These doctrines, as accepted and transformed by eminent scholars in France and Holland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
gained recognition in England and in the United States." Id. at 7. Joseph Story's treatise
"contributed to the continuation ... of an internationally-minded school on the European Continent." Id. Germany's greatest jurist, Friedrick Carl von Savigny "established
The international conception of 'internathe fundaments of modern conflicts law ....
tional private law' was adopted by Foelix (1843) in France,. . . the Italian Fiore (1869),
the Swiss Brocher (1871), and by almost all outstanding authors. . . ." Id. at 8.
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nence, must be comprehensive enough to encapsulate every significant
instance of cultural differentiation relevant to the decision-making process. The theory should be useful in identifying and characterizing, for
decisions, all functional equivalents and disequivalents in the diverse
cross-group, cross-cultural institutions (or patterns of practice relevant
to) in PIL. Consequently, such a theory must be contextual in order to
relate the impact of all value diffusions to the larger, more comprehensive process of global interaction. This means that there must be an
explicit means for recognition of the facts of social interaction in which
value exchanges occur as an ongoing feature of the PIL frame, and
there must be an appreciation of the range of global participants and
participant-community structures through which value exchanges occur. Such a description would seek to adumbrate the functional reach
of each relevant actor, and from an observer's perspective, to limit that
reach according to the real value priorities of each iaffected participant
or participant-group. It is submitted that such a description can be
optimally comprehensive and realistically specific when described
through a policy science phase analysis of the global social process
which stresses the following: who the component actors are; what their
perspectives are; what base values they have access to; what operative
modalities and practices specialized to various value processes exist or
can be structured to accommodate the perspectives of community participants; what outcomes and what effects, with what results for the
aggregate and particular shaping and sharing of all demanded values,
result from this process.
3.

Comprehensive Model of Authoritative Decision in PIL

Certain structural-policy particulars that characterize the PIL decision context have been set forth. It has been urged that, like international law in general, the PIL decision process may be seen as an indispensible and complementary part of the more comprehensive world
process of authoritative decision transcending the boundaries of particular territorial communities, which peoples of the world establish and
maintain for the purpose of clarifying and implementing common interests. The essential ancillary features of decision in this context may
be set out as follows:
a.

A balanced emphasis between perspectives and operations

Perspectives include identifications, demands, and expectations
that frame the parameters of choice. Operations refer to the choices
that are factually made in shaping the allocation of value indulgences
or deprivations across group lines. A balanced focus in PIL between
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perspectives and operations requires realism. This principle demands
that the consequences of decision be considered in factual rather than
formal terms. One of the chief flaws of past theory in PIL has been a
congenital disjunction between perspectives and operations.
b.

Clarity in conception of authority and control

The dynamics of control and authority in PIL have already been
alluded to. It might be emphasized that the conception of law developed here incorporates, upon a continuum, the elements of coercion
and persuasion. It incorporates, in effect, the elements of authority and
control. The empirical references to these notions are to be located in
the expectations about authority and control that include, in each PIL
context, a plurality of discrete groups and individual actors.
c.

Classification of decision: public order, constitutive, civic order

The distinctions maintained here serve essentially analytical purposes which are sustained by the clarity these distinctions provide for
policy-making and policy-application. Constitutive decisions deal with
the establishment and efficacy of the entire decision process itself. Decisions vindicating outcomes that concern themselves mainly with the
efficacy of each phase of the decision-making process are thus identified as constitutive decisions.
Public order decisions establish, design, and redesign the protected and specialized features of all value processes. These decisions
emerge continuously from the constitutive process.
The civic order arena involves decisions that concern a more intensive interaction between the constitutive process and certain phases
of each value process, power over which is presumptively allocated to
the individual's management capacities. Here community-sanctioning
policy is characterized by its relative mildness. The civic order domain
is an arena in which a high frequency of primary group interaction occurs and which incorporates significant features of the affection process. These are of growing significance for PIL and represent an important technique for the resolution of choice of law problems as they
resort to inclusive community policy of a peremptory nature.
4.

Performance of the Intellectual Tasks

Five intellectual tasks have been referred to as indispensible to a
viable doctrine and method about the PIL framework.121 These tasks
121. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 91 (1980).
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bear some repetition: (a) goal clarification; (b) description of past
trends; (c) conditions (environmental and predispositional); (d) projection of future trends; and (e) appraisal and recommendations.
5.

Postulation of Fundamental Goals of a Global Public Order

While the importance of maintaining an appropriate observational
standpoint for discharging the scholarly function has been stressed, the
outcomes of scholarly inquiry are never neutral. The clarity or obfuscation a scholar disposes on social process has unavoidable impacts on
society. There is no escaping the responsibility for one's work, and this
imposes an obligation upon the scholar. Indeed, intellectual honesty
demands at least that the scholar make explicit the public order preferences latent or subdued in his conscious or preconscious. A scholar
working in PIL deals with an extensive and inclusive universe. He has
a unique opportunity to recommend preferences that he might morally
pride himself in as a responsible citizen of a larger community. Given
the burdens and potentials demanded of scholarly choice, an intellectually honest scholar must face the following insistent self-scrutiny:
What fundamental social goals do I, as a responsible citizen of a larger
commonwealth of mankind, consciously recommend to other equally
responsible citizens as the primary postulates of a world public order?
The recommended postulation here envisioned is one that embraces
the notion "optimal justice." It is premised on the assumption that law
should be seen from a practically good rather than a practically bad
man's point of view. The postulation recommended as the overriding
consideration of law and legal process is the optimal shaping and sharing of all demanded values consistent with a public order of human
dignity.
III.

TRENDS IN PAST THEORIES OF OR ABOUT

A.

PIL

The Statutists

During the Eurocentric Dark Ages"' 2 two important conditions appear to have influenced PIL trends. First, the allocation of controlling
competencies in a transgroup setting seems to have been determined
by the lex originis. s2 A Frank thus remained a Frank wherever he
went, and this was thought to be universally accepted. Second, emergent social conditions began favoring the consolidation of bases of
122. The period encapsuled in this time frame allegedly dates from the sixth to the
eleventh centuries. According to Wolf, "[n]o theory of Private International Law was
developed under the Barbarian law." M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 21.
123. Id. "This became a universal principle." Id.
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power according to the control of land by territorial elites. Thus the
Frankish "capitularia" are described as being "territorial in character,
not personal.""1 4 As territorial bases of power became more consolidated, the spatial reach of community policy based on the control of
land began to replace "the law of the person."' 2 5 It should be noted
that these developments did not trench upon the outlines of the prevailing juridical paradigm, which was structured according to the predominant myth of the period: canonical catholic universalism.
For the above stated reasons, the development of a PIL paradigm
from the eleventh century onward, however crude, represents no mean
achievement. This achievement we owe to the statutists in Italian universities, who appear to have reached an intellectual peak in the 13th
century. Outstanding among the Italian statutists for the development
of PIL were Aldricus 2 and Bartolus. 27 These statutists and others
formalized and laid the foundations for a modernist PIL paradigm.1 2 8
The primary contribution of the statutists and their successors
was their ability to structure a durable myth system with an operative
symbology; this system provided a useful technique for the legitimation of transgroup perspectives. They provided the essential features of
a doctrine that enabled decisionmakers to structure a transgroup social
124. Id. The first deviations from the lex originis were, paradoxically, in the direction
of individual liberty, rather than feudal status. Parties were asked not what their primary political-social identifications had been, but what they wished them to be. Wolf
sees this as one of the earliest examples of party autonomy over choice of law. Under
Frankish law the King's Capitulariawere of a territorial nature. During this period, tribal laws continued to remain in force. This gradually gave rise to the problem, initiated
by the multiplicity of tribal laws, of which law should govern legal relationships containing a foreign element. The lex solutionis was the lex originis. See P. KALENSKY, supra
note 65, at 49.
125. M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 21.
126. It is thought that he first raised the problem of the allocation of prescribing
competencies involving a plurality of bodies politic in the 12th century. Id. at 22.
127. Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357) was, of course, a post-glossator. J. BEALE,
supra note 1, at 25. According to Beale, we owe Bartolus "the entire credit for discovering and stating a body of principle on the conflict of laws .
Id. at 26. See also M.
WOLF, supra note 2, at 24-26.
128. The model itself emerged conceptually from positing the following kind of problem: "Quareritursi homines diversarum provinciarum quae diversas habent consuetudines sub uno eodem que indice litigant, utram earum . . .index sequi debeat." M.
WOLF, supra note 2, at 22.
Aldricus' solution to the PIL problem postulated a naive faith that a "better" rule
could be distilled by those experienced in decision. His theory does have a contemporary
"ring." The formulation carries with it the following implication-apply the prescription
that most approximates inclusive standard-or to use the words of the Magister: "potior
et utilior; debate enim iudicare secundum quod melius ei visum fuerit." Id. Here the
inclusive standard is measured by that which is "better and more useful." Id.
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process. Patterns of reciprocity and deference became a major expectation about decisions implicating more than a single group in this social
process.
Through their system of classifications, the statutists sought to
provide a metalanguage about PIL, a symbol system through which
transgroup perspectives might be frequently honored. In short, they
sought to establish a transgroup authority myth primarily outside of
the power process. This was done without consciously establishing the
standpoint of the disengaged observer, although their "scholastic" orientation was a useful adjunct to maintaining some sort of a functional
distance between observer and participant. In addition, the rediscovery
of Roman law served to reinforce a more inclusive pattern of identification in the development of a framework for transgroup law.
Although there was a clear-cut consciousness of the needs and priorities for a broader concept of social process, the statutists' style was
much more formalistic. Priority was given to the classification of statutes rather than to the characterization of claims. Thus, the theory of
PIL that ultimately emerged sought to establish a distinction between
decision and the comprehensive character of the social process in
which these decisions were located.
The emphasis on the taxonomic classification of statutes as the
key to choice of law problems was an exercise in mysticism. The means
became confused with the ends. Thus, the purposes of classification
were often identified with pedantic scholasticism rather than public order priorities. Formalism either deemphasized perspectives or conceded them minimally. Operations were similarly constricted by a formalistic "guessing game" as to how statutes ought to be classified. It is
unlikely, therefore, that an undeveloped concept of "operations" balanced by an astigmatic concept of perspectives would lead to a concept
of decision sufficiently realistic and responsive to PIL problems.
The scholastic method inaugurated by the statutists falls far short
of the comprehensive model of decision to which the policy-oriented
approach subscribes. The key concepts-real statutes, personal statutes, and mixed statutes' 29-were a poor substitute for explaining how
129. That methodology was, Nussbaum has commented, "purely conceptualistic (frequently grammatical or etymological). The legal culture was itself criticially conditioned
by the imprint of scholasticism which had set its imprimatur, inter alia, on theology and
philosophy." A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (1943). The
main function of this type of legal process was to ensure that each local prescription (or
statute) fit into the correct category:
A distinction was drawn between statutes-or rather statutory and customary rules-concerned with persons (statua personalia) and those relating to
things (statuta realia). Personal statutes governed the legal status of persons
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and why competencies were allocated to prescribe and apply policy for
transstate transactions and events. They were an astigmatic lens
through which to view PIL. Enormous energy was spent determining
whether, a priori, a statute was real, personal, or mixed, without reference to its goal or purpose.'"0
A number of scattered developments occurred during the period
associated with the statutists, but none contributed to a more comprehensive or unifying theoretical framework for PIL. Ideas locating prescriptive outcomes with patterns of primary affiliation led to heightened expectations about the underlying power process. A distinction
was drawn between principles of content (conseutudo ad litis
decidendum) and principles of procedure (consuetudo ad litis ordinationem introducts), but how this distinction actually worked was severely limited by an inadequate understanding of the decision-making
process itself.
The use of reasoning by analogy from certain texts in the Digest,"'1 rather than from policy (utility) led to the development of the
principle lex loci act us,'8 2 so that after some doctrinal disputation
there arose a maxim, locus regit actum, 13 that aspired to universal
having their domicile or their origin in the country where the statute was in
force. Real statutes dealt with all rights to unmovables situate in that country.
Bartolus improved on the theory by setting up a third group of
rules-'statutamixta'-later used to denote rules which concern both persons
and things.
M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 24-25.
130. Cf. M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 26 ("nothing was derived from Roman law, yet
they pretended that they only developed rules latent in the Corpus juris," they were
"creating" or prescribing while pretending to be "finding" the law).
131. The Digest is "our chief authority for the law of Justinian, but also our chief
authority for much of the earlier (Roman) law." W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN
LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 39-40 (3d ed. 1966). This work provides a useful background on the development of the Digest. See also H. JoLowIcz & B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 490-502 (3d ed. 1972); B. NICHOLAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 40-45 (1962).
132. The principle of lex loci actus (the law of the place where the act was done) was
developed through analogy from two surces: Dig. Just. 21.2.6 (if a piece of land has been
sold, the question of whether the seller must cavere pro evictione should be answered
with reference to the customs of the place where the contract was made); and from Dig.
Just. 50.17.34.
It is questionable whether the general rule that the sale of immovables is to be governed by the lex loci actus rather than the lex situs can be derived from these passages,
but both were regularly quoted by writers to support the proposition throughout the
Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. See M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 20. The famous
property law symbol lex situs was formulated about this time as well. Id.
133. See M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 23. Locus regit actum in PIL is the rule that
when a legal transaction complies with the formalities required by the law of the country
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preeminence. While the justification of the policy implicit in the
s4
maxim was located in the custom and authority of the Roman law,"
where it is done, it is also valid in the country where it is to be given effect, although by
the law of that country other formalities are required. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090
(4th ed. 1951).
This question alludes to the allocation of competence to prescribe policy for persons,
events, etc. having a multistate character. Bartolus makes an interesting statement that
seems quite out of character with the scholastic approach. He talks of confining, prohibitive and burdensome community policy which should not extend beyond the territory of
the endorsing community. He does not say why this distinction should be drawn, but the
implications lead to interesting speculation about the awareness of the utility of exclusive and inclusive standards in the history of PIL. See BARTOLUS, BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 30-32 (J. Beale trans. 1914 & photo. reprint 1979). Huber also makes this
point using the term "prejudice," but it appears there, as in Bartolus' earlier work, to be
somewhat ambiguous and its full significance for decision is undeveloped. See U. HUs,
DE CONFLICTU LEGUM (1689).
134. Recorded Roman law provides a meagre catalogue of PIL practice. Notoriously
untheoretical as the Roman jurists were, we find no clues in the legal literature about the
cross-cultural dimensions of law and legal process from which a viable theory about PIL
could have been erected. On two occasions the Institutes of Justinian repeat the following didactic statement attributed to Galus:
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law which is in part particular to themselves, in part common to all men: the law which each people has
established for itself is particular to that state and is styled civil law as being
peculiarly of that state: but what natural reason has established among all men
is observed equally by all nations and is designated jus gentium or the law of
nations, being that which all nations obey. Hence the Roman people observe
partly their own particular law, partly that which is common to all peoples.
J. THOMAS,

THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

4 (1975).

This comment has a peculiarly contemporary ring to it. The description of the civil law
comes very close to a conception of an exclusive community prescription; the ideas of jus
gentium, common to all mankind, can be seen to have elements of an inclusive perspective about the societal universe. It should be noted that, conceptually, there seems to be
no hint of the nature of decision when one is dealing with varieties of exclusive community policy. Nor is there any criterion articulated as to why inclusive standards may be
more desirable and may well displace an exclusive and perhaps atavistic relic of civil law.
See M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 19-20.
Roman lawyers never developed a comprehensive model of authoritative decision.
Their framework of decision was essentially that of the formula and the objective was
basically that of stability in the establishment and maintenance of minimum order. The
formula was the instrument that effectually created the myth or doctrine of law that
Roman lawyers were such masters at manipulating. That these doctrines were often supplemented with inclusive standards discovered in the jus naturale or jus gentium, provides a significant lesson for contemporary PIL. It must be remembered, however, that
for the most part, the structure of decision was left as unarticulated as was the policy
basis of much of their results.
It would appear that the closest Roman lawyers came to a role that approximates
that of a partially disengaged observer was with the lay jurists. But even these actors
were close to the power process, although they were "advisors" rather than "practitioners." According to Nicholas, the lay jurist had "characteristics of both the academic and
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its true etiology probably lay in the facts of social convenience and
utility spawned by ever increasing interactions and interdependencies
of peoples, goods and services. But venerable legal doctrines often find
manifest justification in past rather than present or future exigencies.
Locus regit actum appeared to be no exception.
Bartolus made a contribution which was also problematic." 5 His
approach superficially emphasized individual problems and it underscored the need for methodological sophistication in decision but misdirected its focus of inquiry and thus posed the wrong questions. By
using the classification of statutes as a starting point, Bartolus formalized a fallacy that permeates PIL doctrine even today. This framework
avoids both the social context of law and the claims emerging from
society that ought to provide the essential starting point of a comprehensive and realistic theory about PIL.'5s
The Statutists' emphasis on classification of statutes did not ex-

tend to the classification of the kinds of decisions that affected either
the public or civic order, nor to those specialized to the needs of the
transgroup constitutive process. They did not articulate a checklist of
the critical intellectual tasks necessary for a more complete theoretical
formulation about PIL. Nor did they explicitly postulate goals to guide
or inform choice. The fact that they progressed toward "formalizing"
the transgroup expectations about the power process, however, is
significant.
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 29 (1962).
We should note that the universalization of Roman legal culture was conditioned
more by the quest for global domination and the subjugation of others than by a sensitivity to reciprocal tolerances. See the diffuse, Marxist-oriented study by Kalensky, P.
KALENSKY, supra note 64, at 46-48, and authorities cited therein. See also M. WOLF,
supra note 2, at 20. The control factor and its diffusion in the social process are, therefore, critical preconditions for the emergence of structured patterns of reciprocal tolerances. However, it should also be noted that ideas associated with the jus naturale and
the jus gentium were a significant component of the public order domain in Roman law;
and here, clearly, the Roman lawyers were adept at preempting the inclusive standard
when dealing with the allocation of values implicating groups and subgroups within the
Empire, at least until its universalization. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (1950).
135. See BARTOLUS, DE SUMMA TRINITATE (J. Beale trans. 1914); Bartolus, Bartoli A

the practicing lawyer." B.

Saxoferrato Commentariae in Codicem, in F. VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE RESTROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES app. I (W. Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880 &
photo. reprint 1972) (1st ed. London 1869).
136. Wolf details Bartolus' framework succinctly: "What groups of relationships fall
under a given rule of law? Thus his starting-point was the grouping not of legal relationships between persons, but of the rules of law existing in any given country, such as
those contained in the statutes of various Italian city-states." M. WOLF, supra note 2, at
24.
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Their classificatory system was of value in that operative symbols
enabled decisionmakers to stabilize expectations about control and authority across state lines. This feat was rather remarkable because the
Statutists were working from a frame 6f reference that was undevel-

oped.18 7 In addition, the Statutists had a good sense of the function
and use of the authority myth. The doctrines they constructed performed a significant function by serving as an antidote to parochialism
in European legal culture. The rules they invented are overly simple,

yet they did form the basis of a legal myth justifying the crude ground
plan for the allocation of competencies to prescribe and apply law

where control is shared by more than one group or state. In sum, the
theory of the Statutists exerted significant influence on the developments of theories about PIL for over 500 years. Some of the operative

symbols have reinforced the PIL myth system.'" The loose roots of
control over persons (status, capacity, personality) served the function

of localizing problems, and as connecting factors, they played a significant role in the characterization of problems for decision-making.

These concepts are still useful today.
B.
1.

Comitas Gentium and Self-Determination: The Dutch School
Background

During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, legal scholars
in the Netherlands achieved an historic pinnacle in the development of
European legal culture.18 9 Jurists such as Hugo Grotius, Groenewegen
137. According to Nussbaum: "[T]he theory of the statutes persisted on the Continent until the nineteenth century." A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 129, at 12. The nomenclature made its appearance in Anglo-American law as well. See Mathews v. Sniggs, 75
Okla. 108, 113, 182 P. 703, 708 (1919). As a matter of legal method, it should be noted
that the operative symbology performed the function of resolving conflicts of local custom by resort to a functionally inclusive symbol that carried the imprimatur of the Emperor or King. "Consequently, in France, too, there was a law above the local customs
which settled the Conflicts among the latter." A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 129, at 13.
138. See BARTOLUS, DE SUMMA TRINITATE §§ 33, 34, 42 (J. Beale trans. 1914).
139. The Dutch School was greatly influenced by the French. The French statutists
have not been dealt with in any depth here. However, reference is made to Charles
Dumoulin (1500-1566) and Bernard D'Argentre (1519-1590). Dumoulin seems to have
been the first to formulate an adequate notion of party autonomy and refocus the emphasis of PIL on the individual. Ideologically, this is an early move away from what Sir
Henry Sumner Maine calls status to contract. H. MAINE, ANCmNT LAW: ITS CONNECTION
WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 164-65 (3d ed.
New York 1878) (1st ed. London 1861). See also P. KALENSKY, supra note 65, at 67. The
Marxist view of Dumoulin sees him as the originator of party automony and, effectually,
as a mouthpiece of the merchant class. Id. D'Argentre led the reaction to this ascription
of power to private parties proffered by Dumoulin. His response was highly conditioned
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van der Made, Paul and Johannes Voet, Ulrik Huber, and others produced formidable works that rank with the greatest and most durable
contributions to world legal science.1 0 The writings of these jurists
were as significant in international areas as they were in areas of less
inclusive concern.
The most well known jurist of this period for PIL was the Frisian
judge and scholar, Ulrik Huber. His thesis was superficially simple and
was set in three maxims which are summarized as follows: First, the
laws that bind each state have force within the limits of that government and bind all subject to it, but not beyond those limits. Second, all
persons within the geographical limits of a government are deemed to
be subjects thereof, regardless of whether they reside there permanently or temporarily. Third, a sovereign will act under principles of
comity to honor rights acquired within the territory of another sovereign so that such rights retain their force everywhere, unless honoring
them would prejudice the power or rights of such a government, or its
citizens.""
Huber's work represents one of the earliest positivistic formulations about law. In seeking to describe the "law as it is," he fused the
role of scholar with that of decisionmaker. Huber was, of course, a
judge with considerable intellectual accomplishment and his primary
identifications were more intensively displaced upon his Frisian naby Bodin's notions of feudalism, territorialism and sovereignty, and he applied these perspectives to PIL. The orthodox Marxian interpretation locates D'Argentre as the mouthpiece and apologist of the feudal barons against the power alignments of the King and
the Paris bourgeoisie. D'Argentre was himself an aristocrat and an avowed opponent of
such subversive ideas as were contained in party autonomy. The Dutch School preempted D'Argentre's territorial feudalistic notions to ideologically reinforce states' rights
in the Netherlands. See id. at 64-72. See also M. WOLF, supra note 2, at 26-30. The most
glaring flaw in D'Argentre's formulation was his inability to explain why, given the territorial omnipotence of territorial statutes, courts would apply foreign prescription because
of expediency or a sense of justice, i.e., why a court would apply and prescribe an inclusive standard in the allocation of indulgences or deprivations. See J. SZASZY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS IN THE WESTERN, SOCIALIST AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 48 (1974). On territorial
sovereignty and the Dutch School, see P. KALENSKY, supra note 64, at 70-74. The Dutch
solution to the logical puzzle posed by the French was the ridiculously simple comitas
gentium concept. See J. SZASZY, supra, at 49.
140. See R. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 2-23 (5th ed. 1953). Works
by these scholars include S. GROENEWEGEN VAN DER MADE, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ABROGATIS ET INUSITATIS IN HOLLANDIA VICINISQUE REGIONIBUS (1649); H. GROTIUS, INLEIDINGE
TOT DE HOLLANDSCHE RECHTSGELEERDHEID (1631); U. Hunan, supra note 133; J. VoET,
COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS (Hagae-Comitum 1726). Grotius is generally called the father of modern international law. See C. RHYNE, supra note 23, at 16.
141. See, e.g., Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 Nw. U.L. REv. 375, 403
(1918); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 29 (8th ed. 1883 & photo.
reprint 1972) (1st ed. Boston 1834).
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tionalism, albeit a comity qualified variety. It may be said, therefore,
that Huber never really established a clear observational standpoint,
one which would have enabled him to articulate a theory about PIL
rather than his modest alignment of maxims of PIL. His fundamental
identifications reflected great deference to less inclusive patterns of
control and authority.
Huber's exclusivistic emphasis upon the primacy of the Frisian
state was a reaction to a heritage of Spanish imperialism and, perhaps,
the excesses of the Inquisition. In Huber's estimation, the inclusive
and more comprehensive perspective was associated with natural law.
Because of this association with natural law, the Holy Roman Empire,
and perhaps the Spanish conquest, it was rejected. Correlatively, the
right to self-determination of the seventeen states of the Netherlands
was given a primary ideological focus in his PIL formulations. A comprehensive conception of community was, therefore, sacrificed to the
demands for group autonomy contained in the creation and legitimation of the symbols of national sovereignty. These symbol-events were
reflected in Huber's jurisprudence, and more especially, in his approach to PIL. To the exent that the concept of sovereignty, as Huber
understood it, became somewhat reified, the relevance of a conception
of community in a larger sense became more difficult to articulate and
define by the Dutch school. It may be said that Huber's work contains
the seeds of formalistic positivism based on the concept of national
sovereignty.
Huber's maxims focus on the state as the source of law. This focus
bears a striking resemblance to Bartolus' position.14 Structurally,
there is little difference between these theorists with regard to their
conception of an adequate focus of inquiry and similarly, their starting
point appears not to be rooted in the subjectivities of the component
actors. Indeed, it may be urged that Huber's framework focuses more
on the conceptual than the empirical as the starting point of inquiry.
Huber's work is far too brief and cryptic, however, to allow a more
thorough analysis of his positivism as applied to PIL.
The emphasis on a balanced view of perspectives and operations
suffered from an equally limited framework. Huber's formalism gave
great deference to a limited rule-structure that reflected transgroup
perspectives in a very sparse manner. This appears to be supported by
the second of Huber's maxims, which seems to justify the near exclusive importance of the lex fori over transstate claims. The maxim
stresses the idea that all persons within the spatial reach of territorial
142. Bartolus directed his attention to state statutes as the key to PIL problems. See
supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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elites are presumptively treated as being primarily affiliated with the
territorial unit in which they are found at the "instant" a claim involving the person is made. This obscures the necessity of developing
transstateperspectives and operations that are needed in this context.
Huber's understanding of the ideas of control and authority appear to be derived from his conception of sovereignty-the first of his
principles about the nature of PIL. The meaning of sovereignty for
Huber derived from the statist paradigm of seventeenth century Europe, a paradigm of the state system that was formalized by the Peace
of Westphalia (1648).1 4 3 The state-sovereignty idea received accentuated affirmation in the Netherlands mainly through the efforts of the
great Dutch jurist, Johannes Voet. 1" The myth of territorial sovereignty here envisioned resembles a kind of reified garrison theory of
the transnational power process. The formalization of the statist paradigm and the symbology of sovereignty that sought to sustain it represented both an advance and a retreat in the development of PIL theory. The strength of the principle was that it indirectly acknowledged
that one cannot state a PIL theory without some concern for the transgroup dynamics of the power process. Its chief weakness was the use of
the term sovereignty itself. "Sovereignty" is capable of radically differmeanings and is an extremely ambiguous abstraction from realent1 45
ity; the concept does not allow an observer or decisionmaker to draw
46
a clear distinction between the conceptions of control and authority.
To the extent that Huber's framework was concerned with indices
of authority in a multi-state context, reference to the comity principle,
the third of Huber's standards in PIL, is appropriate. By invoking the
comity principle, Huber introduced a caveat to the extended allocation
of power by state elites to themselves. This qualification was, of course,
conditioned by the facts of the transgroup power process which engendered the potential for retaliation. Added to this qualification was the
barest vestige of a minimum order concept, implied in the expectations, that the notion of "prejudice" carried over to affected elites or
individuals.
Huber made no clear-cut distinctions among the kinds of operations that deal with public order or the civic order, or even with the
transgroup constitutive process. Little deference was given to the recommended intellectual tasks. Huber did not explicitly postulate any
143. Peace of Westphalia, 1648, 1 Parry's T.S. 1.
144. J. VOET, COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS (Hagae-Comitum 1726).
145. On the multiplicity of meaning of this concept, see W. NAGAN, THE CONTEXT OF
SOVERMGNTY (unpublished manuscript available in the Offices of the New York Law
School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
146. See W. COOK, supra note 81, at 48-70.
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public order goals of a preferred character other than those reflected in
his maxims.
Huber's contribution may be summarized in these terms: (1) The
context of power and territoriality as a power base is emphasized; (2)
transgroup power configurations on the theory of comity and the tacit
consent fiction that justifies it are accounted for; (3) reference is obliquely made to some sort of policy differentiation regarding basic community policy in the guise of the "prejudice" caveat; and (4) a distinction between prejudice toward state elites and prejudice toward
individuals is ambiguously acknowledged.
For all their brevity, Huber's principles were extremely influential
in the development of more modernist theories about PIL. The territorialism that sustained his doctrine of sovereignty retained a sufficiently
feudal tone which made it appealing to the legal fraternity of that
time. In some ways it also anticipated a more parochial focus on PIL,
moving perilously close to a PIL non-law framework." 7 On the other
hand, the comity fiction was seized upon by Justice Joseph Story and
provided the seeds for a vigorous and influential international perspective.1 48 Huber's contributions may be seen to be problematic in other
respects as well. The demolition of canonical universalism occasioned
only a pseudo-realism which was out of phase with facts of transgroup
behavior. Indeed, it is not unfair to add that this kind of realism has
often been a euphemism for parochialism.
In summary, it may be said that Huber's work represents one of
the earlier positivistic formulations about law and legal process. The
formulation is essentially a theory of rather than about PIL. The perspective seems to be that of the active decisionmaker and appears to
be significantly influenced by a comity-qualified Frisian nationalism.
Law was seen as emanating from the Frisian "state," not from some
transempirical source, yet Huber's standpoint was not one that could
be entirely freed from the metaphysical natural law that he despised.'
2.

Comity as a Brooding Omnipresence: Story's Naturalism
Story, in his Commentaries,'

preempted Huber's framework for

147. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 209 nf. 28-29 and accompanying text.
148. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883 & photo.
reprint 1972) (1st ed. Boston 1834).
149. Indeed, Huber, himself, embraced a number of metaphysical ideas. His idea of
the state was mainly transempirical. The "bindingness" of rules of positive law are a
distinct residue of his own unacknowledged transempirical assumptions about law and
legal process. See Lorenzen, supra note 141, at 376-77, 398-99.
150. J. STORY, supra note 148.
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the Anglo-American posterity, but what De Conflictu Legum151 lacked
in bulk, Story supplied in substantial amplitude. The publication of
Story's Commentaries was a major legal event and the book was lavishly praised and extensively relied upon in practical decisional
152
arenas.
The scheme of Story's book was dominated by two complementary
principles which he had culled from the Dutch school. The first principle was the idea of territorial sovereignty as refined by Voet 153 and integrated more fully into the PIL framework by Huber.'" The second
principle was the comity notion that Huber had added in order to
qualify the overextended conception of sovereignty implied in the sovereignty doctrine.1 5 5 Story emphasized, however, the concept of comity,
which effectually formed the basis of his system.156
Story's main thesis may be set out as follows: First, each nation or
state is presumed to have exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within
a territorial framework.157 Second, each state is legally omnipotent
within its territorial domain; it may bind directly all forms of property
and all persons within that territorial domain and may exercise this
territorial framework. 58 Third, the reach of a state's legal power is circumscribed by its territorial base. 59 The fourth postulate is best stated
in Story's own words: "[W]hatever force and obligation the laws of one
country have in another-, depends solely upon the laws, and municipal
regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and policy, and its own express or tacit consent." ' Story supported the comitas gentium notion as the basis of PIL in the following
terms:
The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, is that the rules, which are to govern, are
those which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a
sense of the inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice,
151. U. HUBER, supra note 133.
152. In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949); Ogden v. Ogden, 40
Misc. 473, 82 N.Y.S. 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dist. 1903); In re Bozzelli's Settlement, [1902]
1 Ch. 751, 757-76.
153. J. VoET,supra note 144.
154. Lorenzen, supra note 141, at 401-18.
155. Id. at 403.
156. J. STORY, supra note 148, at 32-39.
157. Id. at 21.
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 25.
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in order that justice may be done to us in return. 161
Story retained a consistent standpoint which seemed to reflect a
highly inclusive sense of the self. On this point he seems to have been
somewhat precocious. Yet it is this perspective that served to make his
book an international success. He provided a sense of universal outlook
to common interests for
by suggesting that reference should be 1made
62
the solution of choice of law problems.
Story's focus of inquiry aspired to a form of universalism, of a
Eurocentric variety, " rooted in the natural law perspective. But the
inclusive perspective was not sufficiently tempered by a realistic concept of a community in global terms. While the work does represent an
initial effort at adumbrating a cross-cultural, transnational focus, the
concept of community process was lost in the reifications of territorial
sovereignty. The reality of decision within the community power process never emerged clearly. Story did develop a comprehensive focus of
the concept of community in global terms, but the operational indices
he used to sustain this focus were undeveloped.
Story's common law instincts and his flair for practicality and convenience made his work persuasive and distinct from the more pedantic character of the continental scholarly tradition. Story did try to relate the particulars of litigation realities to a broader conceptual map.
Indeed, Story can, in part, be read as one who had at least a vague and
unarticulated sense of relevance of context. For this reason, many lawyers found his talent of relating particular cases to the broader values,
to be a significant part of his contribution to PIL. Story may be seen,
however, as overemphasizing perspectives at the expense of operations.
Story's conception of control and authority was also inadequate
when judged in contemporary terms. For example, the many different
meanings attached to the idea of sovereignty and the appreciation of
the dynamics of control and authority in PIL are poorly developed.
This is the weakest part of Story's theory, although in his analysis of
practical instances, he often appeared to be more sensitive than his
peers to the content of transstate community expectations. Although
Story's work contains many de facto classifications of decision, there is
no real attempt to be systematic, and the policies at stake, even when
he seemed conscious of them, were never very clearly focused. A further important weakness in Story's theory is the somewhat uncritical
acceptance of continental classifications and the almost anecdotal character of some of the exposition. Even where there was an appreciation
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 5.
See supra note 122.
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of at least some of the recommended intellectual tasks, it almost always emerges amid a maze of superfluous or tendentious words. It
should be noted, however, for its time, this represented a most systematic exposition of a difficult subject, and Story's shortcomings on this
score ought not overshadow his many great insights about PIL.
Story's natural law inclination gave him the ability to sense the
utility of postulation of goals of public order as distinct from actual
behavior patterns. His preferences though, were diffuse and not clearly
connected with the facts of social process. However, he sensed the need
for resolving practical problems by use of the common interest idea.'
The comity doctrine developed by Story was severely criticized by
major legal theorists associated with the vested rights theory.1 65 Dicey's
critique is perhaps the most representative.1 61 Comity has been generally criticized as being vague and discretionary.167 Its exponents never
clearly focused on when and why reciprocities should or should not be
mandated. While this point may be sustained in the context of particular cases, Story's theory provides a strong justification for the notion of
reciprocal tolerances in PIL. Despite the fictional quality of the idea of
forum consent implicit in the comity idea, the fact of global interdependency in the multi-state process made the idea an important one.
Story articulated a near universalistic perspective about PIL and
in the manipulation of the comity symbol, provided a significant antidote to the strongly nationalistic trends of the nineteenth century.6 "
The global perspective, however, was achieved at the expense of the
notion of actual transnational operations. Story's theory in some measure overemphasized perspectives at the expense of operations, a point
devastatingly exploited in attacks on Story's ideas of sovereignty and
territorialism made by Cook.'6 9 In fairness to Story, it should be em164. See supra text accompanying note 121.
165. J. BEALE, supra note 1, § 5.4: A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, at 53-54 (Story's
assumption of a binding jus gentium retarded the development of American conflicts
doctrine for almost a century). See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 HAR. L. REv. 361 (1945) (outlines and appraises the American
theories and comity and vested rights).
166. DicEv AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5-6 (J. Morris 10th ed. 1980).
167. H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 11-12 (3d ed. 1949); F.
WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (2d ed. 1881); Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
168. See J. MORRIs, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 501 (2d ed. 1980). "[Tlhe theory has
performed a useful function in freeing our subject from parochialism .... I"
Id.
169. See W. COOK, supra note 81, at 48-70. In this chapter, Cook analyzes the logical
bases of postulates Story discussed in his Commentaries. Cook finds these postulates
internally inconsistent and concludes that they all should be discarded with the exception of the general notion that every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. Id. at 67.
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phasized that the teleological character of Story's book was distinguished by a genuine and, for its time, quite successful attempt to emphasize practical values. It should also be noted that his more
formalized expressions (postulates, as Cook calls them) reflect a
greater, though unclear, deference to minimum order conceptions,
while paradoxically, his practical illustrations and his case analyses evidence something more in the structure of human interactions. Story's
legacy was one of those that prompted the realization that PIL was
needed for structuring global society in preferred ways; this was no minor achievement. Story, like other naturalists of his genre, held an integrated view of man and community. This enabled him to translate
this vision into a larger, more comprehensive PIL framework. He contributed to the evolution of institutional symbols and operational techniques. These were geared to a more inclusive construct of both the
indivisibility of man and the potentials latent in PIL for achieving the
realization of the common interest.
C.

Vested Rights: A Dog Will Fight for his Bone

The theory of vested rights has often been described as an exercise
in legal fundamentalism.1 7 0 The fundamentals of the theory work, in
part, on the assumption of a Hobbesian universe, and reflect the basic
function of law as the control and regulation of aggression. The idea of
a legal right, the fundamental corollary of the legal obligation, for example, reflects the "obvious" assumption, that without the notion of
"right," a "dog will fight for his bone." 7 ' This approach is critical of
the natural law implications of Justice Story's comity influenced perspective. Theorists working in this perspective focused on the assumptions of Huber's second principle-the doctrine of territorial
1 72
sovereignty.
The symbology of territorial sovereignty tied in neatly with the
development of legal positivism as advanced by Austin in his series of
lectures published under the title The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.7' But the perspective developed was not that of empirical
science in the positivist tradition of behavioral social science; rather it
was that of logical science in a more formalistic sense. Hence, Holland
could justly define jurisprudence as the formal science of positive
170.
171.
172.

A.
0.

173.

1 J. AUSTIN,

EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 314 (1920).

14 (1962).

See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW

79-341 (R. Campbell 5th ed. 1911) (1st ed. 1885) (six lectures originally delivered at the
University of London in 1828, parts of which were limitedly published in 1823).
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law. 74 Dicey in England and Beale in the United States were among
the foremost exponents of a formalistic variety of positivism in PIL.
1.

Background to the Vested Rights Theory

The vested rights, or obligatio theory was an early major positivistic theory of PIL with essentially Anglo-Saxon roots.1 75 The theory
built upon the territorial sovereignty of foundations of the Dutch
School but rejected its comity aspect as set out by Story. Professor
Beale described it as follows: "Instead of the Dutch theory of comity,
the common law has worked out indigenously a theory of vested rights,
which serves the same purpose, that is, the desire to reach the just

result, and is not subject to the objections which can be urged against
the doctrine of comity.""" This theory was favored by some of the
174. T. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 13 (13th ed. 1924). Holland
states:
Jurisprudence is not a science of legal relations a priori, as they might have
been, or should have been, but is abstracted a posteriorifrom such relations as
have been clothed with a legal character in actual systems, that is to say from
law which has actually been imposed, or positive law.
Id. at 9. This approach is now called the "analytical school" and is described by Lasswell
and McDougal as the jurisprudence which "dominates thinking in much of the world
today." Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362,
367 (1971). Its emphasis is on "systems of rules emanating from established officials.... [Liaw is defined as the rules prescribed and applied by distinctive institutions
of authority-sovereigns, courts, and legislatures ...." Id.
The name "analytical school" is misleading because the formalistic positivists do
not, of course, have a monopoly on analytical techniques about the legal process, any
more than any other acknowledged jurisprudential perspective. See generally E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW

(1953).

175. See Cowan, Marks of Primitivity in the Conflict of Laws: A Jurisprudential
Analysis, 26 RUTGERS L. REV.191, 198-99 (1973). Professor Cowan believes that the ideological bases for the vested rights doctrine used by Americans are to be found in the
ancient struggle of the "English landed aristocracy" and the emerging "bourgeois" over
the alienability of real property. Id. at 198. To keep real property out of the market,
interests with regard to it were symbolized by the concept of vesting-vested rights.
Such rights were seen as "sacrosanct." Id. at 199. A similar development is to be found
in nineteenth century United States constitutional law theory which protected property
and contract rights by calling them vested rights. Id.
176. 3 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1967 (1935). Beale summarized this territorial theory in J. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
He states:
§1. The topic called "Conflict of Laws" deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign created rights.
§2. In the legal sense, all rights must be created by some law. A right is artificial,
not a mere natural fact; no legal right exists by nature. A right is a political, not
a social thing; no legal right can be created by the mere will of parties.
Law being a general rule to govern future transactions, its method of creat-
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judges in American Law. 7 7 Justice Holmes was the leadof the obligatio theory. 17 The theory is regarded as funbecause its theoretical underpinnings are rooted in
of the nature of a legal right. 79 Indeed, the obligatio the-

ing rights is to provide that upon the happening of a certain event a right shall
accrue. The law annexes to the event a certain consequence, namely the creation
of a legal right. The creation of a right is therefore conditioned upon the happening of an event.
§3. Events which the law acts upon may be of two sorts; acts of human beings,
and so-called "acts of God," that is, events in which no human being has a share.
Rights generally follow acts of men; though sometimes a right is created as a
result solely of an act of God (as lapse of time: accretion).
§4. When a right has been created by law, this right itself becomes a fact; and
its existence may be a factor in an event which the same or some other law
makes the condition of a new right. In other words, a right may be changed by
the law that created it, or by any other law having power over it.
§5. If no law having power to do so has changed a right, the existing right should
everywhere be recognized; since to do so is merely to recognize the existence of a
fact.
Id. at 1. "§47. A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its
existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in
question anywhere." Id. at 18. The American Law Institute's First Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted Beale's perspective on the vested rights theory. J. MORRIS, supra
note 168, at 503.
177. See J. MORRIS, supra note 168, at 502. Morris noted that both Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Benjamin N. Cardozo were among those judges advocating this theory. See
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1902) (Holmes, J.); Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (Cardozo, J.).
178. Holmes discussed the "obligatio" theory in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co.:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject
to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio,
which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found . . . . But as the only source of this obligation is the
law of the place of the act, it follows that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but equally determines its extent.
194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (citations omitted).
179. See 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 313-14 (1920); Holmes, Natural
Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42 (1918). Holmes discussed the idea of a legal right as
follows:
I see no a priori duty to live with others and in that way, but simply a statement
of what I must do if I wish to remain alive. If I do live with others they tell me
that I must do and abstain from doing various things or they will put the screws
on to me. I believe that they will, and being of the same mind as to their conduct
I not only accept the rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy and
emotional affirmation and begin to talk about duties and rights. But for legal
purposes a right is only the hypothesis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon
those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space. One phrase adds no more
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ory served as the doctrinal underpinning of the Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws.' s0 Under this theory, legislative jurisdiction was
deemed paramount.' 8 1 That is, where a state had exercised its legislathan the other to what we know without it. No doubt behind these legal rights is
the fighting will of the subject to maintain them, and the spread of the emotions
to the general rules by which they are maintained; but that does not seem to me
the same thing as the supposed a priori discernment of a duty or the assertion of
a preexisting right. A dog will fight for his bone.

0.

HOLMES,

supra, at 313-14.

180. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 comment d, § 8 comment j (1934).
181. It is commonly assumed that the obligatio or vested rights approach to the
choice of law process has the virtue of simplicity, predictability and certainty. The latter
value is particularly esteemed by lawyers working from the perspective of analytical positivism. In fact, the system in practice was anything but simple, predictable or certain-in
all but the most simple cases. For example, the rule lex loci contractus referred-often
simultaneously-to the law of the place of performance as well as the law of the place of
execution. See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N.
Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883). Traditional practice also recognized a principle presuming validity, and a strong presumption honoring choice of law clauses in validating contracts. Id. at 300. The problems occasioned by these complementaries in the contracts
aspect of choice of law have made the field anything but predictable, simple, certain, or
permitting ease of application.
The rules relating to torts are not much better, because the rule lex loci delictus,
taken literally could mean, inter alia, the place where the wrong was initiated or the
place of the "last event," the sub-principle preferred by Professor Beale. Even the "last
event rule" was qualified by exceptions. For example, the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, dealing with the consumer of poisoned candy tells us that the place where the
poison candy takes effect is the lex loci delictus. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
377 note, rule 2 (1934). The defamation-broadcast cases add a special note of uncertainty
to the perspective. See id. rule 5; Dale Systems, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D.
Conn. 1953). As a critic of the Restatement has trenchantly suggested, the idea of a
single, simple rule for all the complex torts problems with the added difficulty of the
multistate dimension is questionable. Professor Morris asks whether it is inherently
probable that courts will achieve socially desirable results if they apply the same conflict
rule to liability for automobile negligence, radio defamation, escaping animals, the seduction of women, economic conspiracies, and wrongful conversion. Morris, The ProperLaw
of Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881, 884 (1951).
The third significant rule from the traditional perspective is the lex situs rule: the
law of the situs of the property supplies the rule of decision. The rule has covered
problems dealing with real property (immoveable), personal property (moveable), and
incorporeal property (moveable-intangible). The rule has been criticized as highly simplistic and in practice has led to unsatisfactory results. See In re Barrie's Estate, 240
Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949) (revocation of Illinois will, not honored by law of lex
situs because real estate in Iowa); Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank of Boston, 306 Mass.
588, 29 N.E.2d 19 (1940) (situs of gift stock certificate); Cammell v. Sewell, 5 Hurl. R.N.
728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (1860) (lex situs applied to protect third party purchaser of
cargo of wrecked ship).
The fourth major rule when viewed historically is to some degree in derogation of
the territorialist principles of contracts, torts, and property. This rule is the rule that the
lex domicilii is to supply the rule of decision in choice of law cases. The concept of
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tive power in regard to persons or property subject to its jurisdiction,
domicile perhaps more so than other traditional choice of law rules, has defied efforts to
accord it a unitary, single meaning for all purposes. Indeed, Walter Wheeler Cook
demonstrated that as used the concept's meaning changed with the context. Fundamentally the concept of domicile, sometimes used as a synonym for residence or habitual
residence, citizenship, or nationality, deals with the nexus a person or entity has with a
body politic, however inconclusively this latter notion is defined. That nexus or connecting link is thought to entitle the body politic to control and regulate the legal incidents
affecting that person or entity. Taken literally, such an assertion of control would extend
to wherever the spatial location of the individual might be, hence territorial considerations as a function of power may be less than compelling. In practice, the tension between territorial and personal prescription has been particularly problematic in the context of decedents' estates, lex domicilii versus lex situs, and in the area of family law, lex
loci celebrationus versus lex domicilii. Regarding estates, see In re Jones' Estate, 192
Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 85 S.E. 596 (1888). See
COMalso R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASESMENTS-QUESTIONS

(3d ed. 1981); R.

WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(2d ed. 1980). In the family law area, see In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d
256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948); In re Mays Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953); Lanham
v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908). See also Nagan, Conflict of Laws and
Proximate Relations: A Policy-Science Perspective, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 416, 443-79 (1977).
The traditional rule structure is completed by reference to the pleading and proof of
foreign law, and the complicating notion that foreign law is a fact to be determined in a
common law court by a panel of jurors. See Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
This structure naturally generated its share of legal complementarity, described in
current literature by the inelegant phrase "escape devices." See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE
& H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 61-143 (2d ed. 1975); R.
WEINTRAUB, supra, at 48-89. Among the most significant of these complementary concepts are renvoi, d~pe~age, characterization, the "incidental question," and public policy.
Illustrations of characterization under the traditional approach are reflected in Alabama
Great S.R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892) (plaintiff lost the argument
that the problem sounds in contract rather than tort and is to be governed by the place
of making of the contract). Compare Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1941)
with Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). These
cases deal with vicarious liability. Venuto characterizes the problem as tort; Levy characterizes the problem as contract. See also Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184
(4th Cir. 1972). In the area of intra-family torts, see Haumschild v. Continental Casualty
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (automobile accident involving husband and
wife recharacterized as a problem dealing with family relationship to be governed by law
of family domicile). For examples dealing with contract-conveyance classifications, see
Thomson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897) (promissory note and mortgage on separate property in Florida deemed invalid at place of contract were held valid as conveyances under the lex situs rule). The contract characterization was used in Atwood v.
Walker, 79 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (1901), and the property characterization was used in
Wilson v. Kryger, 29 N.D. 28, 149 N.W. 721 (1914), aff'd 242 U.S. 171 (1916). Savings
bank trust accounts have posed problems of special difficulty for characterization. Are
they to be regarded as gifts causa mortis, inter-vivos gifts, inter-vivos trusts, testamentary trusts, wills, assignments of contractual rights, or third party beneficiary contracts?
Compare Succession of Shadrick, 129 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 1961) with Boyle v. Kempkin,
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any rights created by virtue of power predicated upon such legislative
jurisdiction was entitled (subject to certain caveats) to legal recognition
everywhere. It should be remembered that a jurisdiction honoring an
obligatio that had been created in another state was not honoring it in
terms of the law of that state, rather it was honoring a right vested in
that state, i.e., an obligatio. The best statement of the vested rightslegislative jurisdiction formula came from Holmes in the case of Cuba
Railroad v. Crosby:8 2
When an action is brought upon a cause arising outside of the
jurisdiction . . . the duty of the court is not to administer its
notion of justice but to enforce an obligation that has been created by a different law . . . . The law of the forum is material
only as setting a limit of policy beyond which such obligations
will not be enforced there. With rare exceptions the liabilities
of parties to each other are fixed by the law of the territorial
243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d 589 (1943).
Another dimension of characterization involves the perennially difficult problems of
substance and procedure. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (Massachusetts' statute of limitation for wrongful death
recovery deemed procedural). For special problems of statutes of limitations in this context, see Gillies v. Aeronaves de Mexico, Say. Ass'n., 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972).
D6pe4age has been the device whereby different rules of different jurisdictions are
used to determine different issues in the same case. In terms of result, the use of dopeqage may sometimes lead to the formulation of a new multistate rule quite different from
the law of either connected state. For example, in Marie v. Garrison, a contract void in
one state and not enforceable in another state was held to be valid and not enforceable
in the latter state but nevertheless enforceable in the former state, which state makes
such a contract void but does not prohibit the enforcement of a contract valid in another
state, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883).
Major exceptions to the obligation to honor a foreign cause of action are that a forum need not enforce laws dissimilar to its own, nor enforce the penal or revenue laws of
another jurisdiction. In addition, a foreign created obligation will not be enforced if it is
incompatible with the catch-all category of public policy of the forum. Of these categories the public policy exception has been the most difficult to delimit. Compare Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) with Mertz v. Mertz,
271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). See also Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).
If the traditional perspective were meant to epitomize simplicity, uniformity, predictability, and certainty in the protection of basic expectations, it would have to be
admitted that these goals were only honored in a narrow spectrum of simple cases. The
system was complex, devoid of any real unity or predictability, and, in fact, the normative structure of the system supported not stability of expectation, but expectations of
change. Indeed, a major expectation of the traditional system must have been its unpredictability and the recognition of large vistas of discretion in the control and regulation
of choice of law.
182. 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
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jurisdiction within which the wrong is done and the parties are
at the time of doing it .

. .

. That and that alone is the foun-

dation of their rights.""
In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,'
essence of the Holmesian view as follows:

Cardozo repeated the

A foreign statute is not law in this state, but gives rise to
an obligation which, if transitory, "follows the person and may
be enforced wherever the person may be found. . .

."

The

plaintiff owns something and we will help him get it. We do
this unless some sound reason of public policy makes it unwise
for us to lend our aid.'
The vested rights-territorial sovereignty vinculum had all the
classic characteristics of the analytical framework."'
2.

Observational Standpoint

The standpoint of the vested rights theorists is peculiar and highly
paradoxical. Their normal dualistic focus tended to provide them with
a quite exclusive standpoint which "logically" should have compelled a
non-law perspective about international "law." The isolation of transnational vested rights independent of the transnational community
process-a distinctly metaphysical enterprise-compelled a broader
183. Id. at 478. Holmes added:
[T]he only justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause of action
arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well-founded belief that it was a cause
of action in that place. The right to recover stands upon that as its necessary
foundation. It is part of the plaintiff's case, and if there is reason for doubt he
must allege and prove it.
Id. at 479.
184. 244 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
185. Id. at 110, 120 N.E. at 201.
186. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About InternationalLaw: Prologue to
a Configurative Jurisprudence,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
Although the analyticalist does not examine the relation of social process and
authoritative decision in his juridical work, this exclusion is a conscious choice
rather than an omission from inadvertance. It is expressive of an extraordinary
degree of concern with social and legal stability: fixed rules, applied in a fixed
manner, are believed to provide a frame of stable decision hence stable expectation for all those to whom they are directed. The built-in assumptions are that
verbal rules, as well as other communications, are capable of an independent
non-contextual import; that there is a necessary convergence in fact of formalized authority and effective control; that social process is or can be made as
stable as legal nomostatics; and that the relation between authoritative decision
and social process is that the latter is subservient to the former.
Id. at 244-45.
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identification by default. But this was an identification with an "idea"
or abstracted concept (the detached vested right). On the other hand,
the attempt to describe the "rules" of PIL as they are, meant that the
capacity to articulate a theory about, rather than of, PIL was undermined at the very outset of scholarly inquiry. These difficulties stimulated other complexities about the nature, origin and structural locus
of PIL "rules" associated with dualism. The implications of dualism
meant that the theorist would initially lack an inclusive identification
with the key participants in the process if law-making and law-applying. Second, this narrow identification would inhibit the capacity to
articulate interests of broader, inclusive significance. Third, a scientific
perspective rooted in the behavior of participants is undermined. The
characteristic standpoint of the vested rights theorist was his mercurially shifting pattern of identifications and a misperception of rolefunction.
3.

Focus of Inquiry: Comprehensiveness in Conception of Relevant
Community

The theoretical rigidity of the vested rights-territorial sovereignty
formulation provided little latitude for developing a comprehensive
concept of social process for the global community. Law is effectually
the sovereign's command. It follows that the relationship of law to social process, however broadly one defines it, is deemed irrelevant to the
formalist. Rights duly created have an autonomous existence and a
''correct" solution to a claim predicated upon a vested right can always
be found. The vested rights approach made it difficult to articulate international perspectives in realistic terms and served, in the long run,
to inhibit the development of a more satisfying theory about PIL.
4.

Comprehensiveness in Conception of Decision

The arid conceptualism of this school severely limited the development of a comprehensive theory about law or an adequate account of
the taxonomy of decision. The methodology of the vested rights school
generated a perspective about decision that was incomplete. Essentially, the methodology associated with the marriage of legislative jurisdiction, sovereignty, and vested rights was described as that of "selecting jurisdictions"; all key PIL symbols, given any degree of operational
effect, were seen to "select" the appropriate system of law; that system
would then supply the rule of decision in the particular case. Thus the
symbol lex loci contractus would function in such a manner as to spatially locate the correct territorial sovereign whose law was to govern a
legal relationship in space and time. Applied to specific problems, such
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symbols could be manipulated to logically select almost any of the connected jurisdictions. The vested rights-territorial sovereignty approach
to PIL was unable to provide-the institutional stability in PIL that its
adherents claimed it could.1 8 7 From a practical point of view, the theory simply broke down in the face of the intractible facts of the transstate social and power processes. The theory was too far removed from
the reality of social interaction to maintain effectiveness. For example,
if a claimant's pleadings alleged that an accident was governed by the
lex loci delicti, he would be asserting that a particular system of law
governed the substance of a claim for the allocation of values. He
would assume that there is a select jurisdiction that must provide the
correct solution to his claim.'" The assumption behind such an expectation is that law, or the system of law, exists as a thing apart from the
human factor and the reality of decision. Such a perspective paradoxically has an affinity with the legal theory Holmes described as a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky."1' ' It is difficult to resist the conclusion that these theorists have to postulate the existence of a transcendental "strongbox" of legal rules lurking in the selected system
which is ready to supply the correct answer to any PIL claim.
It may be worth exploring the unarticulated premises of the vested
rights approach: If A and B enter into a contract in State X, at the
precise instant that the contract "came into being," a contractual right
would vest in the spatial locus of the parties, that is, in State X. In
theory the right now has an existence independent of the facts relating
to the transaction, unless qualified by various "escape devices" 1 0 that
were invented to ameliorate the impact of the territorial imperative. A
vested right is essentially an inchoate right. It has to be spatially
grounded in some territorially defined legal regime so that a court, exercising an adjudicatory competence over the parties and the subject
matter, may honor it.
One problem with spatially locating the vested right (at the point
of its vesting) was that one could, invariably and logically, locate the
right in more than one jurisdiction. Just what indices should inform
and guide such a discretion in the decisionmaker was unclear. Transs187.
188.

See supra note 181.
The claimant's assumption here would be steeped in the classical positivist area

of law. See J.

AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF

(London 1863). J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW (2d ed. 1938); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605-10
(1908). Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF

THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE

LAW

(1961).

189.
190.

Southern Pac. Co. v. Teusen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See supra note 181.
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tate decision under this framework became a highly fortuitous affair
having an attenuated nexus with the stability in expectations about
such decision and giving little overt deference to demands for change.
5.

The Structural Location of PIL Rules

A further problem pervading the vested rights model of decision
related to the PIL rules themselves and their structural location within
the juridical paradigm. The dualism problem is that prescriptions like
the lex loci contractus and lex loci delictus, lex situs were given an
uneasy structural location in the strongbox of legal formalism.
Whether these prescriptions are part of the "positive law" of state X,
Y, or Z, or considering its transstate character, part of a more inclusive
strongbox that transcends the boundaries of a particular state is somewhat unclear. PIL prescriptions, rules and methods appear to be structurally located in domestic prescriptions, that is, as part of the law of a
particular body politic in space and time. But PIL prescriptions are
also structurally located in an arena of transnational, multicultural significance. In short, conflicts "rules" are of unclear-mystical locus. Most
writers appear to endorse the position that conflict of laws prescriptions are a part of "domestic" law. 9 ' They are, however, somewhat
more than just a part of the "positive law" of a forum, exclusive to that
forum. Structurally, these "rules" are part of a legal process which
transcends the interest of any single community. They are a part of a
global omnipresence rather than the omnipresence of a single legal regime. Both formulations tend to deny or severely constrict transstate
perspectives of control and authority.
The structural dimension, therefore, adds little clarity to analysis
for it is important to know just why these supposed rules of positive
law have to be spatially located so as to vest a right. The quest for
"locating the rule" is part of that aspect of formalistic positivism and
its eclectic offspring which has attempted to ascertain a criterion of
validity; thus the search is for the valid legal rule independent of the
decision, or indeed, the social process context. If, therefore, conflict of
laws rules are located, that is, the criterion of validity is located in
191. A. DICEY, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (9th ed. 1973).
The second question is an inquiry not as to jurisdiction, but as to the choice of
law (lex). . . .Each of these inquiries must be answered by any judge, English
or foreign, in accordance with definite principles and, by an English judge sitting
in an English court, in accordance with principles or rules to be found in the law
of England. These rules make up that department of English law which deals
with the conflict of laws.
Id. at 4. See also E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1958); J. STORY, supra note
148.
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international law, and if international law, at least in its Austinian context, is nothing but a synonym for positive morality, then PIL rules are
simply rules of positive morality. Thus, if we were to equate PIL with
public international law, we would be relegating, for example, almost
all of world trade regulation outside of that governed by treaty law of
"unincorporated" customary law, to a veritable legal vacuum. 92
Dicey ostensibly held the view that public international law was
really part of positive morality and was thus to be relegated to a nonlaw transnational framework.193 The same could not be said, however,
for the aggregate of outcomes representing PIL. Indeed, it would have
been ludicrous to have done so. Dicey, therefore, advanced the view
that PIL was essentially a part of the municipal law of a particular
sovereignty,19 4 and that externally created vested rights were enforceable only insofar as they were permitted to be enforced by the territorial
sovereign."'
6. Intellectual Tasks
The vested rights theorists did not enthusiastically embrace the
recommended intellectual tasks of the configuraline scheme. Their
most notable weaknesses were their opposition to teleology, their near
Cf. J. BEALE, supra note 176.
193. A. DICEY, supra note 191.
The growth of the rules for the choice of law is the necessary result of the peaceful existence of countries governed by different systems of law with the prevalence of commercial and social intercourse. From the moment that these conditions are realised, the judges of every country are compelled by considerations of
obvious convenience to exercise a choice of law, or, in other words to apply foreign law.
Id. at 6.
194. Id. at 8.
195. Dean Read . . . concludes, after an exhaustive examination of the English
and Commonwealth authorities, that "The true basis on which [those] authorities place the recognition of a foreign judgment is that it proves the fact that a
vested right has been created through the judicial process by the law of a foreign
law district. This basis not only supports and explains the finality requirements
and conclusiveness rule; it is implicit in the doctrine of territoriality of law. This,
however,is not to say that the ... common law of foreign judgments gives effect
to the so-called vested-right doctrine of conflict of laws to the extent of recognizing every right created by foreign territorial law through the judicial process."
... [T]he defenses which may be pleaded by the defendant in an action on a
foreign judgment, namely, that the judgment was obtained by fraud, or that its
enforcement would be contrary to English public policy, or that the proceedings
were opposed to natural justice, are all the creatures exclusively of English law.
Hence it is apparent that the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce is a right
created by English law and not by foreign law.
Id. at 987-88.
192.
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exclusion of predispositional and environmental conditioning factors in
decision, and their approach to trend studies. Their implicit predilections were closely identified with stability rather than change.' 96
7.

Postulation of Goals

Because the vested rights theorists were committed to radically
separating law from values and morality, they saw no utility in postulating normative preferences.
8.

Appraisal

To more fully appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of this
school, it will be constructive to set out a kind of "ideal" vested rights
view. When one says: "This marriage is valid everywhere, because it is
valid according to the prescriptions of the lex loci celebrationis," what
is one really saying? In purely formal terms one could be expressing
the' following: The ceremony in which the parties have participated
creates a presumption that a right has been "created" in the beneficiaries to the marriage (contract, sacrament, ritual, pact). In terms of
transnational decision, this vested right is the starting point of a legal
syllogism. The core framework for creating a vested right is if (A) (precipitating event), then (B) (creation of a right), then (C) (claim relating
to a secondary competence); however,the ideal vested rights theory of
PIL would be to eliminate (A) from the prescribing process event. By
eliminating the social facts, (A), in this framework, one is able to avoid
the problem of cross-cultural conflict relating, for example, to the
forms, substance and effects of a marriage in a transstate context. A
decisionmaker, when faced with a claim relating to a secondary prescribing competence that a foreign marriage be honored for some purpose or other, does not ask: "Why should I honor this marriage?"
Rather, he asks whether a right has been vested according to a territorial imperative like the lex loci celebrationis. If the right is formally
1 97
vested, the right vesting the marriage is honored for most purposes.
From a theoretical perspective, a number of unstated policy implications and assumptions derive from this model.
First, there is the substantive policy implicit in the idea that marriage units be honored in transstate context. One might ask is it the
"give and take" principle of reciprocal tolerances? Is there something
anterior to this? An affirmative answer is submitted based upon the
196. What has been set out here is a pure vested rights model. The actual workings of
the system have not, of course, been as rigid.
197. See generally supra note 176.
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belief, perhaps a part of common law tradition, that on a fundamental
level, the results of a process of commitment to a marital unit should
result in a stability in expectation across state lines. More specific policies to be protected include in such a context: (1) consent representing
the ritualized freedom of choice of the parties; (2) honoring the formal
aspect of individualism or civic power cross-culturally with the expectation of reciprocity; and (3) effects of the domestic relations process
(children, legitimacy, taboos, the transmission of wealth and status
through time and space, etc.). These are of course the deeper community policies that the "give and take" comity principle sought to stablize. In aggregate terms, these perspectives were the events precipitating a claim that a state's law-making power be honored.
Now, the vested rights approach denies the utility of the "give and
take" principle, yet its approach to conflict management across group
lines was not without merit if one kept primary community policies in
view. The idea of a vested right, abstracted in form from social process,
avoids in form the overt clash of cross-cultural traditions. It does this
by "avoiding," after a fashion, conflicts of substance. This could be
very important in periods of transstate crisis. Religious conflict like
that spawned by the Reformation illustrates one such example. Conflicts in ideology identified with secular states (inheritance policy
under capitalism and socialism, for example) and extant in a particular
claim provide another example. In such situations, an important function of the process of decision is the avoidance of expectations of
counterproductive chauvinism. The vested rights "formula" assists the
decisionmaker in avoiding the "political" problem.
Professor McDougal, somewhat perjoratively, calls this the "squid
function." It should be noted that the "squid function" is an ubiquitous and not insignificant function in the decision process. At best, the
"squid function" enables a decisionmaker, who is otherwise powerless,
to preempt the power process and advance the cause of justice in the
individual case. In a totalitarian context, such a competency is an important check upon unbridled coercion. 198 McDougal's "squid function" may be generalized within the broader taxonomy of a configurative perspective about law. The function is one of manipulation of
symbolically relevant signs and doctrines as a base and strategem in
198. The term "squid function" is derived from the actions of the sea creature which,
in times of peril, disappears within a cloud of ink of its own making. In an analogous
manner some members of the judiciary who wish to camouflage their legal reasoning
produce arcane and obscure opinions in which they can hide. This process is to be criticized as it fails to clarify the legal issues involved and does not satisfy the common demand for an authoritative decision and a just result in every legal conflict.
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the creation and application of law.""9 The PIL function concerned
with the management of signs and symbols, however, is to be viewed as
an instrumental one. It is not an end; it is a means to an end.
This function has been misunderstood by scholars and decisionmakers socialized to the fundamentalism associated with this perspective. Moreover, advanced techniques in legal research and in the
understanding of the interrelationship between law, logic, and social
policy made this perspective a painfully inadequate one from an observational standpoint. In historical context, however, the vested rights
method was a useful one, its detractors notwithstanding. A protestant
decisionmaker did not have to honor Roman Catholic law because it
was Roman Catholic law, or vice versa; instead, he simply upheld a
"right" that came stripped of any "weltanschauung. 2 00 This was a significant contribution to the stability of expectations about value allocations cutting across state and group lines. 0 1
A third implication of the model set out above relates to the technique by which foreign law could be an institutionally relevant aspect
of the forum's law-making competence. The indirect manner in which
this was achieved was significant in deparochializing PIL without provoking a natural tendency in law to be partial to unilateral perspectives.
The
vested
rights
methodology-however
dysfunctional-performed
a significant integrative job, although it
paradoxically institutionalized a massive myopia as to what was actually happening. In other words, a decisionmaker could deparochialize
the forum's legal culture under the guise of a legal process allegedly
bereft of any "weltanschauung." The resulting "reification" of concepts
such as lex loci celebrationis or lex loci contractus, supported in this
example by favor matrimoni or by so true a rule as "party autonomy, 2 02 could lead to upholding a family unit with the expectation of
199.

Karis provides an example of the use of the squid function in modern times. T.
TREASON TRIAL IN SouTH AFRICA (1965). See also Reisman, Some Observations on the Limits of TotalitarianPower, 12 ANTIOCH REV. 155 (1952). The Reisman
article was developed from an address to the American Committee on Cultural Freedom
forum entitled "The Appeals of Totalitarianism." Reisman was a Professor of Social Sciences at the College of the University of Chicago.
200. At a broad level of abstraction the unarticulated "weltanschauung" is a commitment to the universality of a religious weltanschauung that operates on a more inclusive
pattern of identifications. The word weltanschauung means "view of the world or of life."
MURET-SANDERS ENCYCLOPAEDIC ENGLISH GERMAN 1110 (H. Banman 14 ed. 1910).
201. It should be noted that Professor Ehrenzweig's recent treatise does not seem to
treat the etiology of the vested rights concepts as this writer has. A perusal of his views

KAIs, THE

will clearly show areas of contrast and similarity. 2 A.
INTERNATIONAL LAW (special part 1973).
202.

EHRENZWEIG

& E.

JAYME, PRIVATE

"Party autonomy" apparently means "an agreement between adult parties of
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reciprocity when it should not be so honored, or vice versa. The exclusion from consideration of basic community policy was bound to lead
to the kind of impasse that now epitomizes PIL in the context of family law.203
D.

Modernist Perspectives

1. The Local Law Revolution
The local law revolution was essentially inspired by the American
Realist movement.'" One does not have to subscribe to all the tenets
of the American Realist movement to realize its enormous impact upon
jurisprudential thinking. The spectre of nine old men, making and applying law, was a sobering revelation. So too was the Holmesian insight, that prediction, i.e., what the courts will do in fact, was all that
mattered to the legal fraternity; 0 5 and this, moreover, was essentially
to be seen from the "bad man's" point of view.'06 Results were seen to
encapsulate the heart of the judicial process, not mere juridical eleequal bargaining power upon the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any country in favor of
that of another in a matter devoid of public interest to the contrary." Id. at 43.
203. The idea was well expressed by Judge Traynor in Emery v. Emery, as follows,
"[i]t is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family
cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their home," 45 Cal. 2d 421, 428,
289 P.2d 218, 223 (1955), in effect avoiding the limping marriage situation. The search
was thus to establish a unitary regime on the basis of a series of legal functions about the
nature of "legal rights." The registration of affection units does not solve all the choice of
law problems.
204. McDougal points out that the principal tenet of the American Legal Realist
movement is its "insistence that law is instrumental only to the social ends and ...
it
has consistently ... found authority in peoples' empirical perspectives about social consequences." Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 174, at 372.
205. 0. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPAS 167 (1920). In
addressing the legal profession at a dedication of a new hall at the Boston University
School of Law on January 8, 1897, Holmes explained: "The object of our study, then, is
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts." Id. Cf. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1 (19"13). His
perception of the lawyer's role was somewhat similar to that of Holmes. He stated that:
"Concrete occurrences to the lawyer are pregnant with the potential sequences which
threaten governmental action. His essential business is to predict these future sequences
accurately and to induce the desired and guard against the undesired." Id. at 11.
For both a critical reaction to Bingham's theory and an attempt to distinguish it
from that of Holmes, see Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L.
REv. 352 (1931).
206. 0. HOLMES, supra note 205, at 171. He explains:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
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gance or symmetry. "The life of the law has not been logic" said
Holmes in his Common Law, "it has been experience."' 2'0
Along with the crystallization of Professor Beale's jurisprudence of
territorial sovereignty, vested rights and legislative jurisdiction, there
developed a critical body of Realist inspired scholarship in the conflict
of laws area, spearheaded by two Yale law professors, Walter Wheeler
Cook 0 8 and Ernest Lorenzen. 20 9 The view that Cook espoused was an
essentially critical one-"untheoretical" in many ways, but highly
skeptical of a priori conceptualism. The problem with evaluating Cook
results from the fact that he was primarily an analyticalist-a devastatingly effective one at that-and his function was primarily that of
discharge in an intellectually purgative sense. Cook rationalized his position on the basis that the "discharge"2 10 would fertilize the "intellectual garden," free it of "rank
weeds" and thereafter "useful vegetables
21 1
would grow and flourish."
At the risk of oversimplification, one might say that the formalistic
positivists accepted Story without comity, and that the Realists, in demolishing the conceptualism of vested rights, left one nothing in the
way of a coherent, unified and integrated theory about PIL. In this
sense, Cook may have been right in saying that his "destructive" scholarship had prepared the way for a newer paradigm."1 ' Currie was probthe law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Id.
207. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1st ed. 1881).
208. Cook's contribution appears to have been the result of an accident, since he
never took a law school course in conflicts and missed being indoctrinated in existing
fundamentalist dogma. His initiation to PIL came about when he was asked to teach the
subject in 1919. Cook was a Professor of Law at Yale in the year 1919 and a Professor of
Law at Northwestern University in 1942. He authored a number of works in this area.
See W. COOK,THE ALIENABILITY OF CHOSES IN ACTION (1916); W. COOK, THE ALIENABILTry OF CHOSES IN AcTioN-A REPLY TO PROFESSOR WILLISTON (1917); W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); W. COOK, MY PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1941); W. COOK, THE POWERS OF CONGRESS UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE (1919); W. COOK, SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE LAWS (1927).
209. See E. LORENZEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1951); E.
LORENZEN, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN COURTS (1924); E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1947).

210. On the concept of discharge, see generally Lipson, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J.
952, 952-53 (1975) (reviewing A.I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956: AN
EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION (1974)).
211. W. COOK, supra note 81, at ch. IX.
212. Cook's critique of the Story paradigm was ruthless and quite unfair. He zeroed
in on Story's use of the sovereignty-territoriality symbols, but had little appreciation for
the policies animating the internationalist, comity-directed perspective. Moreover, the
culpability for the use and misuse of the sovereignty idea, especially in reified raimant,
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ably close to the mark when he said that Cook succeeded in discrediting Beale's Restatement of Conflict of Laws 1s as "thoroughly as the
one man can ever discredit the intellectual
intellectual product '2 of
1
product of another.

4

Cook's methods are today a commonplace in any traditional, accredited American law school, where the enormously successful "Socratic" method is used to socialize neophyte lawyers to rigorous analytical thinking. In a sense, the attacks on the "Socratic" method are
essentially mirrored in the attacks scholars made on Cook's "destructive" propensities. 1 8 The consequences flowing from Cook's lethal pen,
however, were tempered by the realization that when the intellect is
not overwhelmed by arid conceptualism, PIL decisions are, in reality,
"being
guided by considerations of social and economic policy or ethics."2 16s Cook held the view that legal decisions demand a consideration
of "all the relevant facts of life required for a wise decision. ' 17 Cook
was committed to practical reason. 18
Cook's "theory" is itself a modest and not altogether original
one.11s It derives in part from Judge Learned Hand's "homologous"
right theory. 2" According to Cook, a court (forum), having before it a
lies at the door of Western political science and legal culture in general since, at least,
the time of Bodin. Story was not the fiend here. However, Cook seemed quite unaware
that no matter how ambiguous the sovereignty idea was, one of its core implications was
its reference to control and authority in global terms. Story was clearly not insensitive to
these realities even if Cook sometimes was. Moreover, one of the crude and brutal truths
about the international power process is that territory-land is and does serve as a base of
power. To ignore the interdependencies spawned by the global power process is just as
unreal as to ignore the interstimulation of authority structures serving the common interests in optimally preferred ways. Moreover, Cook sometimes recognized the power variable associated with territory when he said "the law of a given state or country can be
enforced only within its territorial limits." W. COOK, supra note 81, at 41.
213.
214.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).

B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).

215. It seems rather unlikely, however, that Cook would have conceded the legitimacy of this criticism. For example, in introducing his "study in 'legal method,'" Cook
noted: "It is believed, however, that what has been done . . . is constructive and not
merely destructive." W. COOK, supra note 81, at ix.
216. Id. at 45.
217. Id.
218. Compare this with the position of Joseph W. Bingham, the early realist. He
states: "The law is an essentially practical matter." Bingham, supra note 205, at 3 n.4.
219. See Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HAiv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
220. See Guinnes v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), where Judge Hand expresses his view as follows: "[N]o court can enforce any [law] but that of its own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can
only invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign." Id. at 770. Accord Direction der
Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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problem with a foreign element, never honors foreign law as such. In
actuality, a court is applying a rule of decision identical with or very
similar to that of the foreign law. The court, therefore, never enforced
a "foreign-created" vested right, but created rights by making and applying law.221
a.

Observational standpoint of the Realists

Generally, Realists felt that law could not be approached scientifically unless one adopted the perspective of the observer, and thereby
generated knowledge about rather than of law. 22 This perspective per221. See generally W. COOK, supra note 81, at 35-36.
222. The realists were really the first to recognize the pivotal significance of this
standpoint in jurisprudence. Thus, a very clear-cut distinction emerges in the earliest
realistic formulations that designate the essential differences between theorizing about
rather than of law. One early formulation is the following:
[L]et us pause here a moment to determine the attitude from which we are to
view the field of law. The judge, presiding over and deciding litigation, is engaged in the art of government. He is making law. The lawyer, who argues a case
before judge, jury, or other law determining agency, is assisting in the law-making process. The legislator also indirectly influences similar future processes by
the part which he plays in determining the existence and form of legislative expression, which authoritatively indicates what shall or shall not be done in concrete instances. These processes lie in the field of legal study. They are some of
its objective phenomena. Therefore to view the field from the attitude of the
judge at his official work, or of the lawyer in court, or of the legislator performing his function is, metaphorically, to attempt to see the field from a small spot
inside it instead of from above and outside of it. If we are to view the law as a
field of study analogous to that of any science, we must look at it from the position of the law teacher, the law student, the legal investigator, or the lawyer who
is engaged in searching the authorities to determine "what the law is." These
men are not directly acting as part of the external phenomena which compose
the field of law. They are studying that field from without and therefore from
the position which will give a wholly objective and the least confusing view.
The field of law is far wider and more complex than an imaginary system of
promulgated or developed stereotyped rules and principles. It is a field for scientific study analogous to the field of any other science. Concrete sequences of
facts and their legal consequences are the external phenomena for investigation
and prediction. Knowledge of the causative interrelations of such sequences and
of the causes, organization, and operation of the governmental machinery entering into them constitutes knowledge of law in one of the legal senses of the word.
Rules and principles have been developed for use in this field and technical
terms with definitions more or less stereotyped have been adopted. They are
only mental tools which are used to classify, carry, and communicate economically the accumulated knowledge of the law similarly to the use of generalizations and definitions in other sciences.
Bingham, supra note 205, at 10-11.
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mitted Cook to dissect the traditional PIL perspectives with scientific
accuracy and deliver a telling critique of its inadequacies. The participant aspect of scholarship did not, however, occasion an effort to explicitly identify with mankind as such. Broad and apparently liberal
identifications were presumably adopted. Fundamentally, Realist
scholarship, with exceptions, did not consciously develop a vigorous international perspective.
b.

Focus of inquiry: comprehensiveness in conception of community

The local law adherents gave scant evidence of an internationalist
perspective.113 For this reason, there is no evidence of a comprehensive
concept of community in a larger sense.12 4 The local law theory provided an appealing, if artificial, homogenous simplicity showing little
real concern for cross-cultural comparative investigation. Indeed, such
consideration appears to be absent in Cook's work.
According to some theorists, Cook's importance lies in his "realization that the function of conflict of laws is not the preservation of international order but the carrying out of local law and policy."'225 If this
is a sound judgment," 6 then the whole character of the international
community process with its rich diversity of participants plays a quite
peripheral role in PIL. Moreover, the perspective excludes the notion
of reciprocal tolerances as an intrinsic component of the decision process; it institutionalizes a quite limited perspective about the community context of decision. Cook's theory seems to give too much
credence to the state as the repository of rationality to the exclusion of
a broader view of perspectives.
c.

Comprehensiveness in conception of law

-Balanced

emphasis between perspectives and operations

Cook's theory was an unusual one for a man rooted in the Realist
223. Compare this with the following statement made by Cook on the subject of extraterritorial limitations on the legal process:
Whether international law imposes limitations and if so, what they are, can he
determined only by observation. Personally, I can find no consensus among civilized countries upon the matter under consideration; in fact, the utmost diversity of opinion seems to exist. I must, however, leave it to others more competent
to speak to say whether my observations are in accord with the facts.
W. CooK, supra note 81, at 41.
224. Cook states that territorial organization is not the only form of social organization, although it is a convenient one. Id.
225. P. NYGH, CONFICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 14 (1971).
226. This writer thinks it unsound.
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tradition. It was unusual because it was a highly artificial formulation.
Taken on its face, the idea that a forum always applies the law "of"
the forum, even though it "applies" a rule of decision identical or similar to the rule of decision of another state, comes very close to denying
transstate perspectives about authority in PIL.
-Clarity

in conception of authority and control

The American Realists acknowledged, however, that human beings
make policy and that no meaningful account of patterns of control and
authority can be realistic without a proper appreciation of the human
element. Yet the superrealistic emphasis of the American school
tended to depreciate the utility of the symbol, myth and doctrine in
stabilizing expectations about control and authority across group lines.
In extreme formulations, the Realists could even be read as denying
conceptual thinking. At best, the Realists were masters at the manipulation of signs and symbols of authority. Cook's most enduring methodological contribution was to demolish the mystical connection between "locus" and "right." Once a claim precipitating event was
thawed from being frozen in a particular spatial locus, the conceptual
pathway was opened for a much more functional approach to PIL decision. As Cook put it, "[H]ere, as elsewhere, the basis must be a prag2' 2 7
matic one-of the practical working rule.
d.

Classification of decision: public order, constitutive, civil order

It is paradoxical that Cook purported to provide, through PIL, a
quite unvarnished picture of certain phases of the international legal
process and its animating symbols. He erroneously believed that control and authority did not exist in global terms outside of the realities
'of state power. He came almost as close as the Austinians in believing
the myth of a non-law framework for PIL. As a result, public and civic
order priorities, as well as the constitutive dimensions of decision, were
left undeveloped for the larger global community.
e.

Intellectual tasks

A great debt is owed to the Realists for their eclectic operationalization of a number of the recommeded intellectual tasks. Some of
these legal functions were consciously accomplished while some were
performed by accident. But this much is certain: Their methods, particularly their emphasis on rule and fact skepticism, and their insistence on understanding real conditions of claim and decision supplied
227.

W. COOK, supra note 81, at 45.
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the foundation for a much fuller and more scientific appreciation of
the interrelationship between decision, community process and preferred social goals.
f. Postulation of goals
The local law theorists were an essentially relativistic group. They
preferred not to postulate goals, although their work implies not only a
minimum order but also a situational sense of justice. Moreover, even
here they could not conceive of power and constitutive processes beyond the particulars of their own state. They did show, however, that
someone's preferred choice was extant in all legal decision.
g.

Appraisal

Unfortunately for PIL, the proponents of the "local law theory"
gave scant guidance as to how, and by what criteria, conflict of laws
problems could be solved. Nor did they attempt to clarify fully the
objectives of this branch of law. Their skepticism of grand theory, their
partiality to result selection and social expediency, their reliance on
the "hunch," or the common sense features of justice in the individual
case, indeed, their total or near total partiality to a severe juridical
strain of nominalism, seems to have retarded the replacement of the
vested rights approach with a more coherent theory about PIL. It
should be said, however, that their work did suggest a way out:
functionalism.2 '
2.

Currie, Cavers, and the Legal Process Paradigm: Governmental Interest Analysis and Legal Process'"
Two of the most influential "restaters" of the local law theory were

228. A sophisticated realist statement of the functional approach is to be found in
Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935). "Legal criticism is empty without objective description of the causes and consequences of legal decisions. Legal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory
of values." Id. at 849. Cf. Cohen, The Problems of FunctionalJurisprudence,1 MOD. L.
REV. 5 (1937). See also McDougal, Fullerv. The American Realist: An Intervention, 50
YALE L.J. 827, 835-36 (1941). "[T]hey [the realists] have been hard at work for the
achievement of certain humanitarian and democratic ideals of intermediate or relatively
low-level abstraction." Id. McDougal has, of course, transcended the "binding" character
of these low-level abstractions that have so disastrously castrated the promising start the
realists portented.
229. American scholarship in PIL in the postwar era has been extraordinarily rich
and stimulating. Needless to say, this is a very distinguished group. The leaders include,
in addition to Currie and Cavers, Reese, von Mehren, Trautman, Nadelman, Baade, D.
Currie, Cramton, Rosenberg and others. See generally H. BAADE, THE SOVIET IMPACT ON
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Professors Currie 230 and Cavers.28 I Their work incorporates elements of
a post-Realist perspective. This is a perspective of law whose pervasive
influence in the current trends of American legal culture should not be
underestimated. This section will provide a critique of this point of
view using essentially Professor Currie's governmental interests analysis as the primary target but retaining for criticism those areas that
Professor Currie and Professor Cavers share. The second part of this
section will concentrate upon Professor Cavers because his book, The
Choice of Law Process,'32 brings into sharp focus the strengths and
limitations of the legal process paradigm as Cavers has sought to develop it in PIL.
a. Governmental interests analysis: the theory
The fundamental contribution of Professor Brainerd Currie's governmental interests analysis approach to PIL lies in the recognition
that in this system, many conflict of laws cases pose false problems.
Hence, Currie's key distinction is between those problems that are basically "false" conflicts and those that are "true" conflicts.283 Currie believed that the vast majority of choice of law cases really posed false
problems and that the governmental interests methodology that he developed would identify and dispose of them without the tortuous intellectual baggage of the vested rights appproach, while producing more
2
sensible results.

4

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRI
& H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
CASES-COMMENTS-QESTIONS (3d ed. 1981); K. NADELMAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE (1972); W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS (6th ed. 1966); R. VON MEHREN & W. TMMENG, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: 3 YEARS AFTER PASSAGE (1981).
230. B. CURRIE, supra note 214. See generally B. CuRRIE & N. HEALY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY (1965).
231. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); D. CAVER, Oral Contracts to

Provide by Will and the Choice-of-Law Process:Some Notes on Bernkrant, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW-ESSAYS FOR WAKEMAN ScoTT 38 (1964); Cavers, The Changing Choice-ofLaw Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963).
232. See supra note 231.
233. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 188-91. See also Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974) (forum state's law applies when
foreign state is "disinterested" since its limitation on damages law is intended to protect
only its own resident defendants); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964)
(forum state's law applies even though both forum and foreign states have a substantial
interest in the litigation as evidenced by the public policies underlying their statutes).
Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) (foreign
state's law applies in order to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
contract).
234. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 180-87.
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According to Currie's theory, a choice of law problem was ostensibly false when a judge prescribed the law of a state to a particular
problem in which that state had no rational "interest" in having its law
advanced.2 8 Correlatively, a false conflict also existed when the judge
applied the law of the forum to a problem in which it had no governmental interest to advance and did so at the expense of another "interested" state.' 86 The identification of a requisite governmental interest
is essentially a limited factoral exercise that establishes a logical or
causal nexus among the parties, the states of primary affiliation of the
parties, and a "zone of interest" of the relevant substantive laws delimited in the case.
Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.237 provides an uncomplicated
example of Currie's view. In Walton, the plaintiff was injured by the
defendant in Saudi Arabia. s ' The plaintiff was an Arkansas citizen;
the defendant was a Delaware corporation doing business in New
York." 9 Walton sued the defendant in New York, failing to plead or
prove Saudi Arabian law.' 40 When the case reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court ruled that the plaintiff had
failed to plead a cause of action because of his reliance on a form of
action recognized by the forum. 4" Currie's primary point in this case
was that an interested state had its law effectually displaced by the lex
loci delicti, making an uninterested state (Saudi Arabia) create law for
this problem in a most axiomatic manner, or as Currie put it, by the
"mere logic of the system itself.''4
In slightly modified ways, therefore, Currie sought to demonstrate
that the vast majority of so-called conflict of laws issues were false
problems. According to this theory, the New York court advanced a
Saudi Arabian governmental interest in a situation where Saudi Arabia
235. Id. at 188-91.
236. Id.
237. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872
(1956).
238. 233 F.2d at 542.
239. Id.
240. Id. Under New York State's rules of conflict of laws, the applicable substantive
law to an alleged tort is the law of the state where the injury occurred; in this case, that
would be Saudi Arabia. Under general federal rules, the law of a foreign country is a fact
which must be proved. Id. at 543.
241. Id. at 546. Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, the court would
abuse its discretion if it were to take judicial notice of a foreign law not pleaded by the
plaintiff when that law is not easily comprehended. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 4511 (McKinney
1963); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
872 (1956).
242.

B. CuRRiE, supra note 214, at 5.
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had no interest in having its substantive law govern liability for the
alleged tort. Currie tried to show that most conflict of laws problems
(in terms of his methodology) invariably involved the "exclusive" concern of a particular body politic; to apply the prescriptions of another
state, if different, would be the most basic form of irrationality. A decisionmaker in such a posture would, in effect, be advancing the governmental interests of a state that had no interest in having its law applied. The false conflicts distinction has shown some functional utility
and has been more or less accepted by writers like Cavers,24 s Baade2"4
and Weintraub. 2 45 What Currie proposed in cases of "true" conflicts is
more problematic. 46 Currie's suggested solution was that a forum be
restrained and enlightened. 47 Other scholars have seen bolder challenges and have suggested such ,concepts as "the better rule approach"' 48 or in the case of Professor Cavers, "principles of

preference. "249
b.

Currie's methodology

Currie developed a five step methodology for solving PIL
problems.25 0 The first step was that a court should normally be ex243. See supra note 231. See also Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REV. 141,
150 (1967) (Cavers appears to agree with Currie "on the disposition of true conflicts
cases in an interested forum").
244. Baade, Foreword to New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 673 (1963); Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-InterestsAnalysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 329 (1972).
245. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1980).
246. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 190-91.
247. Id. at 186.
248. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966). Choice of law is not simply a matter of choosing a jurisdiction
but, also, a determination of which law makes "good socio-economic sense for the time
when the court speaks." Id. at 1587. Judges' preferences for the forum state's law reflects
a conviction that these are better laws than other states' laws. Id. at 1588.
249. D. CAvEns, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PRocEss (1965). Cavers' seven principles of
preference, five relating to torts and two relating to contracts, are guides to judicial decisionmaking in true conflicts. The purposes underlying certain aspects of laws (e.g., standard of conduct) and the attribute of territoriality were considered in the formulation of
the principles. For example, principle one provides that if the state of injury sets a
higher standard of conduct or of financial protection against injury than the state where
the actor resides, the laws of the state of injury apply so long as the person injured was
not related to the actor. Id. at 139. Under principle two, the laws of the state of injury
again apply if they prescribe a lower standard of conduct than the state where the actor
resides. Id. at 146. Both principles imply a recognition of a territoriality attribute that a
state will protect people and property within its borders. Id. at 139-40.
250. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 183-84.
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pected to apply its own law to any case having a foreign element.,
The implied assumptions here were first, that the pleadings of the parties did not assert or assume the "relevance" of the foreign community's prescription. Thus, a court would be responding to the demands
and expectations of the litigants as if it were guided by the techniques
of issue-joinder associated with the litigation process itself. The other
assumption is that courts are best suited to make and apply their
''own" law.
The second step relates to the situation where one of the parties
asserts in the pleadings that the law of a foreign state should furnish
the rule of decision. When such a claim is made, the court should, according to Currie, "inquire whether the relation of the forum to the
case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an
interest in the application of that policy. 2 2 This policy was to be ascertained by the ordinary processes of construction and interpretation.
These processes are, of course, by no means "ordinary" and involve
intensely debated jurisprudential questions. Whatever Currie may have
implied in this regard, he was clear about his own jurisprudential perspective. He regarded himself as a sociological-functionalist and saw
the task of interpretation as effectuating a basically "legislative
2'5 3
purpose.
The third step involved the ascertainment of the policy expressed
by the relevantly connected foreign law and the significance of the
"reach" of that law to the problem at hand. 2" Step four involved the
elimination of the state whose prescriptions were irrelevant to the case
and the application of those prescriptions which were relevant to the
decision. 281 The fifth and perhaps most controversial point was that
when a forum had a "reasonable" (in Currie's terms) basis for applying
its own law, it should do so to the exclusion of the other relevantly
connected state's prescription.2 5 6 This last proviso was considerably
27
ameliorated in Currie's later writings. 6
It is evident that these methods, although a notable improvement
upon the void left in the aftermath of the realist revolution, had dis251. Id. at 183. There are a number of threshhold problems involved in Currie's first
step, but these points will be reviewed in a later section. See infra text accompanying
notes 260-62.
252. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 183.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
(1963);

Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNEMr. PROBs. 754
B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 538-39.

N.Y.J.

INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 3

tinctive limitations which Currie himself was the first to admit. Indeed,
Currie sought to follow through on the Realist critique of conflict of
laws "rules" by urging that the entire conceptual edifice be reduced to
ashes, rather than merely be purged of rank weeds. Currie despaired
that a new paradigm would, however, in phoenix-like fashion, arise
from the ashes. He put it in these words:
We would indeed do well to scrap the system of choice-oflaw rules for determining the rule of decision, though without
entertaining vain hopes that a new "system" will arise to take
its place. We shall have to go back to the original problems,
and to the hard task of dealing with them realistically by ordinary judicial methods, such as construction and interpretation,
and by neglected political methods. 58
The outstanding virtue of Currie's governmental interests analysis was
its focus upon the clarification of the "relevant substantive policy" of
the bodies politic whose laws were in ostensible conflict. Such a focus
was no small accomplishment, but the method does not go far
enough. 5 9 Clarification of policies dealing with a public order system
that transcends the framework of a particular state and includes significant transgroup perspectives of authority and control, requires much
more than a mere ascertainment of legislative purpose within a discrete community which may be mythical and is, in any event, highly
problematic in law. As Cook and others have suggested, a broader understanding of decision-making would seem to be crucial to the
enterprise.
c.

Observational standpoint

Currie retained a sophisticated perspective about some aspects of
the observational standpoint. The same is, in large measure, true of
Cavers. Professor Baade has rightly observed that
both for Cavers and for Currie, the governmental-interests ap258. B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 185.
259. Focus on policy content requires using the method of comparative justice. If
adjudication is conditioned by functional, rather than formalistic perspectives, this approach opens a pathway to a comparative law aspect in PIL that stresses the significance
of functional equivalents and disequivalents in the prescribing process as well as homogenizes the content of PIL through the search for the deep structure of prescriptive
equivalents-the so-called bommon core of legal prescription. Furthermore, the approach
could be used to stress a sensitivity to emerging standards of international justice associated, inter alia, with human rights. Currie, of course, did not go this far. He was neither
a comparativist, nor an international lawyer. Nonetheless, his approach can be read as at
least suggesting the potential relevance of these issues.
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proach is "academic." While both authors sought-and
found-some justification for their theories in past decisions,
and while everybody is gratified by seeing his views accepted
by the courts, the main objective is the development of a
method about which it can be said that "we should all be better off if my hypothesis had, indeed, been the principle actually
informing the decisions of the courts." Conflict-of-laws questions are amazingly complicated, and they are, probably in
good part for this very reason, rather infrequently litigated. It
thus seems essential that the scholar pave the way for the
2 s0

judge in this area.

It was this "academic" approach which, in reality, served as the
rough approximation of an observational standpoint that led Currie to
urge that the fundamentalist approach was so bankrupt that the entire
myth system "of" law be scrapped and that "real" problems serve as
the prime condition for decision. What seemed less explicit in Cook
became thoroughly explicit in Currie's formulation.
Currie, perhaps more than any other conflicts theorist, cleared the
conflicts garden for a meta-theory about PIL which had a distinct policy-directed focus. But this realistic appreciation of law in relation to
social process, crucial to the observational standpoint, was severely undermined by other weaknesses which seemed to afflict Currie's theory.
First, Currie did not distinguish the academicians or the scholars' perspective sufficiently or consistently from that of the active decisionmaker.21 1 This inadequacy may have prevented him from developing more fully a theory about PIL that would include transstate
perspectives as an indispensable component of theory. Second, Currie's
conception of the allocation of role-competencies between judges and
legislators was very structured and did not adequately explore the role
of judges or other decisionmakers in multistate situations. This conception, in turn, had a dramatic effect upon his maintaining a consistent "observational" standpoint when he needed to do so.
These problems emerged in Currie's earlier essays " s where he ap260. Baade, supra note 243, at 145 (footnotes omitted). Professor Baade agrees on
the advantages of the "academic" approach. "There is no need to manhandle precedent
until it falls in line with the new scheme, nor is there any necessity for the use of question-begging formulae that are to receive their specific contents through future decisions." Id. at 146 (footnotes omitted).
261. The problems that we alluded to earlier seem to have compelled this perspective. See supra text accompanying notes 96-120.
262. See B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 9.
The English practice, whereby the law of the forum furnishes the rule of
decision until it is displaced by a different law with a greater claim to recogni-
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peared to merge, within the structural limits of the judicial role that he
thought appropriate, the perspective of scholar with that of the judge
as decisionmaker. Note here the confusion caused by role identification
with judges and the simultaneous assumption of a standpoint outside
of the system in order to prescribe the appropriate role-designation.
The nature of the subject compels that the scholar's standpoint be
identified with a theory about PIL. These problems emerged more
acutely in Currie's later essays. "s
d. Currie, governmental interests and the judicial standpoint
Currie's early essays appeared to merge the standpoint of the observer with that of the judicial decisionmaker to the detriment of clarity for both roles. He did this by ascribing structural-functional limitations to judicial lawmaking in his role as a scholar. In the formulation
of his governmental interests perspective, Currie largely merged the
standpoint of the disengaged observer with that of the judge. He delimited the functional capability and role-structure of the judge by asserting the primacy of constitutive foundations of the separation of
powers myth and by the moral axioms associated with representative
democracy. 2 " Having done this, the standpoint shifted to that of a partion, brought forward by a party wishing to take advantage of the difference,
seems normal and natural. It has something of the quality of soundness that one
associates with a house that has been designed skillfully in terms of its relationship to the physical characteristics of its site. This is a rule of law admirably
adapted to the facts of its environment. Lawyers and judges are ordinarily
schooled in their own domestic law. Day in and day out they think, advise, and
argue and dispose of cases in terms of that law. They develop familiarity with its
provisions and sometimes expertness and even insights concerning it. They are
prone, at least according to a widely held belief, to overlook the significance of
foreign facts and to proceed in accordance with local law in many instances in
which attention to the foreign law would have produced a different result. The
intrusion of foreign law is an unsettling departure from routine, involving even
under ideal conditions some encounter with the unfamiliar, some departures
from usual procedures, some additional burden; and there are situations in
which the degree of unfamiliarity and the burden of understanding can become
oppressive. To say that there is a strong presumption favoring the application of
the law of the forum until good cause is shown why it should not be applied is to
give prescriptive form to an observation of behavior that has something in common with Newton's laws of inertia.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
263. See infra notes 267-78.
264. Thus, Currie stated:
Where several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests in the
application of their policies, a court is in no position to "weigh" the competing
interests, or to evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly. This is especially evident when we consider two co-ordinate states, with
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tially disengaged observer. For false conflicts, therefore, one was not
entirely disengaged but had to apply the law of the forum if one's state
had a legitimate reason for doing so. If there were no interests being
advanced in applying forum law, one then had to apply the law of the
group whose interest would be advanced-a peculiarly atomized concept of transgroup interest. Currie added that if two states are involved
in a problem designated as a "true conflict," the decisionmaker had to
abstain. This he designated as "political" decision-making of a high
order. He therefore questioned whether judges ought to be charged, as
a matter of principle, with the discretion to make the kinds of choices
that such problems require. He appeared to argue, in effect, for a conservative approach to judicial decision-making in this arena or for the
displacement of any judicial discretion where the choice of law problem
involved a conflict of statutory law or perhaps uncodified common
65
law.2
The quintessence of governmental interest analysis, therefore, is
that the legislature is functionally geared to the making of law because
of the resources and institutions at its disposal such as the legislative
committee system. Judges, on the other hand, are seen to apply law,
but they are functionally limited by the resources and capabilities of
counsel in the adversary system and the moral-ethical conventions attendant upon democratic decision-making.2 "
such decisions being made by the courts of one or the other ....
But when the
court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign law applicable, it is assuming
a great deal: it is holding the policy, or interest, of its own state inferior and
preferring the policy or interest of the foreign state. . . . [T]he task is not one to
be performed by a court. I know that courts make law, and that in the process
they "weigh conflicting interests".... But assessment of the respective values
of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a
function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function
that the courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack the necessary resources. . . . This is a job for a legislative committee, and determining the policy to be formulated on the basis of the information assembled is a job for a
competent legistlative body.
B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 181-82 (footnotes omitted).
265. Id. at 177-87.
266. But see Reese, Book Review, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 228, 232-33 (1965). Reese
states:
With all respect to Professor Currie, it seems clear that a legislature is not
well equipped to handle (questions as to competing state interests). Of necessity,
a legislature can legislate only on a plane of some generality. But, as Professor
Currie rightly points out, generalities must be avoided like the plague in choice
of law. . . and questions should be decided, at least initially, on a narrow basis.
Only a court can tailor its decision to the needs of the particular case, and only
by proceeding on a case-to-case basis can there be hope of ultimately developing
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It is evident that Currie sought to clarify the judicial and legislative competence in functional terms and relate this to PIL. He appears
not to have clearly located himself, however, in terms of the scholar's
identifications and objectives. His primary identification seems to have
been with that of judge as decisionmaker and the legislator as decisionmaker. His primary objective, as he admitted, was a functional, teleologically oriented conception of what he thought a state's governmental interests were. These interests, he maintained, were to be
ascertained by the ordinary processes of interpretation and statutory
construction although the judicial role appears to have become somewhat more significant in Currie's later writings.2 6 7 According to Currie
to assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the
foreign state is a serious matter; the mere fact that a suggested
broad conception of local interest will create conflict with that
of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should
be reexamined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained
interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in
which it must be applied to effectuate a forum's legitimate
purpose. 268
His persectives, however, remained closely identified with those of the
legislature and the judiciary. Yet, in assuming these identifications and
objectives, Currie, at the same time, unconsciously sought to establish
for himself the observational standpoint of the scholar with a more inclusive, if inarticulate, sense of "justice." In this connection, Currie's
satisfactory rules of choice of law. If the job is to be done at all, it will almost
surely be done by the courts and not by the legislature. Indeed, Professor Currie
is quite frank in stating that the legislature can hardly be expected to deal comprehensively with these matters.
If the job is to be done at all, it must be done by the courts. The real question is whether there should be any weighing of interests in choice of law or,
more specifically, whether there should be a weighing of competing state interests and a weighing of a state's interests in the application of a particular rule
against its other more general interests. Professor Currie would be quite content
to eschew all efforts of this kind and simply to have the court apply its own local
law whenever the forum state has a legitimate interest of its own to protect. This
would be done, for example, even though some other state had a far greater
interest in the matter and even though application of forum law would defeat
the expectations of the parties. To accusations of defeatism and negativism, Professor Currie replies simply that the courts cannot be expected to do more.
Id.
267. The verdict of Professor Currie's quiescent years required him "perhaps, to sand
down the sharp edges of the position that the courts are not equipped to make decisions
that are essentially political in character." B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 627.
268.

Currie, supra note 257, at 757.

19821

CONFLICTS THEORY IN CONFLICT

comments on Grant v. McAuliffe 2 " illustrate his sense of justice. This
decisionmaker, Justice Traynor, had embraced the governmental interests approach. When the statements of Currie are read in conjunction
with the statements of Justice Traynor, they bring to the fore a number of important issues relating to scholarly and decisional roles. Although in this instance the scholar has recommended after the fact, his
general orientation appears to vindicate the necessity of an observational standpoint. On the other hand, Justice Traynor has attempted
to develop the cultural perspective normally associated with the
scholar in understanding the significance of his own past decisions.
Scholars, in this context, appear to unconsciously interchange their
identifications and objectives with decisionmakers and, in significant
instances, decisionmakers might assume the standpoint of the
observers.
This critique underscores three simple points that continuously recur in PIL. First, the problem of standpoint in PIL is important to
both the scholar and the active decisionmaker. Second, the relative inclusivity or exclusivity of the pattern of identification of both the
scholar and decisionmaker has a very real and direct impact upon actual decision-making because PIL claims require responses grounded
in theories that transcend notions of law as defined solely by statist
considerations. In a sense, what is demanded is a meta-juridical perspective. Finally, the complexity of these problems may play havoc
with concerned participants because of the demands of multiple identifications about the self-system and because of the extraordinary demands of role-structure and role-function in the larger comparative,
transnational arena.171 Indeed, these complexities could not ultimately
be avoided by the theorists associated with governmental interests
41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
Now, what happened in the Grant case is pretty clear. The judges fed the
data into the machine in the usual way, but, when the machine's answer came
out, they couldn't swallow it. They rebelled against the machine. They adjudicated the case. Using discretion and intelligence, and having regard to the fact
that it was a lawsuit they were trying, they looked for a result they could live
with .... So they decided the case their way. This was a kind of insubordination on their part, of course ... "
B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 138-39. See also Justice Traynor's afterthoughts on Grant:
!t may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is my own, I do
not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would make no more apology for it
than that in reaching a rational result it was less deft than it might have been to
quit itself of the familiar speech of choice of law.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. Rav. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
270. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 199-202.
269.
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analysis. The climax emerged because of what was thought to be a juridical "Okapi": the neutral forum. Professor Currie gave extended
treatment to this problem which he characterized as the problem of
the disinterested third state. According to this school, the decisionmaker in the "normal" PIL situation would, with differing emphasis, be subordinate to legislative control. Indeed, the role of a judge in a
democracy demanded no less. In a peculiar way, therefore, the judge
seized with the problem in forum A, involving in sharp juxtaposition
the prescriptions of forum B and forum C as being most governmentally interested in the application of their own prescriptions, would
find himself in a situation calling for a role in which the "academic"
dimension would have to produce results. Here the "disinterested" forum had no interest of its own to advance and had to choose between
interests of the other interested states. There was prima facie no idea
of honoring an interested state's law without "offending" at least one
interested state. For Professor Currie, the solution to this problem lay
in the empirical datum that such cases were rare. He also seemed to
qualify the omnipotence of lex fori principles in these "true conflict"
situations (even where the forum was not a neutral one) with the theomore moderate, and enrem that the courts ought to be restrained,
27 1
lightened when operating at this level.
But Currie did note that if a more moderate or restrained construction did not resolve the problem; if the problem could not be dismissed because of the obligation to provide a forum; if it could not be
avoided by deft construction; and if indeed it was unavoidable, then: "I
confess I cannot see where all this ends. We are discussing a problem
of infinitesimal practical importance; a statutory remedy is proposed
that would lead to fantastic complications. Surely the part of wisdom is
2
to wait for the courts to gather more experience with the problem. '7
This theory could not account for true conflicts in a neutral forum
or the class of problems designated as "unprovided for" cases. In effect, the implications of this perspective on a decisionmaker are of this
order: (1) find out what the legitimate interests of state A are; (2) find
out what the legitimate policies of state B are; (3) find out if your state
has any interest and if not, you are "disinterested"; and (4) if you are
"disinterested," as defined and the "laws" of A and B differ on the
allocation of values contingent upon discharge of decision-work it out
for yourself for there is no one to help you with criteria of choice.
The principal flaw in the standpoint of the governmental interests
271.

See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28

(1963); B. CuRRin, supra note 214 at 120, 606-09, 721.
272. Currie, supra note 271, at 793.
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school2 73 was that it seemed to operate upon the essentially dualistic
myth of statism associated primarily with the Dutch School. The governmental interest perspective assumed a concept of the community
power process (state sovereignty) that is deemed to be not only omnipotent, but also the repository of contemporary rationality. What
this exclusivist perspective overlooks is the importance of accounting
for and perhaps identifying with the rich plurality of global
community
274
participants from the local to the most comprehensive.
e.

Focus of inquiry: comprehensiveness in conception of relevant
community

Currie did not develop a comprehensive concept of community
transcending discrete groups and bodies politic. He was not, however,
altogether insensitive to this criticism; he felt that it was more impor273. It should be noted that Currie took an essentially "sociological" approach to his
analysis of PIL problems. Many of the criticisms leveled at the inadequacies of the diverse standpoints implicit in the work of various writers identified with the sociological
school are germane to the governmental interests school. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 44, at 262-63 (discussion of the perceived deficiencies in
sociological jurisprudence).
274. Myres S. McDougal has refined an earlier formulation of such an observational
standpoint. It is particularly appropriate in this context:
The applier or other evaluator should make himself as conscious as possible of
all the different communities, from global to local, of which he is a member and
upon which his choices must have unavoidable impacts. His most appropriate
identifications are with all these communities, concentric in their geographic
reach and interpenetrating in their value processes, and his primary concern
should be that his choices take into account the aggregate consequences for all
these communities and reflect their common interests. The aspiration of an applier who represents a community whose basic constitutive process projects a
comprehensive public order of human dignity-as is increasingly sought in the
contemporary human rights prescriptions-and who is himself genuinely committed to this goal, should be to make his every particular application of authoritative prescription contribute to progress toward this goal. Such an applier will
recognize that, in a global interdetermination of all values, there is indeed a
human rights dimension to all interaction and decision, and will make every effort to insure that such dimensions are effectively taken into account in decision.
This recommendation, it may require emphasis, is not that a decision-maker assume the license to impose his own unique, idiosyncratic preferences upon the
larger community. It is, rather, a demand that the decision-maker identify with
the whole of the communities he represents and that he make a systematic, disciplined effort to relate the specific choices he must make to a clarified common
interest, specified in terms of overriding community goals, for which he personally can take responsibility.
McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387, 396-97 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
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tant to demolish whatever residue had escaped the reach of Cook's
devastating pen. In this aspect, Currie's theory was further emaciated
by the assumptions about community process that he accepted as the
factual preconditions for his system. For example, Currie, like Cook
and the other realists, considered the contemporary structure of social
organization to be primarily located within the state system in somewhat undynamic terms."' The restricted "lex fori-type" focus was convenient for the clarification of a limited arena of policy concern. It did
not, however, focus on the structure of value process transcending
states both horizontally and vertically. Thus, it understated the realities accompanying the integration of social processes in the more inclusive arenas of decision that epitomize the PIL context. The realities,
therefore, of interdependence and interdetermination were not adequately accounted for in this perspective. It is precisely at this point, it
is submitted, that Currie went wrong. Once he had limited his focus
about community process to fit his concept of the lex fori, thereby creating a "pill-box" taxonomy for the transgroup process, he could define
interests in almost "pill-box type" fashion as well. This led him to conceive of the spurious distinction between "interested" and "disinterested" governmental interests without a properly contextual appreciation of all community interests relevant to the public order, both
inclusive and exclusive. In short, the concept of community Currie envisioned did not give a proper account of the spatial reach of interpenetrating relevant power processes; indeed, it was not broad enough to
account for these value processes or the diverse range of participants
animating these intersecting and interacting processes; it did not seek
to account for aggregate consequences of choice relevant to the common interests of all affected communities. Currie unfortunately lacked
a truly transnational concept of community in a more functionally inclusive sense.
f. Comprehensiveness in conception of law
-Balanced

emphasis between perspectives and operations

In sacrificing the transnational perspective, Currie could not adequately exploit the strong points associated with his approach to operations. If this imbalance is glossed over, however, Currie's methodology
still demonstrated, with powerful results, that policy is the most useful
instrument for informing decision in PIL and that policy could be
operationalized and applied to the microdetailed instances of decision
275. It is at this point that an awareness of the process of consociation would have
been most useful to these scholars.
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in the so-called "private" law domain. Currie may be seen as having, in
some measure, brought a kind of phenemonological perspective to PIL
theory.
-Clarity

in conception of authority and control

Professor Currie clarified his concept of law as follows:
Law is an instrument of social control. Recognition of this
fact, and emphasis on the economic and social policies expressed in laws, would lead to a fresh and constructive approach to conflict-of-laws problems. But law is not an instrument of social control alone. It retains something of the quality
and function that were commonly attributed to it 17 before
we
6
became so acutely conscious of its sociological role.
Writing in specific reference to the common law, Currie declared: "We
realize now, of course, that the common law itself is an instrument of
social and economic policy. 12 7 The clarity of Currie's conceptions of
PIL as a process of authoritative decision transcending discrete groups
was colored, as has been suggested, by his concept of the state and the
separation of powers doctrine.
Currie described his approach as sociological, although what he
meant essentially was sociological in the teleological sense. But these
goals were for Currie not a matter of scholarly speculation, but rather a
policy to be found in the prescription of state elites. Hence, governmental interests were, within limits, what state elites said they were.
The function of the judicial decisionmaker was, therefore, to ascertain
what the policies implicit in prior policy-making really incorporated,
and to apply these policies to particular cases. Currie was attacked on
this point. To use one illustration, Professor Baade seemed to read
Professor Ehrenzweig as undertaking "to banish teleology and policy
from private law."' 7 8 According to Baade, "[g]overnmental interest
analysis is merely one of the many applications of teleological interpretation. It seeks to determine the pertinence of rules of law to multiplecontact cases through an analysis of the purposes behind these
9
rules. 127
Two simple questions underscore the major difficulties inherent in
Currie's formulation. First, what does one do when another body politic asserts a concurrent reasonably founded competence to apply and
276.
277.
278.
279.

B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 64.
Id. at 65.
Baade, supra note 243, at 149.
Id. (emphasis added).
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prescribe policy? Second, what if the policies identified with one or
both of these states are a prima facie violation of a preemptory norm
of international law or human rights?280
Currie's response to these problems may be summarized as follows:
In a democracy, judicial decisionmakers in the PIL arena have no legal
power to choose between the prescriptions of two competing states because state policy is justified on the moral grounds of representing the
consent of the governed and upon the functional allocation of certain
competences to legislators. The problem with this formulation is that,
in the PIL arena, not all states can preempt the legitimizing symbols of
representative democracy and, to be consistent with the assumptions
implicit in this approach, one might not give deference to groups whose
political culture appear undemocratic, even when it would promote
human dignity to do so. Second, the problems of democracy are never
simple. Indeed, the disposition of power in any society is complex and
the total moral equation relevant to power and influence8 ' may have
to be accounted for before one can reach the question of "whose interests" have preempted all the symbols of moral rectitude inherent in
the terms "governmental" or "state." This means that a realistic map
of the social and power process transcending discrete groups will have
to account for participants like pressure groups, political parties, lobbies, individuals in various role patterns and so forth. To avoid these
realities by adopting an all too rigid distinction between the interested
and the uninterested is to impose formalism on international decision
of the kind that Currie himself would have inveighed against.282
This ground for limiting the policy focus of control and authority
is not compelling, particularly in the context of PIL, where the demand
for reciprocal tolerances directly impacts upon the production and distribution of values for identifiable litigants, and where the aggregate
flow of such outcomes may show PIL to be one of the most important
mechanisms for shaping the global value processes in positive ways.
Moreover, Currie's own emphasis upon the relevance and reach of the
equal protection clause in the PIL context shows that he was sensitized
280. See B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 526-83. Here Currie sought to adumbrate
what effectually amounts to inclusive community policy to solve PIL problems via the
"positive" law envisioned in an expanded reading of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
281. See generally R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM
(1969); F. LUNDBERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH (1968); C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE
(1959).
282. Baade mentions that the application of inclusive community policy in Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) would have offended a governmental interest
closely identified with the insurance lobby. Baade, supra note 243, at 154.
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to the utility of inclusive symbols even if they were in "positive law"
283
garb.
It is hard to believe that Currie would recommend that a decisionmaker violate fundamental rights or the human rights of active litigants by telling them to look for a remedy in the political arenas of a
transgroup context, particularly when the customary allocations of
power over PIL-type claims have, since time immemorial, been allocated in substantial measure to judical decisionmakers, and are an intrinsic part of community expectations of a more inclusive community
process. Paradoxically, Currie's emphasis on using domicile as a key
connecting factor for the prescription of choice of law policy associated
with the state or governmental interest myth meant that in theory,
Currie would honor the perspectives of a totalitarian state, where political participation is low and perhaps circumscribed by restrictions such
as "race," "class," "party affiliation," "caste," or "religion.""" The
problem is the implied assumption that even in the PIL arena of
choice of law, Currie's approach, although not Currie himself, seems to
assume the moral omnipotence of the state and, by fiat, thereby excludes a broader perspective of community policy for realizing the very
kinds of humane results he demanded of "the system."' 85 The objection to Currie's concept of governmental interests is more fundamental. Perhaps the most useful way to illustrate this is by a closer examination of Currie's notion of governmental interests. In this regard it is
important to note that the term "interests" in this phrase, even if only
by default, has been somewhat uncritically accepted. Indeed, writers
who have criticized Currie have frowned on the term "governmental, '"288 assuming, it would appear, that the term "interest" had a settled meaning. The Currie school has defended the use of the term
''governmental" on the basis that the word functions somewhat as a
term of art rather than a term of more specified "scientific" or generalized import. At the same time, it should be noted that the term "governmental" does function as a code word for directing a decisionmaker
to the substantive prescription of a particular body politic.
Whatever inadequacies may repose in the way the Currie school
B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 530, 536.
Is the interest analysis merely a complicated way of saying that the law of domicile governs? See R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1968).
285. "I regard most of what is good in our law and literature as the product of revolt
against the system, while he (Professor Hill) regards it as a product of the system itself."
B. CURRIE, supra note 214, at 615.
286. See, e.g.. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to
Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 388-90 (1966); Twerski, Neumier v. Kuehner: Where Are
the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 104, 107 passim (1973).
283.
284.
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uses the term "governmental," the problems attending the word "interest" are more pronounced. The way to demonstrate this is simply to
ask the following: What is the empirical reference for the term "interest" in Currie's PIL theory? To ask the question is to answer it: None.
It may readily be seen that the term "interest," as used by Currie, derives whatever utility it has from the legal process paradigm, and more
28 7
specifically, from the model of externality implicit in this approach.
One might illustrate the dubious empirical reference accorded the term
"governmental interests" by briefly setting out the empirical reference
the policy science school provides for delimiting the concept of basic
community policy. This includes the notions of common and special
interest and the notions of inclusive and exclusive interests as related
to minimum or optimum order standards.
In the policy science framework, the terms "policy" or "interest"
have their intellectual utility sustained by deriving their meaning from
social facts, and more specifically, from the perspectives of participants
in the social process. Thus an empirical reference given to the notion of
"interest" centers upon (1) identifications of the relevant participants;
(2) demands of component actors; and (3) the expectations, through
time, that these actors entertain about how their demands for and
about values can be secured. The point here is the fact that demands
are specified as outcomes (a taxonomy of claims) of the social process.
The empirical reference for "policy" is directly related to the demands
for values that emerge from any of the complex value processes that
constitute any organized group or community. This is not to say that
Currie aspired to the realm of the transempirical. On the contrary, the
point is that Currie's framework was too limited to allow a greater deference to the factual context of claim and ultimately, therefore, of decision.s
In summary, Currie's model seemed to overemphasize the
287. The specific critique of the model of externality as contraposed against the more
empirical model of the policy sciences is more carefully examined in the section dealing
with Professor Cavers and the jurisprudential context of his work. See infra text accompanying notes 326-52.
288. The most important reason for this limitation, according to Professor Baade, is
that Currie sensed a basic incompatibility between governmental interest analysis and
the policies implicit in full faith and credit. See Baade, Marriageand Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-InterestsAnalysis and the Restatement (Second), 72
COLUM. L. REV. 329, 330 (1972). Of course, Currie made no clear-cut distinction between
inclusive and exclusive community policy, nor did he distinguish between the minimum
and optimum order priorities, although it may be said that some "false" conflicts simply
reflect inclusively shared community expectations. Here again an appreciation of context
would have enabled him to more realistically grasp the significance of the full faith and
credit clause as a code-phrase for reference to inclusive as well as exclusive community

policy.
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control variable at the expense of the more inclusive construct of the
symbols of transstate authority; in this sense it may be said that his
conception of law was less than adequate and certainly partial, although important for PIL.
g.

Classification of decision

Currie's work within the context of American federalism provided
a sophisticated picture of both the public order and constitutive process aspects of decision in PIL as then understood. The weakness with
this conception is that he did not expand these ideas more broadly.
h. Intellectual tasks
Currie did not explicitly aspire to complete all the intellectual
tasks recommended here, but he went a long way toward operationalizing some of them. Perhaps his most significant contribution in this
context is his methodology. Currie was perhaps the most successful of
PIL scholars to attempt to clarify community policy extant in the pattern of claim and decision and to show how policy might directly inform decision. 8 9 Baade attributed Currie's success to his "unusual gift
for reconstructing legislative intent," ' although Currie's skills were
similarly influential in clarifying the policy basis of common law prescription as well. But these "governmental interests" were not specified
in terms of their relative inclusivity or exclusivity, or indeed, in their
relation to minimum or optimum order goals of society. Professor Hill
made a similar critique, but did not carefully adumbrate the typologies
analytically discernable in the clarification of basic community policies.
He maintained:
The fallacy is in the assumption that this is the dominant and
characteristic aspect of the process of choice of law in the assumption that when a particular foreign interest is preferred to
a particular local interest, the courts of the forum have necessarily sacrificed the interests of the forum. As has been observed it is probably more likely that the result is actually a
289. Currie's idea of "policy" is narrow and somewhat constricted. Policy intitially
meant ignoring traditional symbols of transstate expectations. The substantive laws of
competing states were not to be appraised in terms of rule formalism or internal logic
but according to their conceptual basis. Currie thus sought to avoid the normative ambiguity of rule directed formulations by linking the fact pattern of a case to the policy
behind the rule. This was an important innovation, but does not go far enough. The
limitations on Currie's thinking here are mainly attributable to the law paradigm he used
to buttress his system.
290. Baade, supra note 243, at 151.
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vindication of the over-all governmental interests of the forum,
and that the particular local interest involved in the litigation
has been defeated not so much by a competing foreign interest
as by competing local interests which may be specific or quite
general in character. 9
i. Appraisal
Professor Currie basically saw his work as the culmination of a
revolt against "the system."'2 92 The Realist inspired work of Cook, Lorenzen, and the urbane internationalist, Yntema, simply had not had
significant influence on rationalizing decision in PIL as a practical matter. After World War II, it is fair to say that "the system" was well and
functioning with scant regard to the Realist critique of Cook and Lorenzen. 29" The problem with the Cook-Lorenzen perspective was one of
inherent difficulty. It did not and perhaps could not propound a coherent social policy to inform choice; it was silent about "ethics" as a component of choice. The Realist scheme, however, allowed too much. How
is a judge in a particular case to make a reasonable choice when past
trends and past theory have been thoroughly discredited, when he is
given no alternative constructs upon which to rely, and when he is
shown that the past is an unreliable guide to decision?
The system Currie attacked was a judicial crutch known as formalism. It was a formalism that, in its worst manifestations, resulted in
the frustration of public order per se, whether it be "provincial,' 2

94

to

"global." 2 5

Indeed, the "system"
use Mr. Justice Traynor's word, or
often failed to realize exclusive minimum order policies, let alone as291. Hill, Governmental Interests and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 463, 490 (1960).
292. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
293. The problem with the Cook-Lorenzen perspective was that it did not propound
a social policy to inform choice nor did it attempt to devise a recommended economic
policy to inform preferred choice; moreover, it was ubiquitous for its silence about ethics
as a component of choice. How is a judge in a particular case to make a reasonable choice
when past trends and past theory have been thoroughly discredited, when he is given no
alternative constructs upon which to rely, and when he is shown that the past is, in any
event, a sham exercise in mystification? Judges rarely have sophistication in moral philosophy, social and political theory, or economic science.
Chief Justice Kenison suggests that the failure of certain state courts to reject the
old choice of law rules "has resulted from an unwillingness to abandon established precedent before they were sure that a better rule was available, not (from) any belief that the
old rule was a good one." Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 352, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (1966).
294. Traynor, supra note 269, at 675.
295. McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Future, 50 Miss. L.J. 259, 262-64 (1979).
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pire to what Justice Traynor calls "optimum justice."' 2 " As far back as
1969, Justice Traynor could still say that the principal hazard in PIL
was "less impassioned provincialism than the lingering ills of a passive
formalism. ' ' 2 97 Technique, under the Formalists, had become the end.
This formalism is essentially what Currie sought to demolish in his
vigorous and searingly honest style. 2 98 Currie did more than simply
clear the "conflicts garden" of decrepit formalism, however. He made
community policy, after a fashion, the focal point of decision. According to Justice Traynor, this was an enormous conceptual breakthrough
in PIL.2 99 Currie, he said, put "first things first." 00
Justice Traynor adumbrated the importance of this innovation for
PIL decision-making.80 ' He appears, however, to have understated the
importance of standpoint and an adequately inclusive identification for
a constructive PIL paradigm. At best, Currie's implied assumptions
about the moral and political foundations of the state are a naive venture into the uncharted ocean of political sociology. Moreover, the dualistic-positivistic model that he assumed to be an eternal verity was
inadequate to fully adumbrate the more inclusive policy dimensions
about PIL which transcend states and groups. Nowhere does Currie,
Traynor, or Baade provide a sufficiently sophisticated concept of basic
community policy and criteria for delimiting that which is exclusive;
that which is inclusive; that which refers to minimum order; and that
which includes an optimal sense of justice in more than mere casual
fashion. Baade seems to have implicitly recognized this weakness for,
in criticizing Dr. Jenk's reference to public policy in the United
296. Traynor, supra note 269, at 673. Traynor remarks that a court is "as concerned
in a conflict case as in any other with optimum justice." Id.
297. Id. at 675.
298. Professor Morris noted Currie's criticism of the traditional system. Currie's series of challenging articles contain words such as "'conceptualistic,' 'irrational,' 'mindless,' 'ruthless,' 'wretched,' 'spurious,' 'futile,' 'arbitrary,' 'hypnotic,' 'mystical,' 'intoxicating'...." Morris further notes that the system "is 'an apparatus,' 'a machine,' 'a
field of sophism, mystery and frustration'; 'it has not worked and cannot be made to
work.'" J. MORRIS, supra note 168, at 511.
299. Traynor, supra note 269, at 668. Traynor suggests that "Professor Currie . . .
succeeds in breaking away from the fuzzy interchange of policy, contacts, and interest
that has characterized our awkward efforts to abandon the lexicon of superlaw." Id.

300. Id.
301. Such clarification is heartening to judges reluctant to resolve problems in
terms of the old lexicon, yet reluctant also to improvise at close range to an
isolated case that has come up at random in a crowded calendar of unrelated
ones. It seems clear that with such experimental pitons at hand, a judge stands a
far greater chance than before to reach at least a ledge from which he cannot
only prepare for further exploration but secure a rope to others.
Id.
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States,302 he explicitly refers to the "possible utility of the McDougalLasswell concept of public order in the conflict of laws field" as having
potentials that appear to be "much more promising." 303 There appears,
however, to have been no follow-through from the governmental interests camp.
Although the dualistic model tended to constrict a more inclusive
perspective about PIL, it did force into view the limits of that paradigm and made its continued viability less axiomatic than before. This
model also stimulated an inchoate awareness that PIL could be used to
deparochialize, universalize, and structure social processes in preferred
ways at all levels of community. Justice Traynor again underscored
this point well."0 4
302. Baade, Book Review, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 451, 453 (1965).
303. Id. at 453 n.12.
304. Meanwhile the courts could do much more than they have done toward a
rapprochement of states in the optimum development of common law. The more
courts strive for the optimum, the more they will liquidate local anachronisms
that breed conflict. The more they realize that judical law-making is something
more than parroting the once timely wisdom of their predecessors or perpetuating their sometimes unfortunate foolishness, the more they will come to share at
least the idiom of their own day and therefore common rules. If I speak confidently and not hypothetically of such a prospect, it is because of a belief that
law schools are training future lawyers and judges who will be ready, willing, and
able to analyze universal problems in a universal language that transcends
archaic modes of thought and the patois of their own provinces.
Traynor, supra note 269, at 665.
If the local interest rests on a policy clearly envisaging more than local transactions or persons, and that policy is expressed in a valid statute, it is bound to
prevail. If instead the policy is found in judicial precedent it is not bound to
prevail. If a court hitherto uncritical finds it backward in comparison with that
of the other state it may overrule its own precedent as unsuitable not only for
the instant case but for strictly local ones, and in so doing again eliminate a
conflict. It is as concerned in a conflict case as in any other with optimum justice. It is alerted as in no other to alternatives that may reveal shortcomings in
its own law, and its enlightenment in such a case is bound to extend to purely
local cases also.
Id. at 673.
Moreover, Traynor showed that forum law can and must be clarified in accord with
inclusive community policy:
More than one scholar has suggested that a state may also facilitate commercial transactions having no significant public repercussions and at the same
time preclude conflict, by recognizing the autonomy of parties of roughly equal
bargaining power in a contract with multistate aspects. When more than one
state has substantial contacts with the transaction, it seems reasonable that
equal parties should be free to designate the law of one of the states as controlling the validity and effect of their contract, since reasonable certainty is of the
utmost importance to the parties and needless uncertainty serves neither private
nor state interests.
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Courts have acted on Justice Traynor's recommendations. For example, in Clark v. Clark,30 5 Chief Justice Kenison concluded that New
Hampshire's policy was "preferable" to the policy of Vermont, essentially because it represented a more inclusive standard."' In Clark,
Chief Justice Kenison, in following the challenges pioneered by governmental interests scholars, went even further along the pathways of rationality in embracing, from a policy science perspective, preferred
public order perspectives:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases just
as is done in nonconflicts cases, when the choice is open to us.
If the law of some other state is outmoded, an unrepealed remnant of a bygone age "a drag on the coattails of civilization"
. ..we will try to see our way clear to apply our own law instead. If it is our own law that is obsolete or senseless (and it
could be) we will try to apply the other state's law. 0 7
Perhaps a legacy attending Currie's pioneering work (from a phenomenological perspective) is the evaluation of this challenge by one of
his most eloquent colleagues, Professor Baade: "This statement," he
said, "with respect seems to be at least irrelevant in a no conflict case
3' 0 8
such as the one at hand."
Id. at 674 (footnote omitted).
305. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). In Clark, a husband and wife, domicilaries of
the New Hampshire forum, were in an automobile accident while passing through Vermont en route from one part of New Hampshire to another. The wife's injuries allegedly
were due to her husband's negligence. Vermont's guest statute holds a host is liable to
his guest for only gross and wilfull negligence whereas New Hampshire's higher standard
holds him liable for ordinary negligence. The forum chose to apply its own law and in so
doing, abandoned the vested rights approach. Id. at 356, 222 A.2d at 210.
Baade comments: "who (but the insurance lobby) would disagree?" Baade, supra
note 243, at 154.
306. Chief Justice Kenison came to this conclusion using Currie's five-step analysis.
107 N.H. 351, 354-55, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09. He stated that "Vermont's interest under its
statute are in suits brought in its own courts affecting hosts, guests and insurance companies subject to its jurisdiction." Id. at 356, 222 A.2d at 209-10. See supra text accompanying notes 260-68.
307. 107 N.H. 351, 355, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (citation omitted) (quoting Freund, Chief
Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1216 (1946)).
308. Baade, supra note 243, at 155. Baade notes that Chief Justice Kenison purported to follow Cavers in advocating the "better rule" approach. However, Baade argues
that the "better law" approach was an early effort by Cavers and that the "theory has
progressed since then, and so has Cavers." Id. at 154. Elaborating, Baade asserts that
Cavers would apply his principles of preference only in a true conflicts case, and only
where no guidance could be ascertained from the forum's law. Id. at 151. Clark, however,
did not present such a situation, as demonstrated by the Chief Justice's disposal of the
case on the policy ground of advancing the forum's governmental interests. Id. at 151-52.
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All of these specific criticisms, in the final analysis, do not minimize the ultimate questions about the utility of any law-paradigm; the
key point is how much deference such a paradigm accords the principle
of realism at the outset. Specifically, Currie was unable to provide, in a
disciplined and systematic way, a realistic empirical index to sustain
his concept of governmental interests. As a result, he was unable to
account for the social process in a comprehensive and realistic way.
Part of the problem may have reposed in a failure to provide for a
more stable and disciplined focus of inquiry due to an insufficient degree of disengagement, which, in turn, may result from an inability to
manipulate basic identifications. Moreover, Currie's idea of interest
still suffers from some of the normative ambiguity of the "legalist." For
these reasons, it is difficult to provide empirical indices to the Currie
methodology. In addition, Currie failed to clarify goals in terms other
than his commitment to a kind of unilateralism based on dubious
moral axioms assumed to repose in the power process. The net result
was that no real preferences (relative to both demands and expectations) appear to be extant in being unilateral about the basic priorities
of the social process conceived in a more inclusive sense.
Professor Currie's model, whether advertantly or otherwise, provides a high degree of deference to the power process, apparently at
the expense of just how the power variable might, in context, impact
upon other value processes. His inattentiveness to this problem was to
a very partial extent, ameliorated by the caveat he made in the socalled true conflict situations: The decisionmaker must be "restrained"
and "enlightened." ' 09 These concepts are themselves without special
significance, unless one assumes that duly constituted judges tend to
be unrestrained and unenlightened about multistate problems for reasons that perhaps even Currie would shrink from.
Finally, Currie's method utilized a limited and very traditional
range of intellectual tasks. This fact, perhaps more than any single factor, accounts for the lack of a contextual approach and the clarification
of policy in PIL. Lack of context essentially meant a restatement of
PIL without references to transgroup customary expectations about
the allocation of values across group lines.
3.

Cavers in the Context of the Legal Process Framework
Professor Cavers' contributions to PIL 110encompass two signifi-

See 107 N.H. 351, 356, 222 A.2d 205, 209. Thus, Baade concludes, Chief Justice Kenison
had no need to discuss the "better rule" concept. Baade, supra note 243, at 154-55.
309. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-87 (1963).
310. Works by Professor Cavers include D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS
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cant jurisprudential perspectives. During the course of his distinguished career, Professor Cavers emphasized the importance these perspectives held in understanding the character of PIL. The early Cavers
can be located within the broad parameters of the American Legal Realist Movement. The later Cavers may be appropriately located within
what might be generally called the Legal Process paradigm. This perspective of law apparently emerged in the aftermath of the Realist
revolution, probably as a response to the intellectual challenge the Realist movement posed for questions concerning the nature of law and
authoritative decision. Professor Cavers' work is important in contemporary PIL because it spans both the Realist tradition and the Legal
Process paradigm. Indeed, it may even be considered as going beyond
the boundaries of this latter perspective.
It should be emphasized at the outset that a great many of the
criticisms made in connection with Professor Currie's application of
the Legal Process perspective to the PIL framework are equally applicable to Professor Cavers. These include the inadequate observational
standpoint, incomprehensive focus of inquiry, inattention to relevant
intellectual tasks, and to some extent, the failure to postulate goals. As
previously noted, the essential difference between Cavers and the governmental interests camp seems to repose in just how Cavers and Currie would handle "true conflicts" cases, as these theorists have defined
them, and more specifically, how they would dispose of a "true conflicts" case if the forum were neutral. Cavers sought to provide for this
kind of case by postulating "principles of preference" which he concedes are value judgments."" For Currie and his followers, this seemed
inappropriate. Yet one should carefully note what Cavers was attempting; he sought to develop a legal process paradigm for choice of law
that would account for its intellectual symmetry by the use of subjective value postulates. This was a major change in the legal process paradigm and is highly significant to those who embrace the policy-science
perspective, a perspective that gives considerable weight, inter alia, to
the postulation of goals.
a.

Cavers and the Realist background: context of the Principles of
Preference

Professor David Cavers is a Harvard-bred legal educator who
comes from a law school with a distinguished pedigree in conflicts
(1965); Cavers, The Changing Choice of Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REv. 173 (1933); Cavers, The Two 'Local Law' Theories, 63 HAIv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
311. D. CAVERS, supra note 310, at 213.
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scholarship.1 ' Cavers entered the conflicts arena with a highly influential article published in the HarvardLaw Review in 1933.313 Following
closely the path of Cook and Lorenzen, Cavers delivered a stinging attack on the process of decision implicit in the vested rights-territorial
sovereignty approach associated with Beale and Dicey. According to
Cavers, the territorial method was essentially that of "selecting" a jurisdiction in which the criterion of choice appeared to be some notion
of "fairness" or "neutrality." " " The criterion that assured "fairness"
was essentially a "blindfold" test as to whether the foreign law would
be honored; various escape devices (complementaries) were available if
316
a peek through the conceptual blinders revealed an absurd result.
In his critique of the vested rights approach, Cavers actually had
described the structure of a formalistic mode of decision. This was a
model of decision, inadequate to be sure, yet Cavers was able to distill
the crucial decision procedures that had animated it, thereby exposing
its basic weakness. This was an important intellectual breakthrough
for the process of decision that underlay the vested rights approach
was now itself the focus of attention and meaningful criticism.
Cavers did not stop there. He developed a methodology for the
solution of choice of law problems; a methodology that effectually provided the framework or taxonomy of a model of decision of more general jurisprudential interest. The model appears to have emerged almost inexorably from the legacy of the Realists. The most direct
Realist influence on Cavers' model for the choice of law process appears to be attributable to Lorenzen. Lorenzen's suggested solution to
the choice of law problem was couched in the form of a rhetorical question cited twice with apparent approval by Cavers. The question was:
"What are the demands of justice in a particular situation; what is the
controlling policy?"3 11 Cavers argued that an adherence to his taxonomy of decision would point the way to a "just decision in the principal
case. 3 1 7 Misunderstandings emerged concerning exactly what Cavers
312.

The Harvard faculty produced such figures as Story, Beale, Griswold, and more

recently, von Mehren and Trautman, not to mention Cavers himself.
313. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
314. Id. at 180. The essence of this test is the choice of a jurisdiction's substantive
law, without exercising any scrutiny of that law, save for purposes of application. Id.
315. Id. at 182-87. These complementarities include renvoi, public policy considerations, the intention of the parties as to which state's law should apply, and characterization of a foreign jurisdiction's law as procedural as opposed to gubstantive in content.
Cavers notes that it is a "familiar doctrine that the forum's rules of procedure will always be employed." Id. at 185. See also Baade, supra note 243, at 142-43.
316. Cavers, supra note 313, at 187.
317. Id. at 193. Cavers envisioned the following decisional map:
This effort to portray an approach to problems of conflicting laws which
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meant here; whether, for example, this implied "cadi" justice or the
creative potential of a "free law" syndrome. The implication in Cavers'
argument was that PIL, like all other legal decision, was essentially
concerned with social, political, economic, and ethical choice; authoritative decision could be conditioned by a common sense estimation of
how decision would impact on the social process. Then, perhaps, choice
could be made according to what was or was not deemed desirable in
context.
Many years later, Cavers expressed some disquiet about the "free
law" implications of the 1933 article."' 8 These attitudes, it appears,
served as a prelude for what was to come. In 1965 Cavers published his
now classic Cooley lectures.310 In this book Cavers responded to the
challenge posed by the "free law" implications that many had attributed to the 1933 article. To the extent that there could be attributed to
Cavers a "free law" approach, Cavers sought to displace it. He displaced it by recourse to "principles of preference. ' ' 3s 0 Cavers' book,

however, is even more interesting from the standpoint of developments
in American legal culture in the aftermath of the Realist movement. In
would free the courts from the blindfold of a theory which has compelled them
to grope for solutions to problems for which perspicacity is peculiarly essential
has been argumentative and discursive. At the risk of distorting an idea not susceptible of blackletter statement, I shall hazard this summary.
When a court is faced with a question whether to reject, as inapplicable, the
law of the forum and to admit in evidence, as determinative of an issue in a case
before it, a rule of law of a foreign jurisdiction, it should
(1) scrutinize the event or transaction giving rise to the issue before it;
(2) compare carefully the proffered rule of law and the result which its application might work in the case at bar with the rule of the forum (or other
competing jurisdiction) and its effect therein;
(3) appraise these results in the light of those facts in the event or transaction which, from the standpoint of justice between the litigating individuals or of those broader considerations of social policy which conflicting
laws may evoke, link that event or transaction to one law or the other;
recognizing
a) in the use of precedent, that those cases which are distinguishable only in
the patterns of domestic laws they present, may for that very reason suggest
materially different considerations than the case at bar, and
b) in the evaluation of contacts, that the contact achieves significance in
proportion to the significance of the action or circumstance constituting it
when it related to the controversy and the solutions thereto which the competing laws propound.
Id. at 192-93 (emphasis added).
318. D. CAvsaS, supra note 310, at 8-12.
319. Id. This book is based on the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered at the University of Michigan, Jan. 21, 22, 24, 1964, under the title "Policy, Justice, and Principle
in the Choice-of-Law Process."
320. Id.
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order to fully grasp Cavers' retreat from the "free law" implications of
his earlier work; to understand his own evolving concept of law as a
process; and to understand his postulated principles of preference in
sustaining such a concept of law, one must trace his intellectual passage back to the kind of crisis for legal ideology that the Realists
posed. This is a crisis that, in some measure, was provoked by Cavers
himself (if his 1933 article is to be taken at face value).
b.

The aftermath of the Realist challenge

Cavers, like many American law teachers, was immensely influenced by the Realist giants of his day. Indeed, he would have needed
an uncommon degree of intellectual independence to have remained
immune to their infectious iconoclasm. But Cavers, working in the PIL
framework, seems to have taken the Realist challenge to the extreme.
The "free law" implications of his decision model literally demanded
something more in the way of a rational decision process. His taxonomy of the formalistic model of decision and his own partial model,
which he seems to have recommended as a mere academic exercise,
posed a decision challenge to the Realists with heightened specificity.
Professor Cavers' 1933 model seemed to express an optimism, characteristic of much Realist thinking, that science, social or otherwise, and
technology, under the control of intelligent decisionmakers, would provide a more just social order. To make the 1933 model work, Cavers, or
anyone using his model, would have to give operational significance to
the Realist claims about social policy, instrumentalism, and pragmatism; indeed, the very idea of a functional jurisprudence. Cavers had
hinted at a solution in the 1933 article by recommending procedures
for a more elaborate decisional process.
How did the architects of American legal culture respond to the
challenge of the Realists and, to some extent, the challenge of Cavers
himself? Three broad currents appear to have emerged in the aftermath of the rule and fact skepticism of the Realists.
The most direct of these responses was the law, science, and policy
jurisprudence of McDougal and Lasswell. If, as the Realists had
demonstrated, rules of law were really a mask for the nonspecification
of the real reasons for decision, then it was thought that a new paradigm was necessary; nothing less would suffice. Professors McDougal
and Lasswell planted the seeds of this new paradigm. in their 1942 article in the Yale Law Journal.21 The Policy Science framework was
321. McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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built on the foundations of the Realist movement.8 2' It appeared to
accept, perhaps niively, theoretical aspects of the Realist challenge; it
accepted, perhaps uncritically, the assumption that the revolutionary
rhetoric of the Realists be taken literally, together with their commit-

ment of some vaguely conceived sense of human decency. In contradiction to these assumptions as directed at legal education, the law teaching fraternity was, and has remained, essentially conservative though,
in the upper echelon schools, seemingly opportunistic.3 2 Thus, the
322. It is possible that the New Deal provided a great deal of justification for the
belief. Many Realists became distinguished administrators in the New Deal Administration of President Roosevelt. See generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AmRICA (1976). The interesting historical question is what

would have happened to the New Deal and its supporters in the American legal culture if
World War II had not come about.
323. This statement needs to be qualified. It is a conclusion borne, in part, of a personal experience of the writer. This writer's first experience with the Realist's style occurred when he took a course in basic business associations law under Dean Elvin R.
Latty of the Duke Law School. The writer found the experience a remarkable one, coming, as he did, from a very traditional Oxford legal education. Dean Latty's style included tearing opinions apart, illustrating unarticulated assumptions and values, essentially seeming to challenge the institutional integrity of judges, and by implication, the
entire legal system. All of this seemed to be a thoroughly radical enterprise. And yet
Dean Latty's views on lawyer's roles tended to be ultra-traditional, even by American
standards. Perhaps this experience is to some extent supported by Professor Gilmore's
comparison of Yale and Harvard law schools. According to the sardonic Gilmore, "If you
go to one of them (i.e. Yale or Harvard), you will in all probability come out a conservative anarchist. If you go to the other, you will come out an anarchic conservative. The
difference ... is more of style than substance." See Gilmore, The Truth About Harvard
and Yale, 10 YALE L. REP. 9 (Winter 1963).
An even more interesting issue, in this context, is directed at the character of the
law teaching fraternity itself. It has been suggested that the traditional educational exposure of the law student was pervaded by an assumption of moral neutralism; that the
traditional curriculum did little more than instill a laissez-faire moral tone to legal education. See Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HAnv. L. REv. 392, 393-94 (1971).
Why are American law teachers in prestigious law schools so essentially conservative as a
group, and yet still capable of embracing the distinctive realist style as a principle mode
of dispensing legal education? And why, paradoxically, is the end product of all this
probing and challenging so thoroughly wedded to the status quo? Conservatism is ubiquitous among law teachers and students. Why?
There are many reasons for this, but it is probable that theoretical perspectives
deeply embedded in the legal culture contribute to sustain this strain of conservatism.
Interestingly, the middle and lower echelon law schools have and continue to remain
somewhat immune to the Realist influence-and have remained staidly conservative too.
See W.

WEYRAUCH, HIERARCHIE DER AuSBILDUNGSSTXTTEN,

REcHTSSTUDIUM UND RECHT IN

DEN VEREININGTEN STAATEN, (1976). According to Professor Weyrauch, the legacy of
Blackstone has never been overcome in lower echelon law schools. The assumptions that
underlie the Blackstonian style embody such ideas as a closed legal system and the assumption that correct solutions can always be found within the system by the process of
deductive reasoning. This style has a mechanical quality. It embodies the classification of
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rhetoric of the Realists became commonplace in top-class law schools,
but the radical implications of this perspective were seemingly
finessed, with the important exception of developments in the policy
sciences at the Yale Law School under McDougal and Lasswell.
There remained a latent conservatism which could seemingly follow two credible pathways; it could either revert to the legal ideology
associated with formalistic positivism or it could carve out a more conservative post-Realist law paradigm. The legal perspective associated
with formalistic postivism would continue to focus on such traditional
jurisprudential questions as: What is a valid law and how does one distill the criterion of validity of a binding legal rule? Many American
scholars were influenced by this approach, which appears to have attained a new degree of respectability after the publication of Professor
H.L.A. Hart's book, The Concept of Law.3 2" But the pathway that
came to predominate in elite law school circles was the framework that
was closely identified with Harvard legal culture, or more accurately
identified with such eminent scholars as Hart, Sacks, Wechsler, Bickel,
Wellington, and others. The framework these men have developed and
worked from has not been appropiately identified although it has been
variously styled as the Legal Process school because of the title of the
tentatively formulated materials of Hart and Sacks. 2" An exploration
of the conceptual basis of this framework will enable one to better appreciate Professor Cavers' contribution to the development of the
choice of law process.
c.

The conceptual basis of the legal process paradigm

Theorists within this framework asked a slightly different question
from that of the formalistic school. They did not ask what is a valid
law or what is a binding rule. They did not believe there was a "correct" doctrine to every problem. Indeed, they had absorbed at least
abstract legal categories that can be easily handled by computers and which lends itself
to mass application on a routinized basis.
Elite institutions came under the influence of the legal skepticism of Holmes-an
orientation given a decisive thrust by the Realists in the thirties and early forties. This
perspective appears to have been preempted by a predominant variety of the legal process paradigm.
324. H. HART, THE CoNcEPT oF LAW (1961).
325. One reason may be that the two major ideologies that this writer believes are
relevant to American legal culture, those of McDougal and Lasswell's "Law, Science and
Policy School" and the Hart and Sachs' "Legal Process School," have been espoused
only in tentative editions and are being revised continuously. How widely accessible they
are within the United States--let alone outside-is difficult to say.
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some of the remaining relativism of the Realists.3 26 Essentially they
asked what, in context, is a judicial question; and correlatively, what is
a political question? The model seems to have anticipated a kind of
theory of games 8 7 in which all the power-centered actors were charged
with assuming certain role-typologies: legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, etc. The principal thrust of this school became the
search for the "correct" role for the judiciary. s ' The crux of legal disputation, what would importantly define role-in-context, was how to
respond to what Llewellyn infelicitously called the "law-stuff."'8 2'
326. A further condition that, it has to be admitted, influenced the Realists and inhibited a larger following in the Policy Science framework were the confusions the Realists developed about scientific relativism and its uncritical transposition to human affairs. They failed to grasp an essential truth that even Austin was aware of: that there is
nothing relative about the finality of decision in social process; that in decision arenas
there are practical limits to the luxuries of philosophic relativism. In addition, the Blackstonian style of legal culture simplified the decision process and presented the law in an
easily communicable form. This may also account for the resilience of Blackstone-style
legal culture in rank and file circles.
327. Complex mathematical models constructed in game theory have not been detailed enough to describe the intricate structure of the legal decision. Perhaps the most
serious objection to game theory model building from a policy science point of view is
that the limited range of indices for projecting from the past into the future are invariably weighted in favor of "tradition" and hence the status quo. If this kind of moral
authority were accorded, e.g., the doctrine of stare decisia (an almost causally determined
morality), claims for change would rarely be tolerated. The configurative approach, with
its contemplative and manipulative features and with its focus upon equilibrium and
developmental analysis, represents a comprehensive, realistic and more flexible model of
decision about law. For a discussion of game theory, see generally A. RAPAPORT, FIGHTS,
GAMES AND DEBATES (1960); M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOcIAL. BEHAVIOR: SELECTIONS (1964); J. vON NEumANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY or
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1953).
328. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGzRoUs BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); A. BIcKL, THE MoRALITY oF CONSENT (1975); A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS, BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). Cf.
M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL RzvIW (1966); M.
SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT. NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL Ju-

(1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in
(1961); Wellington, Common Law Rules
and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221
(1973). This general perspective has been subject to some interesting criticism. See
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968); Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
329. See, e.g., K. LLEWEULYN, THE BRAMBE BUSH (1930); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). By "law stuff" I mean generally the use of precedent, interpretation of symbols, use of models and analogies, derivative logic, "informal logic," i.e. the mixture of rhetoric and dialectic, etc.
RISPRUDENCE

PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
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The Legal Process school developed an inward and timid processoriented focus to sustain itself as a credible perspective in the aftermath of the Realists. 3 0 This perspective emphasized, in large measure,
the traditional "methods" of legal argument. It emphasized traditional
methods of judicial conflict management sustained by an emphasis on
craft skills styled as neutral principles."' It sought to exploit the
"traditional" insularity of "law" from being accountable for dynamics
of social policy and the value outcomes that necessarily flow from deci330. See supra note 328.
331. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAuv. L.
REV. 1 (1959). See also L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Fuller's conception of
an internal morality in the structure of law has some affinity with the concept of neutral
principles and the relationship of the craft-skills to the structure of these principles.
According to Fuller the "inner morality of law is condemned to remain largely a morality
of aspiration and not duty. Its appeal must be to a sense of pride of craftsmanship." Id.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).

at 43. See H.

The key to the legal process school is the emphasis on the "principle of institutional
settlement." H. HART & A. SACKS, supra, at 4. This principle defines role. It best defines
role within the context of the priorities of the minimum order dimension. Compare the
following:
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central idea of law-an
idea which can be described as the principle of institutional settlement. The
principle builds upon the basic and inescapable facts of social living which have
been stated: namely, the fact that human societies are made up of human beings
striving to satisfy their respective wants under conditions of interdependence,
and the fact that this common enterprise inevitably generates questions of common concern which have to be settled, one way or another, if the enterprise is to
maintain itself and to continue to serve.the purposes which it exists to serve. To
leave decision of these questions to the play of raw force would defeat these
purposes. The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. The principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgement that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted
as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed.
Many of the mysteries about the nature of law and of legal concepts disappear in the light of a clear understanding of the principle of the institutional
settlement and of the reasons which entitle it to acceptance. Thus, countless
pages of paper and gallons of printer's ink have been expended in the debate
about whether law is something which "is," like the data of the physical sciences,
or something which involves elements of what "ought" to be, resting upon moral
or other prudential considerations. The external facts of physical existence and
human behavior and attitudes with which the law must deal are, of course, matters of what "is," or of what "will be." But apart from these limiting conditions
which the law must recognize as fixed by the nature of its subject matter, the
only important elements of "is" in the law are consequences simply of the principle of institutional settlement.
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sion.88 2 Community expectations about role and professional image
were, therefore, what "lawyers" thought they were. This was established by examining the past to define the present and stabilize the
future. The principle of institutional settlement and the traditional indices that sustain this concept served to define the judicial role-in-context. In practice, this has roughly appeared to mean that procedural
values, conceived as the stuff of argument, became the end rather than
the means to an end.88 8 Procedural values are seen to be distinctively
legal values; the dynamics of the legal process are conceived in the

nexus between "legal values" and "legal institutions." Thus, the adherents of this school tend to emphasize principles of procedure and to
deemphasize principles of content. A proper balance between the two
appears to be avoided assiduously by the more conservative adherents
3

4

of this frame.
The Legal Process school distinguished itself from the pre-New
Deal Court on the basis that the Court was activist in nature and that
the naturalistic vision, that had bemused the operative majority in that
Court, was not necessarily good or bad. What was to be deplored was
that it should have had the temerity to have entertained such a vision
at all. The policy dimension in this perspective was, therefore, deemed
to be meta-legal. If it was "political," therefore, it was to be allocated
to the "political" branches of the power process: to the executive-type
8 5
or to the legislative-type.

What, then, is the conceptual basis of this school? The foundations for this perspective were, of course, directly attributable to the
332. See L. FULLER, supra note 331, at 96-109. Fuller uses the famous example from
the early sixteenth century: Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 8 Co. Rep. 107a
(1610). Here Fuller argues that Coke's opinion relies heavily upon "procedures" and "institutional practices" as instruments of legal insularity. L. FULLER, supra, at 100. Fuller
criticizes the Court's opinion in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) for striking
down a state statute as violative of the eighth amendment, thereby breaching this insularity. L. FULLER, supra, at 100. Cf. A. BicKmL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120-21 (1975);
M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT, NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL
JURISPRUDENCE (1964)

The Court's failure to grapple with the complex philosophical and theoretical
issues that lie behind the notion of constitutional democracy led it away from
the delicate and tentative adjustments that our peculiar form of democracy requires and into the formulation of appealing slogans.
Id. at 250-52.
333. Procedural law in a technical sense has been called adjective law, i.e., it exists
for the sake of something else-for the sake of substantive law. See C. HEPBURN, THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING (1897).
334. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1959).

335.

Cf. Deutsch, supra note 328.
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ubiquitous Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.-a Harvard alumnus. A most
useful illustration of Holmes' thinking on this point was provided in
Lochner v. New York.380 In Lochner, Holmes recorded a powerful dissent in response to a decision from the majority of the Court declaring
that the New York State legislature did not have the legal power to
regulate the wages and working hours of New York bakers because that
statute unconstitutionally interfered with the freedom of contract of
the affected parties.38 7 Holmes castigated the majority, not for the
right or wrong of its perspective; rather he criticised them for having a
perspective incompatible with their role as Supreme Court Justices.
Holmes wrote:
I regret sincerely that I am unable to agree with the judgment in this case, and that I think it my duty to express my
dissent.
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study
it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of
a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisiofts of this court that state constitutions and state
laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators
might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this,
and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract. . . . Some of these laws embody convictions or
prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But
a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez-faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
. General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than
any articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition
just stated, if it is accepted, will carry us far toward the end.
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word
336. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
337. Id. at 74.
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liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,
unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law. 3 '
Holmes continuously refined these ideas which he felt embodied nothing less than the theory of the Constitution. Appropriate roles in the
process of power allocations were a major component of legitimacy and
effectually a criterion by which the authority myth was established and
maintained.
Holmes implicitly recognized two essentially recurring problems
attending the disposition of power in society. First, as Lerner put it,
life inevitably involves "a clash of power, and law was in the main, the
rationalization of the interests of the dominant group. ''3 3 9 Second, that

pure democracy, the consent of all, was the archetype of anarchy, a
nonlaw state. The solution that Holmes saw in the Constitution
seemed to amount to the following: While the consent of all cannot be
obtained in a heterogeneous society, there can, at least, be consent
about the process. That is, while various individuals and groups which
comprise the community may differ upon substantive policies, they
nevertheless "agree" or "consent" to abide by those decisions because
of the "legitimacy" of the decision-making process. Dissenting in the
context of a first amendment claim, Holmes wrote:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." 0
This model incorporated an old philosophic fallacy which Holmes
did seek to avoid. This was the effort to objectify "law" by sustaining a
338.
339.

Id. at 74-76.
M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 44-111 (1943).

340. Abraham v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
the pluralistic version of this thesis, see R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 3-4 (1967). For a reply to the invisible hand assumptions
implied in this model, see T. Lowi, THE END OF LISERALISM (1969).
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"fictitious" cleavage between the "external" and "internal"-a form of
dualism that has existed frequently in various forms in Western political culture, the most simple formulation of which is the familiar dualism between the individual and society. 4 1
Holmes appears to have unwittingly accepted the neo-Kantian
idea that law was somehow connected to a (relativistic) version of universal rationality. 4 He accepted this, however, in a version that
sought to minimize its metaphysical implications in law. Holmes effectually set this up as a model of community expectations about the legal
process extrinsic to the human element. A good illustration of this
point was reflected in his essay on The Theory of Legal Interpretation,s3 in which Holmes came close to a model of externality and objectivity in exploring the nature of law. 8 " It seems Holmes tried to
invent an ideal-type of "speaker of English" for the interpretation of
language embodied in legal instruments. According to Holmes, the
"law-job" associated with interpretation was not "to discover the par341. See H. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLrrICS (1930).
342. Law is "external." Morality is "internal." Law is "objective." Morality is "subjective." According to Kant:
When it is said that a creditor has the right to exact payment from his debtor, it
does not mean that he may put it to the debtor's conscience that the latter ought
to pay. It means that in such a case payment may be compelled consistently
with the freedom of everyone and hence consistently with the debtor's own freedom, according to a universal law.
R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 104 (1969).
343. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HAIv. L. REv. 417 (1899).
344. The following quotation illustrates yet another application of Holmes' objective
theory of law:
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in
the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary rights
and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be assigned
or explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H~Av. L. Rlv. 457, 462 (1897). This is essentially why
common law lawyers have rejected the continental "wills" theory of contract (on the
basis of its' being subjective) in favor of their own concept of an objective law of contract-sustained essentially by the doctrine of consideration. See R. LEE, AN I rroDucTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 431-36 (5th ed. 1953).
Recently, Professor Gilmore attempted to trace the decline and fall of the doctrine
of consideration on this side of the Atlantic. G. Gn.MoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974). It may be that the title of this book overstates the central thesis which points
more to the death of the objective theory of contract because of the alleged demise of the
doctrine of consideration and the bargain theory that it presupposes. For critique, see
Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN.
L. RE v. 1161 (1975). A more contemporary, and avowedly jurisprudential restatement of
the objective theory of law is to be found in Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE
L.J. 1311 (1969).
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ticular intent of the individual to get into his mind and bend what he
said to what he wanted"; rather, the critical task was to ask "what
those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English. 's4 5 He justified the theory on the basis that the normal speaker
of English had a spatial and temporal relation that was "external to
the writer," and "a reference to him as the criterion is simply another
instance of the externality of the law. '' us This idea, it is suggested,
forms the conceptual basis of the legal process school. It suggests, paradoxically," 7 that there is an objectively verifiable, and therefore "correct" model of the judicial role, and that this role can be distilled from
the past so as to prescribe the future. This model assumes, in a broader
vein, that there exists objective criteria that defines and distinguishes
the "legal" from the "nonlegal," the "judicial" from the "political"
question; and that all of these outcomes are the product of an extrinsic-objective character. A key assumption in this frame is that all outcomes of decision are the products of beings who have purged themselves of all subjectivities, i.e., that decisionmakers are informed by
purely extrinsic objective criteria in assuming the decisional role.
345. See Holmes, supra note 343, at 417.
346. Id. at 418.
347. I say paradoxically because Holmes was a skepticist. The roots of Holmes' skepticism are probably traceable to the Greek Sophists. Protagoras, a leading sophist, was
noted for the following doctrine: "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are
that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." PLATO, THAzTrus, cited in
B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 77 (1945).
Russell explains, "This is interpreted as meaning that each man is the measure of all
things, and that, when men differ, there is no objective truth in virtue of which one is
right and the other wrong. The doctrine is essentially skeptical and is presumably based
on the 'deceitfulness' of the senses." Id. There are conservative implications in such a
philosophical stance. According to Russell:
The disbelief in objective truth makes the majority, for practical purposes, the
arbiters as to what to believe. Hence Protagoras was led to a defence of law and
convention and traditional morality. While, as we saw, he did not know whether
gods existed, he was sure they ought to be worshipped. This point of view is
obviously the right one for a man whose theoretical skepticism is thoroughgoing
and logical.
Id. According to Russell the Sophists "taught the art of arguing, and as much knowledge
as would help in this art. Broadly speaking, they were prepared, like modern lawyers, to
show how to argue for or against any opinion, and they were not concerned to advocate
conclusions of their own." Id. at 78.
The pursuit of truth, when it is wholehearted must ignore moral considerations;
we cannot know in advance that the truth will turn out to be what is thought
edifying in a given society. The Sophists were prepared to follow an argument
wherever it might lead them. Often it led them to skepticism."
Id. Interestingly, Holmes' skepticism and his search for an objective theory of law may
be inconsistent jurisprudential perspectives; or they may reflect a dialectical process
from which higher jurisprudential insights might emerge.
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In this perspective, the focus on process was "judicial" in a literal
and very constricted sense. Process meant definition and redefinition
of role. Major goals or purposes in this model were centered on rolemaintenance. The technique was defined as that of judicial self-restraint. The impacts of self-restraint were to be judged more in terms
of what such outcomes did for preserving the "judicialness" of a role,
rather than with regard to impacts on the structured ordering of the
substantive practices in the social process. One might say that law (the
judicial role) became an end itself rather than a means to an end. In
this respect the position of the Legal Process perspective shares some
affinity with the formalistic school. Judge Fitzmaurice, writing in dissent, crystallized this point well when he wrote: "Inferences based on
the desirability or, as the case may be, the undesirability, of certain
results or consequences, do not, . . .form a satisfactory foundation for
legal conclusions .. ."34 The teleological question, "What is law
for?," was conceded in classically "bad man" terms. The bad man
wants to know the outer limits of licit behavior; he wants to know
when public force will be used-the minimum order dimension. The
bad man needs objective law. The school thus implicitly accepted, at
least, some of the implications of a Hobbes-type universe and perhaps
even a laissez-faire approach to the power process. These assumptions
seem to be more intensively identified with those who emphasize as
critical the role-structure of "restraint," rather than that of "activism."
The legal process then, in practical terms, is the one that epitomizes the goal of fairness as contained in the idea of procedural due
process. The focus is on conflict management and conflict resolution.
Law is seen as an "umpire" between competing wills, and the outcomes
of judicial decision are system-maintaining so long as every claimant
has been accorded his "due process." The definition of law is the definition of legitimacy conceived in terms of minimum order standards. If
this conclusion is sound, then it seems that the Legal Process theory,
on balance, takes a kind of laissez-faire approach to the disposition of
power in society. Important consequences for the relationship between
law and justice flow from this premise. For example, any symbol can
serve as an operational index of legitimacy if the propaganda managers
are competent and if effectual elites are sufficiently deft in the manipulation of the symbols of moral rectitude, while in fact the substantive
value processes might be unfairly managed by them or their surrogates.
This frame appears to radically simplify the actual working of the
348. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Nambia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 224.
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power process.4 9

There are two broad responses to Holmes' formulations. The first
response comes from the psychoanalytic insight into the subjective-ob-

jective dichotomy, a conceptual Gordian Knot that Professor Lasswell
slit over forty years ago when he substituted for this "fictitious cleavage," a continuum of reference points that reflect the subjectivities of

individual and collective selves.8 50 The critical decisional question is,
therefore, not the establishment of an ideal-type of legal form (or form
of English speaker) that is external to the relevant participants, but
rather the recognition of how shared perspectives (subjectivities) stabi-

lize and change value allocations in society and whether these outcomes are good or bad according to the stated goals or major purposes

of the legal and political culture. And the function of a decisionmaker
in law is essentially, as McDougal, Lasswell and Miller pointed out,ss1
conditioned by a much more comprehensive and realistic range of decisional indices and goals from which that decisionmaker cannot, in any
event, escape. This does not deny the existence of some form of externality; it emphasizes that the decisionmaker does not have to strive for
normal externality; it is a fact of life. He has such externality thrust
upon him by the fact that he cannot directly observe the subjectivities
of the parties.852
349. This simplistic appreciation of the power process within the United States is
demonstrated by Judge Skelly Wright in Wright, ProfessorBickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769, 787-89 (1971). Theorists in the legal
process school have addressed themselves to the problem of the moral foundations of
neutralism. The solution to the tradition of moral neutralism in law is apparently rooted
in the moral foundations of Holmes' philosophical skepticism. Fuller provides perhaps
the clearest expression of this "solution." He saw in the Socratic method in legal teaching a "return to the Socratic conception that men find virtue best, not through faith or
exhortation, but through understanding." Fuller, What Law Schools Can Contribute to
the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 189, 202-03 (1948). To avoid the question of
choosing between substantive values, Fuller disclosed the secret formula: "The secret is,
in other words, to concentrate on the process, and not to try to determine in advance
what results should emerge from the process in the form of specific solutions." Id. at 204.
Expressing a naturalistic faith in the "process" he added, "[i]f we do things the right
way, we are likely to do the right thing." Id. Analytical vigor, it appears, could illumine
the pathway to ethical and moral "higher purposes." This is, at least, one of the premises
of adherents of this perspective. The Fuller position seems more ambiguous because it is
so emphatic about the process of argument and the traditions and institutional practices
that sustain it. These traditions and institutional practices seem to represent Fuller's
"internal morality" of law.
350. H. LASSWELL, supra note 341 (cleavage separates the study of the "individual"
from the study of "society").
351.

M. McDOUGAL, H. LsswLL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMErs

AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDE.R (1967).

352. See generally id.
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The critical issue is this: observing the subjectivities of component
actors is an exercise in realism if decisions are to be made about "real"
demands (perspectives). Some of these components of behavior are
easily observable and we tend to call these facts "objective." Some
components of behavior are less observable and we call these facts
"subjective." Because we cannot readily or easily observe and record
less observable behaviors in the process of social interaction, the objective model of law implicit in Holmes' formulation would tend to discard the less observable as an insufficiently "hard" predicate upon
which to sustain the concept of law. The terms "objective" and "subjective" have presented a rigid dichotomy that seems to have had a life
of its own in law, and in addition, appears to have inhibited the development of a more innovative methodology in the process of decision.
From the policy science standpoint, such a distinction would not be
thought methodologically sound. A policy scientist would place behavioral interaction on a continuum which moves from the more to the
less observable. To the extent that there are techniques to discover the
less observable facts of human behavior, there would appear to be no
good reason to exclude such techniques and facts from shaping the legal myth to comport more realistically with the human subjectivities
found in ever evolving community expectations about control, authority and the allocation of values. The contents of consciousness are empirical. The critical question should therefore focus on the indices one
uses to distill the content of consciousness in context. It is these indices that "ought" to shape the decisional role. In short, the model of
externality suffers from major defects reflected in the critiques leveled
at Professor Currie's governmental interests analysis. Indeed, among
its drawbacks are its lack of a principle of realism; its lack of a principle of contextuality; and its inability to supply meaningful empirical
indices that "ought" to frame the decision role as a challenge to the
traditional and emergent demands of men and women in society. The
focus of inquiry implicit in Holmes' demand for objectivity appears to
require that the decisionmaker purge himself of the crucial facts of social interaction animating the claim in the first place-the subjectivities of the claimants themselves.
By making law "objective," the Legal Process school sought to sustain a very old tradition. It sought to refine the concept of law without
power; a concept which held that the legal regime could sustain and
regenerate a continuing myth independently of the power process. It
attempted this in a refined and quite sophisticated manner. This
school never quite understood, however, the profound implications of
Cardozo's aphoristic comment on the Realists that "law never is, but is
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always about to be. ' 33 ' For this dynamic quality is the essence of making policy. Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger stated this remarkably well when he emphasized the creative element in policy-making. He said: "The essence of policy is its contingency; its success
depends on the correctness of an estimate which is in part
conjectural."' 3 54
The essential problem with this school, especially in its more restrained orientations, is that it seems to assume, in large measure, that
structure should condition role. This assumption is implied in the objective characterization of the nature of law. The critical question,
however, is not the externality factor as such-this is a biological datum; rather, it is the content and character of the indices that sufficiently frame the predispositions of a decisionmaker, allowing him to
make a sensible decision that should, so far as possible, fulfill such subjective demands of all claimants as are consistent with the aggregate
pattern of shared subjectivities of the body politic. It is the character
of individuated and collective demands that, in context, should inform
the decisional role and not the reverse. This reversal is the essential
difference in the starting points of the policy science and legal process
schools.
In conclusion, the critical difference between the policy science
and legal process schools lies in their diverse approaches to the challenge spawned by the Realists. For the policy science school, the challenge lay in developing a comprehensive and realistic model of decision
that could be meaningfully related to the social process and understood in terms of the priorities of that process. To the legal process
school, there was the self-conscious cultivation of the legal image
whose function was not to discover whether the body politic was on the
wrong track and headed for a collision, but rather to make the "train"
move faster. The legal process school sought to cultivate a kind of juridical-bureaucratic personality-type, whereas the policy science school
sought to make the decisionmaker mature and technically capable of
making the creative choices that the decision process demands. Kissinger stated this idea rather well:
Profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant
redefinition of goals. Good adminstration thrives on routine,
the definition of relationships which can survive mediocrity.
Policy involves an adjustment of risks; administration an
avoidance of deviation. Policy justifies itself by the relationship
353. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126 (1921). Cardozo himself
made the comment rather perjoratively.
354. H. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED 326 (1964).
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of its measures and its sense of proportion; administration by
the rationality of each action in'terms of a given goal. The attempt to conduct policy bureaucratically leads to a quest for
calculability which tends to become a prisoner of events. The
effort to administer politically leads to total irresponsibility,
because bureaucracies are designed to execute, not to
conceive.863
While the nature of law might have compelled a greater respect for
the problem-oriented approach among the legal process theorists, they
were and remain noncontextual, although significantly, they were not
entirely tradition-bound in terms of their receptiveness to advances in
science and technology. They have never, however, provided a model of
decision sufficiently flexible to scientifically integrate the findings of
science into the arenas of decision, except in the more simple context.
This brief summary then, is a bare conceptual outline of the legal process paradigm that appears to have informed both Professors Currie
and Cavers in PIL.
d. The Choice of Law Process
As we have indicated, the foregoing approach did not assume an
exclusive primary on the frontiers of American legal ideology. A school
developed at Yale sought to respond more directly to the challenge the
Realists had formulated regarding the nature of decision. Indeed, it
was Cavers' 1933 article that had sought to set out some sort of a taxonomy of decision for the PIL context. It was the 1933 article that
enabled the next generation of conflicts scholars to appreciate the limits of fairness and neutrality as criteria guiding PIL decision; the concern for results could not be avoided.
In 1965, Professor Cavers published his book The Choice of Law
Process." 6 The title should have betrayed its ideological roots. It was
framed in what seemed essentially the structures of the legal process
paradigm. The early Cavers had left us with the "free law" legacy; a
challenge to decision, policy-making and application. The new Cavers
acceded to the major assumptions of Currie and the legal process
school up to a point. Currie would go no further than being "restrained
and enlightened" about creative choice; Cavers emerged with criteria
for a "principled" decision in his principles of preference. Essentially,
these principles are postulated as Caver's version of preferred goals. He
offered five for transgroup tort claims, two for transgroup contracts
355.

356.

Id. at 326-27.
D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965).
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claims and one for conveyancing needs. Cavers' five principles in tort
law are, briefly, as follows:
(1) If the lex loci delicti sets a higher premium on conduct or financial
compensation than the lex loci domicilii, or the place where the defendant "acted" delictually, select the lex loci delicti as providing the rule
of decision.
(2) If the lex loci actus, or the place where the injury was caused,
prescribes a lower standard for the conduct of the defendant or the
measure of financial compensation due than the lex loci domicilii of
the plaintiff, select the lex loci actus as the law that supplies the rule
of decision.
(2a) If the law of lex loci delicti sets a lower standard of compensation
(protection) than the lex loci domicilii of either defendant or plaintiff,
select the lex loci domicilii of either of the concerned parties that carries the lowest financial compensation.
(3) Where a state legislates explicitly for the multi-state tort context
and the other concerned state does not, defer to the "laws" of the former state where the nature of the injury meets a kind of foreseeability
test.
(4) The fourth point invokes the Savigny "seat of the relationship"
test, and recommends that, where the state that harbors the seat of the
relationship (its center of gravity) has a standard of conduct or of
financial compensation which is higher than that of the place of the
injury, select the former law.
(5) If the law of the center of gravity of the relationship imposes lower
3 57
standards than the lex loci delicti, it should also prevail.
For contract law, Cavers recommended: Where state A prescribes
standards for incompetence, heedlessness, ignorance, and inequality,
its law prevails when (a) that is the person's lex loci domicilii; or (b)
that state is the center of gravity of the relationship; or (c) the facts
make reference to other prescriptions as fortuitous or manipulative. 56
Finally, where, under the aegis of party autonomy, the parties choose
the prescription of the law of a state "reasonably related" to the transaction, deference should be given to that state's laws even though that
state is not the "center of gravity" of the contract and neither party is
affiliated with it. This principle is subject to the laws of the lex situs
and subject further to the proviso that third parties are not affected by
35
it.

These principles of preference incorporate only torts, contracts
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 139-80.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 194.
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and conveyancing. Just how applicable this is to the vagaries of these
fields and all others is a matter of conjecture. Currie and Cavers said
little or nothing about marital problems and, (so far as this writer is
aware), only one really definitive statement by the governmental interests school has been directed to the problems of marriage and divorce
in the conflict of laws.
e.

Observational standpoint

It has already been noted that theorists working within the legal
process framework did not consistently distinguish between theories of
and theories about PIL. The choice of law process is no exception. The
principles of preference suggest, in a modest and nearly grudging manner, that the solution to the choice of law problem reposes in the development of theories (perhaps principles of preference) about PIL. But
Cavers probably sees these principles as a very modest adjunct to an
already circumscribed decisional role for the jurist in PIL. This, in
turn, suggests that the role of observer and decisionmaker are not sufficiently distinguished. The decisionmaker is limited in the arena of effective choice by having to conform to community expectations about
demanded public order. It is critical, however, that the observer "create and maintain a functional theory which enables him realistically to
perform the indispensable intellectual tasks in reference to the flow of
conventional theoauthoritative decisions and the accompaniment of
36 0
ries employed to explain and justify decisions.
f.

Focus of inquiry: comprehensiveness in conception of relevant
community

Cavers and Currie essentially accepted the same central concepts
of dualistic positivism.36 1 Hence Cavers' capacity to articulate a more
360. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362,
380 (1971).
361. Cavers first formulated his "result selective" approach in 1933. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933). He contended that
when faced with a multi-state case, a decisionmaker should look at the substantive rules
of all the forums involved in the case and select the rules most suitable to a solution in
light of the circumstances and factors present in the specific case. This view is opposed
to the more traditional view which recommends a clear selection between the rules of one
state or another. Other important works on the choice of law problem by Cavers include
D. CAvERs, THB CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem: 1972 Addendum, 17 HARv. INr'L L.J. 651 (1976).
Currie has recommended a "governmental interest" analysis as an approach to the
choice of law problem. For a compilation of Currie's most noted work on conflicts of law,
see B. CURRIE, supra note 309.
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inclusive concept of community was crippled at the outset. What distinguishes Cavers is that he would not accept the logical limits of this
framework. For the narrow margin of cases dealing with so-called "true
conflicts," he postulated his principles of preference, the criterion of
validity of which, to use a dualist assumption, reposed in Cavers himself. Cavers participated in the creation of transstate perspectives
about control and authority in PIL. This breakthrough was a significant concession, in the legal process paradigm, to the reality and relevance of at least some kind of transstate inclusive community policies
for PIL.
g.

Comprehensiveness in conception of law

-Balanced

emphasis between perspectives and operations

Cavers implicitly accepts the need for an "objective" concept of
law and, therefore, an objective concept of PIL. How did such a concept affect a proper balance between perspectives and operations?
First, the lack of a comprehensive concept of community makes it
nearly impossible to focus on a more comprehensive (or inclusive) and,
therefore, realistic appreciation of perspectives. Cook and Currie, as
earlier suggested, could be seen as literally denying transstate perspectives altogether. Cavers, however, sought to distill a narrow range of
such perspectives in his principles of preference for a small range of
problems that could not be logically accounted for in the legal process
paradigm.
The basic problem with Cavers' principles, if they are to be representative of transstate perspectives, is that they aspire to do too much
with too little. These principles purport to be more than simply a kind
of "rule" or some other inference guidance device; they purport to displace or at least simplify the entire decision-making process.
The serious methodological question implicit in the principles is
this: If the "rules" of PIL were admittedly threadbare as the realists
had shown, would a slightly higher level of abstraction make a significant contribution to the accretion of sensible results? The chief weakness of the "rules" is that they aspire to simplify the decision process
by purporting to eliminate the social context. The normative ambiguity
of rules, and to some extent principles, have been more than adequately demonstrated in the past.5 6 2 The critical question posed by
For a discussion of various approaches to the conflict of laws problem, including an
analysis and explanation of the works of both Currie and Cavers, see Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism. 14 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1975).

362.

The "lex loci" rules sought, by means of short Latin phrases, to perform multi-
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Cavers' principles is this: Can "principles of preference," a conceptual
technique of marginally higher level abstraction than the "rule" preferences, be a substitute for the principle of contextuality? It seems highly artificial to set out a program of middle-to-low-level abstractions as
the priorities of the specialized features of the transgroup social process geared to transgroup deprivations, without even a vague account
of this process and with only the barest account of its normative basis.
To pretend that one can account for these realities within the structure
of merely five principles, and to provide for an adequate taxonomy of
decision as well, is to demand much faith and fortitude of any reader.
The problem with all of these formulations is not that one agrees
or disagrees with them; it is that they purport to be a substitute for
making a rational decision in context. This is not to say that the problem of choice is a simple matter. Rather, the taxonomy of any and all
of these principles of preference is simply inadequate if it is meant to
be a taxonomy of all transstate perspectives relevant to the process of
decision in PIL. The following is but one illustration of the simplistic
assumptions that inhere in these principles. Cavers correctly sees that
there is a major problem with regard to degrees of culpability and the
legitimate expectations that people have when they are involved in
transgroup delicts. But he accounts for these by making enormous assumptions about territoriality and how the spatial condition seems to
exclusively frame the subjectivities of the self about tort liability across
group lines. The spatial dimension is not the only criterion for imputing such outcomes. Cavers' principles purport to account for community expectations through time and space, without an elaborate decision procedure whereby all indices relevant to particular problems can
be brought to the focus of decision. Thus, the structure of policy fluctuates between a notion of equitable fairness in the allocation of indulgences and detriments, and the idea of optimality in a peculiarly atomized sense which is operationalized by a quite mechanistic formula.
Aggregate expectations about optimality are not essentially accounted
for, nor is there an explanation of where the author stands on this
question.
The problem here is that the idea of public order is unrefined. The
principles of preference carry a peculiarly positive aura but their genesis is essentially neutral. Why Cavers should have been so conservative
is to be found in his unconscious identifications with the role of the
pie intellectual tasks. For the definitions and functions of these rules, see, e.g., DIcEY AND
MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 27 (J. Morris 10th ed. 1980). Currie's interest analysis
theory was also criticized for the normative ambiguity of such concepts as "governmental
interests." See supra.note 286 and accompanying text.
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judge as the legal process school defines it. Essentially, the principles
of preference betray the same normative ambiguity of rules, a point
that led Professor Baade to question whether the book, The Choice of
Law Processs3 s was an alliance (against formalism) for progress, or a
counter-revolution. If this criticism is sound, it follows that "rules" or
"principles" are a poor substitute for the distillation of perspectives
about a comprehensive social process, characteristic of PIL. One may
therefore conclude that there is no balanced emphasis between perspectives and operations in The Choice of Law Process.8"
-Clarity

in conception of authority and control

The criticisms made with regard to Professor Currie are equally
applicable to Professor Cavers regarding their appreciation of the dynamics of authority and control in PIL. Although Cavers' principles of
preference acknowledge the importance of myths to decision, the basic
emphasis is still less on indices sustaining the allocation of substantive
values, than the narrower emphasis on procedural goals. The other criteria for evaluating Cavers' work are essentially reflected in the critique made of Professor Currie's governmental interests analysis
perspective.
h.

Appraisal

The appraisal made with reference to Professor Currie's use of the
legal process framework are in large measure germane to any appraisal
of Professor Cavers' later work. This appraisal will, therefore, focus on
the essential differences between Cavers and Currie and how these differences have undermined the conceptual basis of the legal process
paradigm.
Currie "gave up" when confronted with a PIL claim that involved
what he called a "true" conflict where the forum was itself a "disinterested third state." ' Cavers took up the challenge but was forced back
on what are essentially "subjective" value preference principles. Both
perspectives within this school have in their own terms had to concede or transcend the limits of their own paradigm. Thus Cavers,
whether he was conscious of it or not, by writing into the legal process
paradigm his own recommended scholar's subjectivities, undermined
363. D.

CAVERS,

supra note 356.

364. Id.
365. In his later writings, Professor Currie urged that judges should be restrained in
the identification of forum interests. This has been characterized as Currie's theory of
the restrained and enlightened forum. See Currie, supra note 271, at 758. See also Traynor, supra note 269.
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the essential externality or objective basis of this school as set out by
Holmes. The scholars in the legal process school in PIL have more
than amply demonstrated, in their own terms, that the facts that are
the precondition for a realistic and comprehensive theory about PIL
are quite unruly. Thus, in order to make their own framework credible
in PIL, they have had to essentially change, in a fundamental way, the
conceptual basis of their own paradigm, even if this is done in a cautious and near minimalist manner.
It remains only to reiterate the point that Cavers does not provide
us with a systematic effort or taxonomy of just how policies are clarified in terms of common interest; in terms of their relative inclusivity
or exclusivity; and in terms of the minimum and optimal priorities of
the social process. Cavers' own principles are not without merit as tools
for the clarification of basic community policy or common interest. But
they are only partial. s6' Just why they should be confined to a limited
366. Professor Cavers has acknowledged that his principles of preference do not necessarily add up to a theory about, or of, choice of law. In his lectures, Cavers said:
If a particular case did not fall quite within a principle as I stated it, this did not
call for a choice contrary to that indicated by the principle; it simply meant that
the case posed a somewhat different problem than that covered by the principle
and therefore required further consideration.
Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, III RECUEIL DES COURS,
77, 152 (1970). Cavers added that he felt "greater confidence in the concept of principles
of preferences than in the particular principles he proposed." Id. at 158.
The territorial bias of Cavers' principles of preference have been honored by some
courts. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). This was a guest
statute case involving a Pennsylvania plaintiff and a Delaware defendant who relied on
Delaware's protective statute for an accident that occurred in Delaware. Following the
principle articulated in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d
519 (1969), that the state's contacts be measured in qualitative terms with reference to
the policies and interests and underlying the particular problems, the court determined
that it was faced with a true conflict. The court decided that the Delaware contacts were
qualitatively greater and relied on Professor Cavers' second principle of preference to
justify the conclusion. The majority opinion contains the following passage quoted from
D. CAVERS, supra note 356, at 146-47:
Consider the response that would be accorded a proposal that was the opposite
of this principle if it were advanced against a person living in the state of injury
on behalf of a person coming there from a state having a higher standard of care
or financial protection. The proposal thus advanced would require the community the visitor entered to step up its standard of behavior for his greater safety
or lift its financial protection to the level to which he was accustomed. Such a
proposal would be rejected as unfair. By entering the state or nation the visitor
has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject
persons living there to a financial hazard that their law had not created.
Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. at 567, 267 A.2d at 856.
Cipolla contained an eloquent dissenting opinion by Justice Roberts in which he
dissected the "localization" ideas of territoriality, and rejected the "territorial" view of
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range of claims in PIL is unclear from a policy science point of view.
Moreover, precisely why Cavers should not have embraced a broader
constellation of human values than his own minimalist contribution is
never clearly explained in The Choice of Law Process.37 The final
irony is this: Cavers had pioneered the importance of the methodology
of decision. Yet the choice of law process recedes from decision to a
kind of "institutional settlement" formula, at the expense of the contextual perspective that was, at least, hinted at in his 1933 article.," In
short, Cavers receded from his own challenge. Why? It may be that
here again Cavers had not evidenced an uncommon degree of intellectual independence, this time from his "legal process" colleagues at
Harvard.

Professor Cavers, as adopted by the majority. His interpretation of the guest statute and
its transstate reach is in turn influenced by Leflar's better rule concept and by von Mehren's and Trautman's preference for the "emerging" rather than "regressing" rule. See A.
VON MEHREN

& D.

TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

394 (1965).

It should be added that Cavers' territorially oriented principles have been influential
in reinforcing choice of law methods drawing upon the seat of the relationship or the
center of gravity approach. See, e.g., Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1961); and Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). This method is also an
aspect of the "localization" technique associated with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). These perspectives have in turn been highly influential with a
"new" approach to choice of law loosely styled the "new Territorialists." See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (3d ed.
1981); Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania

Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373, 382 (1971). Unfortunately, Professor Twerski's methodology
has neither the benefits of Professor Beale's theoretical sophistication nor its rigor of
analysis. It has no real theoretical basis. On the other hand, his view gains none of the
benefits of modern functionalist, policy centered law. His approach appears to have encapsulated the worst of both worlds.
Finally, it should be noted that for all of the territorial emphasis of Professor
Cavers' principles of preference, the technique he uses comes close to that of governmental interests analysis in analyzing false conflicts and apparently true conflicts. In his
analysis of Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), Cavers holds that his principles can
sometimes discharge a useful function by aiding a court to determine whether
apparently conflicting laws produced a true or a false conflict, contrary to the
statement in The Choice of Law Process that the principles become operative
only after it has been decided that the case does not present a false conflict.
Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, III RECUEIL DES CouRs,
77, 191 (1970).
367.

D. CAvss, supra note 356.

368. Cavers, supra note 313.
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E. Selected Contemporary Perspectives: The American Scene3 '0
Trends in theories of or about the choice of law process have proliferated substantially since the 1971 publication of the Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws.3 7 0 The Second Restatement does not provide as clean-cut a theoretical foundation for the choice of law process
as does its predecessor271 Indeed, it is probably a fair criticism of the
Second Restatement to say that it is an example of political and ideological compromise. Effectually, the conceptual basis of the Second Restatement does not reflect a unified, coherent and consistent jurisprudential theory about PIL. Indeed, it has sought to integrate a kind of
legal pluralism which, translated into jurisprudential terms, might be
seen to integrate theoretical ideas that are sometimes compatible and
sometimes not. The outstanding virtue of the Restatement is that it
institutionalizes a highly flexible perspective about PIL. In effect, this
means that in the light of experience, theory and practice may evolve
into a framework of the rational allocation of the law-making and lawapplying powers of the key participants in PIL.
The polestar of the Second Restatement is the concept of the law
of the "place of the most significant relationship. ''37 This determination is to be made according to the criteria of § 6. These criteria are
369. The evaluation of these selected modern or contemporary perspectives in American conflicts' law is not meant to suggest that other views from other legal cultures do
not also merit in-depth consideration. Constraints of space limitations allow one only to
skim the surface of the contemporary landscape in the United States, much less do justice to it. This means that a consideration of developments in the theory of PIL abroad
shall have to await a more convenient time and forum.
370. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). For a sample of some of

the discussion of conflict of laws after the release of the Restatement (Second), see generally Adkins, Conflict of Laws: Contracts and Other Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 112
(1974); Hay, Unjust Enrichment in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative View of German Law and the American Restatement 2d, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L. (1977); Westbrook, A
Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975).
371. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). The first Restatement sought simplicity by formulating rules that would "allocate each case to the legal system of a single
state," usually offering the principle of territoriality as its criterion. D. CAVERS, supra
note 356, at 65. Cavers, in his effort to achieve predictability and uniformity, however,
often sacrificed policy and common sense considerations.
372. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). In the absence of any
express provision by the contracting parties or any statutory provisions as to choice of
law, § 188 directs the courts to use the "most significant relationship" test to determine
the applicable law using the policy and practical considerations of § 6 as a guide in defining the elements of that test. For an analysis of some of the relevant issues and concerns
in the contracts area of conflict of laws, see e.g., Adkins, supra note 370; Reese, Choice of
Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 315-16 (1972).
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styled choice of law principles:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular fields of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied."'
The general principles of § 6 are sharpened by detailed rules and
principles that operate within the framework of particular subject areas. For example, § 145 sets out the principle applicable in tort cases as
follows:
§ 145 The General Principles (in Tort Cases)
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue
include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and the place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered." 4
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. Thus, under the Second Re373.
374.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). Consistent with its

general approach to conflict of laws, the Restatement in § 145 regarding torts calls for
deference to the local law with "the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Id. For a discussion of the central importance of the policy and practical considerations enumerated in § 6 as a thematic reference point for the other articles in the Restatement, see Westbrook, supra note 370, at
433-34.
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statement, the key objective is to identify the state with the most significant relationship to the problem because one must look to that
state's law for the rule of decision.
There are basically two phases to the technique of the Second Restatement in identifying the relevant contacts relating to states whose
law might supply the rule of decision. First, reference is made to the
more precise rules found in a particular subject area; second, the applicability of the rules must be evaluated under the general principles of §
6. Thus, in a tort problem, § 145, which is essentially jurisdiction selecting, must be evaluated against the principles of § 6. Similarly, the
contracts rules of § 188111 must be evaluated against the standards of
§6. The methodological difficulties of integrating both the policy considerations of §6 and the territorial emphasis of § 188, for example,
suggest a marriage of incompatible theories about law. The territorialist emphasis on the detailed rules seems to encompass a half-hearted
bow to fundamentalist vested rights assumptions; § 6, on the other
hand, seems to represent a commitment to a functionalist, result-oriented idiom.
The theoretical compromises epitomized in the Second Restatement have had the advantage of broadly defining the legitimate avenues of the content and process of choice of law. It is therefore not
surprising that the Restatement itself has stimulated an enormous
quantum of productive scholarship ir this area.376 It must be admitted,
however, that judges and practitioners who sought to rely on the Restatement as a "quick fix" to the complexity of choice of law have,
perhaps, been disappointed by its inability to meet their needs for certainty and predictability.
Three broad perspectives have emerged in the aftermath of the
Restatement. First, there are those who have seen in the Restatement
a flexible commitment to the definition of law-making in terms of territorialist notions. The Restatement codified a more flexible vestedrights/territorialist perspective, but rather than formulating rigid rules,
375. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
376. See Conflict of Laws Round Table; The Value of Principled Preferences, 49
TEx. L. REV. 211 (1971); Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 10 (1977); Reese, supra note 372; Sedler, Characterization,Identification of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in
Judicial Method, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 8 (1970); Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the
Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1972); Shaman, The Choice of Law Process: Territorialismand Functionalism,22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 227 (1980); Weinberger, Party Autonomy and Choice-of-Law: The Restatement
(Second), Interest Analysis, and the Search for a Methodological Synthesis, 4 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 605 (1976); Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law for Torts: What Principles
Should Be Preferred?, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146 (1977).
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such as the last event constituting a tort as being the place of the
wrong, the focus has been on discovering concepts like the "center of

gravity" or "seat of the relationship" of a problem.77 The technique
from the territorial viewpoint of the Restatement has been to focus
analysis on contact points creating a nexus with a concerned jurisdiction.37 8 In some formulations it is the quantum of contacts that deter879
This apmines which is the state of the most significant relations.
of a
localization
the
as
involving
proach has also been described
380
significant.
is
most
law
state's
which
problem in order to determine
The second main perspective is effectually a doctrinal outcome of
the first. It assumes that the scope of actual experience, under the

guidance of both the Second Restatement and loosely allied methodologies of choice of law, has provided a level of experience which compels
the creation of narrowly drawn rules to govern the choice of law process. These rules, it is thought, will be germane to particular policies

envisioned in the choice of law principles of § 6. They would especially
include § 6(2)(a), "the need of the interstate and international systems," § 6(2)(f), "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,"
and § 6(2)(g), "ease in the determination and application of the law to

be applied."' '

This approach was strongly endorsed from the bench in Neumeier

v. Kuehner.8as Neumeier involved New York and Ontario guest stat-

377. See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 560, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69
(1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1954).
378. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 comment c (1971).
379. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145 comment e, 148
comment j (1971).
380. See R. WEINrRAuB, supra note 245, at 363-68.
381. See Reese, supra note 372. Reese argues that a rules approach to conflict of laws
issues is more consistent with the nature of judicial tasks than a methods approach, since
the latter requires judges to ascertain the policies of other states. Id. at 316-17. Reese
argues:
Rules are the product of policies, and it is unwise to seek to formulate a rule
until the nature and range of the policies it embodies are well understood ....
Experience should eventually develop to the point where it is possible to attempt with some confidence to state a precise rule of law.
We have probably reached a stage where most areas of choice of law can be
covered by general principles which are subject to imprecise exceptions. We
should press . . .beyond these principles to the formulation of precise rules. A
choice of law rule that works well in the great majority of situations should be
applied even in a case where it might not reach ideal results.
Id. at 333-34.
For an example of Professor Reese's approach, see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
382. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). For the immediate reac-
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utes. A New York citizen was driving an automobile insured and registered in New York; the trip, however, was between two Ontario
points. 83 The automobile collided with a train, killing both the driver
and his Ontario guest.384 The personal representative of the guest sued
the estate of the New York host and the railroad. Under Ontario law,
the host is liable to the guest only for gross negligence.38 5 Under New
York law the plaintiff would recover.38 6 The New York Court of Appeals
held the rule of decision to be that of Ontario, and the plaintiff
387
lost.

Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, characterized the

problem as res nova because the precise issue had been left open in the
landmark New York case of Tooker v. Lopez.3 88 In that case Judge
Fuld had hinted at the undesirability of the guest-host cases being decided on an apparently "ad hoc" basis.3 8 ' He also hinted at the notion

that the evolution of the law in this area might now require "the formulation of a few rules of general applicability, promising a fair level
of predictability."'9 In Neumeier, Fuld suggested three rules that he
thought would serve as a "sound" basis for cases involving guest statutes in the PIL context. These rules are as follows:
tion to Neumeier v. Kuehner, see Symposium: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93 (1973).
383. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68. The New York rule imposes
upon the driver the duty of exercising ordinary care for the protection of a guest. Id. at
129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
387. Id. at 130, 286 N.E.2d at 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
388. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969) (wrongful death action.
Michigan guest statute held not applicable to issue of negligence. Automobile accident in
Michigan; decedent (passenger) and driver New York domiciliaries attending Michigan
State University; automobile owned by New York resident and registered and insured in
New York; intrastate commute).
389. Id. at 584, 249 N.E.2d at 403; 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (1969).
390. Id. See Hancock, Some Choice-of-Law Problems Posed by Anti-guest Statutes:
Realism in Wisconsin and Rule-Fetishism in New York, 27 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1975);
Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1971); Rosenberg,
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REv. 551, 641 (1968). For a rule-based view
of law, see H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). The perspective of Judge Fuld, Professors Reese and Rosenberg, and others who prefer to see concrete rules formulated to
guide decision making in the choice of law process, may also echo the turn of the century

perspective of F.

HARRISON, ON JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1919). Harri-

son's positivism led him to prefer an "untheoretical" choice of law process; a process that
would be "solid" only if based upon "actual practice and decisions of different states,
and to look to the comparison and gradual systematization of current rules, to positive
laws and practical convenience rather than to deduction from speculations, however
profound." Id. at 145.
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1. If the guest, host and automobile are from the same state,
that state provides the rule of decision.
2. If the host's state has a guest statute, and the guest's state
does not, and the accident occurs in one of these states, the
lex loci delictus provides the rule of decision.
3. In other situations where host and guest are domiciled in
different states, the lex loci delictus provides the rule of
decision.39 '
The rules approach initiated by Fuld is still in its infancy, and it is
uncertain whether this effort at the codification of experience rests on
an empirical predicate that is sufficiently realistic or comprehensive so
as to assure that the choices made are indeed ones that vindicate the
common interest. Judge Fuld's rules have been strongly criticized, 92
and interest oriented scholars have shown that in terms of their approach, there is an unprovided for case, i.e., a case in which no concerned jurisdiction has an interest to advance, short of altruism and
generosity. From the perspective of a better rule approach or the common interest/policy-science view, there is, of course, no such thing as a
no-interest case. 93
The third main perspective is that which sees itself as avowedly
policy-centered. It seeks to state an approach to choice of law in terms
of the techniques and methods inspired by Professor Brainard Currie,
techniques which have undergone subsequent judicial refinement.'
The developments in the area of policy-centered analysis have directed
concern to several problems associated with Brainard Currie's governmental interest analysis. A substantial number of contemporary theorists accept Currie's analysis up to the point of the false conflict."s 5
391. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 335 N.Y.S. 2d
64, 70 (1972).
392. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 314-18 (2d ed.
1980).

393. Cf. Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1
HOFSTRA L. REv. 150, 161-67 (1973).
394. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215 (1976) (comparative impairment); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522
P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1966) (Keating, J., concurring); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964).
395. According to the original version of [Currie's] theory, a court should apply its
own law whenever the forum government can claim a "legitimate" "governmental interest," i.e. a "reasonable basis for the application of [its] law in order to
effectuate the specific policies that it embodies." A competing foreign governmental interest is to be disregarded since only the legislator is capable of prop-
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Upon further study it has been urged that many conflicts described in
Currie's system as "true" conflicts are not so in reality.390 Hence, it is
claimed that an additional problem exists in separating these "apparently" true conflicts from true conflicts. Of course, apparent conflicts
are those kinds of cases that, upon further analysis, are shown to be
false conflicts; presumably, the term apparent conflict disguises what is
really a false conflict.
Two leading candidates for the status of apparent conflicts are
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria9 7 and Bernkrant v. Fowler.9 ' In
One Ford Victoria, a Texas chattel mortgage was honored in a seizureforfeiture action against the chattel.399 California law was construed to
not reach a Texas secured creditor-debtor transaction. '00 In Bernkrant,
the Nevada plaintiff's suit to enforce a contract to make a will was held
not subject to California's statute of frauds.4' 0 One Ford Victoria and
Bernkrant may be viewed as either true or apparent conflicts. ' In
erly weighing and deciding between conflicting interests.
A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1967) (citing Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69
YALE L.J. 1323, 1361 (1960)). Thus, so long as the forum could assert any arguable governmental interest, an apparent conflict would arise and the forum law would apply
without any reference to the foreign interest. It has been asserted that "all courts and
writers who have professed acceptance of Currie's interest language have transformed it
by indulging in that very weighing and balancing of interests from which Currie refrained." Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80
HAuv. L. REV. 377, 389 (1966). This weighing served to unmask spurious conflicts that
would have slipped by Currie's analysis.
396. In response to the heretical weighing of interests by his professed adherents,
Currie developed the theory of the more moderate, restrained and enlightened forum
which, upon finding an apparent conflict, would take a second look and altruistically
subordinate forum self-interest in the face of foreign interests and a desire for the "minimization of conflicts problems and the advancement of a stable legal order." B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 525 (1963). "In its final form, Currie's theory
permits and expects courts to apply foreign laws even in the presence of a legitimate
forum interest." I A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1967). Currie thus
implicitly allowed cases which would have been apparent conflicts under his original theory to now be viewed as false conflicts. This altruistic evaluation of the forum interest in
light of foreign interests was said to have "reopened that very problem of choice of law
that [Currie] had purported to solve or to avoid and struck a telling blow in the counterrevolution against his own revolt." Id. at 389-90. See also Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961).
397. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
398. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
399. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 599, 311 P.2d 480, 483.
400. Id. at 598, 311 P.2d at 482.
401. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 612, 360 P.2d 906, 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270.

402. Horowitz sees Bernkrant as a "false false-conflict." Horowitz, The Law of
Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 743-44 (1974).
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each instance the forum, California, honored the law-making power of
another state. Currie viewed the technique as an example of a "more
moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the
in which it must be applied to effect the forum's
circumstances
40 8
purpose.'

The technique used to solve the problems of apparent conflict as
seen in Bernkrant and One Ford Victoria is not at all easy to divine
from the opinions. The technique appears to involve delimitation of
the problem according to criteria of domicile and territoriality. Confining the problem to two concerned states involves a court in a teleological reconstruction of the purposes to be advanced by each state's competing rules. The court circumscribes these purposes in terms of their
multistate reach and formulates rational standards of expectation for
the parties whose conduct is to be governed by the competing rules. In
One Ford Victoria, for example, Justice Traynor said:
A person financing the sale of an automobile in Texas for use
exclusively in that state will look to the laws of Texas for the
determination of his rights and duties. He cannot reasonably
be expected to familiarize himself with, and comply in Texas
with, the statutes of the forty-eight or more jurisdictions into
which the automobile could possibly be taken without his 4con4
sent, and in violation of express contractual prohibitions. 0
In Bernkrant, Traynor stated, "in determining whether the contract
herein is subject to the California statute of frauds, we must consider
expectations of the parties
both the policy to protect the reasonable
'0 5
and the policy of the statute of frauds.'

A refinement of the Traynor conception has been reflected in several later cases emerging from the California Supreme Court.'0 6 These
cases show an acceptance of the concept of a true conflict and the court
has pioneered a principle of "comparative impairment" for its solution.
This principle is attributable to Professors Baxter and Horowitz.'"
The principle of comparative impairment requires that the forum
403. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 754, 757
(1963).
404. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 598, 311 P.2d 480, 482.
405. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 612, 360 P.2d 906, 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270.
406. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719,
128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581, 522 P.2d 666,
670, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1974).
407. See, e.g., Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1963); Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L.
REv. 719, 728 (1974).
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"subordinate, in the particular case, the external objective of the state
whose internal objectives will be least impaired in general scope and
impact by subordination in cases like the one at hand."40 8
Another major writer who has contributed to the evaluation of an
interest/policy-centered concept of PIL is Professor Leflar. He has
recommended five choice-influencing considerations for the solution of
choice of law problems. 0 9 These are predictability of results, maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and the
application of the better rule of law. 410 The consideration relating to
the advancement of the forum's governmental interests suggests that
Professor Leflar accepts the true-false conflict distinction and that this
consideration, in effect, makes reference to Professor Currie's mode of
interest analysis. If this is correct, then the last consideration, the application of the better rule, would apply only to those cases where
there is a true conflict or a disinterested forum, or in the circumstance
of the unprovided-for case. However, in Clark v. Clark 1' and
Milkovick v. Saari,'41 2 Professor Leflar's better rule of law approach has
been applied to false conflict cases. This means that the concept of a
better rule of law may be used to resolve not simply true conflicts and
unprovided-for cases, but also false conflicts. This would seem to substantially undercut the framework of analysis implicit in Leflar's advancement of the forum's governmental interests consideration.
Leflar's better rule concept appears to be a prescription that is
both bold and challenging. At the same time, however, it is problematic, for it assumes the existence of principles of procedure and content
accessible to judges so that, in the tradition of comparative justice,
they will choose the better rule. Leflar has argued that there is nothing
startling about requiring judges to find a better rule. Indeed, in Leflar's
view, "most judges are capable of" doing so.41 s Leflar maintains that a

reasonable court will "prefer rules of law which make good socio-eco41
nomic sense for the time when the court speaks."1
' Leflar believes that

the preference he envisions is "objective not subjective" and that it is
no more or no less result selective than any other aspect of judicial
408. Baxter, supra note 407, at 18.
409. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54
REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
410. Id.
411. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
412. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
413. Leflar, supra note 409, at 1588.
414. Id.

CALIF.

L.
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decision-making. 41
Three major theorists who advance an avowedly functionalist approach to choice of law are Professors Weintraub,'41 von Mehren, and
Trautman. 4 ' 7 Professor Weintraub sees the idea that criteria of judgment ought to be determined by concern for "social consequences" as
key to any functional analysis of a choice of law problem.' The focus
is, therefore, upon: (1) delimiting states having a rational connection
with the problem; (2) determining policies to be advanced by laws in
conflict, if any; (3) determining the social consequences of advancing or
not advancing, by prescription, the law of one of the concerned jurisdictions; (4) determining whether the conflict is either a false or true
conflict; and (5) developing in the event of a true
conflict, a rational
49
and objective solution along functionalist lines.
There are two key choice criteria that Weintraub considers essential to the solution of a true conflict case (in the governmental interests
sense of the term case). First, the choice must be made in an objective
way, and "circumspection and common sense" must guide the decisionmaker towards fair and impartial results. 4 20 Second, a choice of law

rule or principle ought to, as near as possible, approximate actual or
emerging reasonable community expectations-"the preferred national
solution interstate conflicts problem.' 421 These fundamental ideas are
conceptualized as honoring "clearly discernible trends" and avoiding
unfair surprise and anachronism.4 "2 Finally, the choice of law process
should be tested in reference to a functional conception of reasonableness in terms of the purposes of the relevant rules and 4the connection
or contacts of the parties to the particular jurisdiction. "1
415. Id.
416. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMETaRY ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1980);
Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law for Torts: What Principles Should Be Preferred?, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146 (1977).
417. A. VON MEHRN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTAT PROBLEMS (1965).

418.

R. W.NRAuB, supra note 416, at 48.

419. Id.
420. Weintraub, like Currie, believes that weighing the interests of concerned jurisdictions is too subjective a predicate to produce a viable choice of law process. He said
that "such a weighing process is too subjective to be satisfactory for resolving a conflicts
problem .
Id. at 270.
I..."
421. Id.
422. Id. at 270-71, 273.
423. The following illustrate Weintraub's rules governing the validity of contracts:
A contract is valid if valid under the domestic law of any state having a contact
with the parties or with the transaction sufficient to make that state's validating
policies relevant, unless some other state would advance its own policies by invalidating the contract and one or more of the following factors suggest that the
conflict between the domestic laws of the two states should be resolved in favor

N.Y.J.
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Professors von Mehren and Trautman present a framework that
seeks to integrate the best of both governmental interests and functional analyses in terms of a more international outlook, or one which
42
is at least sensitive to the concept of transstate or transnational law. 4
Like other conflicts theorists, these authors are interested in those connecting factors that delimit the problem to "concerned jurisdictions.'

"8

As does Currie, the authors focus on considerations that lead

a court to displace the law of the forum-to depart from the regulating

rule that it would use in a wholly "domestic" problem.42, In step with

the First Restatement, they believe that rules or prescriptions that give
a multistate solution to a multistate issue27 do exist because of the "special" multistate nature of the problem.4

of invalidity:
1) The invalidating rule reflects a viable, current trend in the law of contracts such as the growing concern for protection of the party in the inferior
bargaining position;
2) The invalidating rule differs in basic policy, rather than minor detail, from
the validating rule;
3) The parties should have foreseen the substantial interest that the state
with the invalidating rule would have in controlling the outcome;
4) The context of the contract is noncommercial;
5) The courts of the state with the validating rule have, in similar interstate
cases, deferred to the policies underlying the foreign invalidating rule.
Id. at 382. The following are the rules for torts:
1. "False conflict" cases: If, in the light of its contacts with the parties or the
transaction, only one state will have the policies underlying its tort rule advanced, apply the law of that state.
2. "True conflict" cases: If two or more states having contacts with the parties
or the transaction will have the policies underlying their different tort rules advanced, apply the law that will favor the plaintiff unless one or both of the following factors is present:
a. That law is anachronistic or aberrational.
b. The state with that law does not have sufficient contact with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended course of conduct to make application of its law reasonable.
3. "No interest" cases: If none of the states having contacts with the parties or
the transaction will have the policies underlying its tort rule advanced, apply the
law that will favor the plaintiff unless one or both of the following factors is
presenta. That law is anachronistic or aberrational.
b. The state with that law does not have sufficient contact with the defendant or the defendant's actual or intended course of conduct to make application of its law reasonable.
Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).
424. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUrMAN, supra note 417, at 215.
425.
426.
427.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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The determination of whether a "domestic" rule should be given
multistate reach is not to be done only in terms of the policy basis of
the rule, but should also be made in light of transstate interests implicit in such notions as reciprocal tolerances, promotion of transstate
interaction, and multistate expectations that are justifiable in context
(equality, fairness, economy, and simplicity).2"
The solution to conflicts between concerned jurisdictions lies
partly in acknowledging that many conflicts are false.429 Cases eliminated as false conflicts may be decided according to criteria defining a
"predominantly" concerned jurisdiction. 8 0 The most arresting and

original part of the von Mehren-Trautman contribution is not in the
area of false conflicts but rather in their handling of a true conflict, an
approach which seems to presuppose the absence of a jurisdiction of
predominant concern. For such cases the suggested. approach proceeds
to: (1) determine "how strongly" a state holds to a particular rule/policy; (2) consider whether this rule/policy reflects "emerging" or "regressing" law; (3) insure that the decisionmaker is sensitive to nuances
of particular problems and general criteria; (4) consider the significance or harshness of an outcome in the application of a particular
state's rule; and finally (5) consider the distillation of common multijurisdictional policy of all concerned jurisdictions for selected classes of
problems.

48

1

Von Mehren and Trautman concede that having done all the
above, there may still be no obvious jurisdiction to supply the rule of
decision. " 2 Here different cases may be solved by different common
sense considerations. The decisionmaker may adopt the rule that promotes interstate activity or party autonomy. If the problem is intractable, the law of the forum, if it is a concerned jurisdiction, may be applied by the decisionmaker. Expanding on this theme, Professor von
Mehren has advanced the thesis that for true conflict situations there
are two inherently fundamental objectives. First, the domestic rule of a
court is a measure of justice. Forced to mediate between equal treatment of litigants and the enhancement of preferred values, von Mehren would allow a court to apply its own internal rule to the prob428. Id. at 233-304.
429. Doctrinally, Currie would disagree that a case like Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass.
374 (1878), is a false conflict.
430. The cases cited in support of the law of the predominantly concerned jurisdiction includes cases that are obviously false conflicts, e.g. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
431. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 417, at 403-08.
432. Id.
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lem.'3 Second, a "compromise" solution may be found between the
two domestic laws in conflict.4 34 Avowedly this solution involves a court
in a law-creative enterprise: the creation of transstate law for the
choice of law process. Although this proposal is carefully framed and
confined to a narrow spectrum of new intractable problems, it is a sigpoint and has vast implications
nificant doctrinal and jurisprudential
5

for the development of PIL.'

Von Mehren and Trautman's solutions for a rational choice of law
process involve the judge in a more complex function than that seemingly allowed by Professor Currie and his followers. In contrast to von
Mehren and Trautman, Currie believed that judges should not indulge
in the function of policy-weighing. 3 Professor Weintraub also eschews
policy-weighing or balancing as too subjective an enterprise for judge37

made law.
The perspectives encapsuled in the Second Restatement, as well as
those inspired or reinforced by it, are, of course, creatures of contemporary legal culture or ideology. This culture, at least in the United
States, is complex, conditioned not only by socio-political and economic conditions, but also by complex advances in our understanding
of the nature of decision and legal processes. Hence, contemporary perspectives reflect both the influences of the traditional, immediate past
geared to a fundamentalist kind of positivism, and of those develop433. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problems of Justice, 41 LAw & CoNmEMP.
PROBS. 27, 43 (1977).

434. Id. at 36. See also von Mehren, Special Substance Rules for Multistate
Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88
HARv. L. Rav. 347, 366 (1976).
435. Professor von.Mehren has written numerous articles on the theory and methodology of contemporary choice of law. His dissatisfaction with the fruits of contemporary
perspectives is, he believes, a function of the "apparently intractable nature of the
problems.... Intricate and subtle analyses are undertaken; ambiguities and uncertainties are painfully resolved. Ultimately, a result is reached, yet the solution is too frequently neither entirely satisfying nor fully convincing." von Mehren, supra note 433, at
27.
For special, narrowly drawn situations, Professor von Mehren feels that the creation
or generation of special multistate rules-reflecting a compromise between divergent
state laws--is needed. Professor von Mehren suggests several arguments to support this
position. First, he urges that "[tiheoretically, choice between two principles of justice in
question-equal treatment and the advancement of values-should be avoided whenever
possible." Id. at 30. Second, he argues that "[n]o choice-of-law methodology can harmonize the principles of equal treatment and of advancing values in all cases." Id. at 32. It
will be seen that in this study an effort has been made to respond in some degree to the
challenge to international justice that PIL problems present. The view taken here is one
of more optimism than that of Professor von Mehren.
436. Currie, supra note 403, at 758-59.
437. R. WmNTrua, supra note 416, at 270.
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ments made in the area of sociological (i.e., realist) thought. These influences can be traced in the writings of scholars as well as in appellate
court judgments in the area. Yet, it is still a fair criticism of the modern trend that the teleological aspect of the sociological-functional perspective remains underdeveloped in articulating transstate and transnational values in context. It is also a reasonable complaint that the
scientific aspect of the sociological approach, (i.e., depicting the behavior, the living law and the facts of transstate interactions, of key participants in the law-making and law-applying process in a multi-state
context) remains unexplored. 4 u This does not mean that much progress has not been made. It does suggest that more theoretical work
needs to be done to secure a framework that meets articulate jurisprudential criteria of evaluation. An infra-structure of theory would
thereby be established that will secure a more enlightened and challenging operational PIL.
1. Observational Standpoint
The Second Restatement gives scant guidance as to the importance of standpoint. Sometimes the perspective is one of a decisionmaker concerned with describing trends in practice; sometimes the
standpoint shifts to perspective, and often to the distillation of perspectives larger than necessarily embraced by those charged with decision. The complex combination of recommended methodology and
black-letter rules makes it difficult to secure a clear-cut distinction between observing, deciding, and demanding. Still, the Restatement is an
important instrument for deparochializing the perspectives of both
decisionmaker and scholar; the Restatement goes a long way toward
creating transstate expectations: transstate law. The effort to restate
PIL from the perspective of a "neutral" forum is helpful in attempting
to move in the direction of developing a theory "about" rather than
438. This criticism will become more apparent as recent trends in theory are evaluated against the criteria of evaluation suggested in this article.
According to Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen the concept of interests refers to "a pattern of demands for values plus the supporting expectations about the con-

ditions under which these demands can be fulfilled." M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWmLL & L.
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WoRLD PuBLic Osma 409 (1980). Common interests are described as those "which relate in empirical reference to activities with inclusive impacts,
express demands compatible with human dignity, and are supported by realistic expecta-

tions of interdetermination, as demonstrated in reciprocal tolerance and mutual accommodation." Id.
In contrast, special interests are those interests that "though relating to activities
having inclusive impacts ... are destructive of common interests ... in the sense that

the demands asserted are incompatible with human dignity values and the expectations
entertained do not include reciprocity and mutual accommodation." Id.

N.Y.J.
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"of" PIL. Yet it would be helpful to the evolution of this field if more
concern had been accorded to the question of standpoint. Perhaps the
central criticism of this contemporary trend is the tendency still to
identify interests, almost exclusively, with state interests. This is a primary positivist assumption: the law and the state are one. The key
point is that state interests may or may not be coextensive with common interests, yet only the observer can clearly see this. Hence, the
tendency toward parochial less inclusive conceptions of common interest is still an important contemporary element. A recommended and
conscious identity with the common interests of all humankind would
be a significant improvement in our current perspectives.
2.

Focus of Inquiry: Comprehensiveness in Conception of Relevant
Community

The focus on the advancement and/or mediation between state interests, so characteristic of contemporary PIL, has meant that core features of the interstate and international process are often not accorded
the importance in analysis that they require. The conditions that prescribe interdetermination and interdependence of community process
across state lines are often underappreciated because scholars assume
that law-making is a discrete group or state phenomenon, rather than a
multi-group phenomenon. Concessions made to this assumption are
modest and confined to special circumstances such as "true conflict"
contexts or conceptions of compromise when problems are seen as intractible. A recognition that in a multi-group, multi-state, and national
world, complex law generalizing interaction takes place requires a
much more inclusive concept of community than is evidenced in either
contemporary theory or practice.
3.

Comprehensiveness in Conception of Law

a.

Balanced emphasis between perspectives and operations

Two primary limitations of the contemporary scene have been the
inadequacies in articulating the character of the perspectives that
should guide decision-making and a lack of concern for more empirical
data to appreciate the practically relevant behaviors of the key lawmaking actors in PIL. Newer formulations have sought to cautiously
prescribe narrow rules having a sounder empirical basis. These innovations in theory represent progress. On the other hand, the inability to
distill perspectives of multi-jurisdictional dimensions, or to realize
them in grudging terms, means that theory has fallen short in understanding the normative as well as the practical-operational dimension,
of context in this area.
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Clarity in conception of authority and control

One of the central failures of conflicts scholarship is the assumption that authority and the state are synonymous. Transnational interaction often frees pivotal aspects of behavior from the control and regulation of state process viewed in discrete terms. The problems that
arise, therefore, are ones that require a sensitivity, not simply to state
perspectives of authority, but also to a broader constituency of participants. Realism demands no less. Perspectives grounded in authority
make this imperative. Already it has been shown that the dimensions
of control in the multi-state context remain underdeveloped. Yet lawmaking and law-applying in the PIL context cannot be effective or just
without appreciating more readily the nature of control and the dimensions of authority in this sphere."3 9
4.

Classification of Decision: Public Order, Constitutive, Civic Order

Already stressed has been the importance of recognizing the different types of decisions: those that are system-maintaining or constitutive; those that primarily serve the function of value allocation, often
other than power; and those kinds of decisions that are better left to
private volition. Such a scheme is particularly valuable to any viable
theory about PIL and should help to clarify the nature and substance
of diverse decision roles. That little explicit theorizing is done about
multi-state and multi-national conceptions of public and civic order or
about the broader emerging though rudimentary constitutive processes
of the larger world arena, accentuates the myth that in international
affairs, disputes are better resolved by the exercise of naked power.
The recognition of the role of PIL in the public and civic order of the
world community and its system of maintaining dimensions in the constitutive sphere could substantially enhance the relevance of contemporary perspectives.

439. See McDougal, LassweU & Reisman, Theories About InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
Some theories [of international law], unable to observe the patterns of authoritative expectation and control which in fact transcend nation-state boundaries,
have concluded that international law is not really law at all, but only "positive
morality," and that most decisions of transnational impact or reference are
taken by mere naked power, expediency, or calculations of special interest.
Id. at 194.

N.Y.J.
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Intellectual Tasks

a.

Clarification of community policy
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Modern theory has made substantial advances in the clarification
of community policy. The technique has failed, however, in not honoring a broader and more realistic concept of community. It is in the area
of policies germane to the well-being of the larger world arena that
conflicts theory has been found wanting. This may be the result of all
theorists being wedded to the notion that one's "law view" must be
"objective," and hence one's own value scheme, if it is to condition
one's "law view," must also be "objective." This problem has been directly addressed by the existential philosophers: choice and the responsibility for choice lies with man and not with extrinsic forces.44 The
suggested way out of the dilemma of objective-subjective "law" and
"value" is in the notion of the postulation of overriding goal values:
that value being human dignity. From such a position the clarification
of values and policy becomes a more stable and coherent enterprise.
Again, it will be seen that narrow conceptions of justice or optimum
order pervade the PIL literature, and preferred solutions are formulated in the ambiguous forms of positive neutralism or "least bad"
scenarios.
b.

Description of past trends

Description of trends in perspective as well as what courts in fact
do is a well executed task in this era. Where the trend has been less
than effective is in the descriptions of law-making processes of PIL
that are not necessarily court-centered. A richer conception of how law
and particularly international law is made and applied should greatly
enrich this task in the PIL context.
c.

Explicit postulation of public order goals

While some modern writers have been willing to introduce a small
subjective element into the scheme of values to decide hard cases in
this field, they have been unwilling to comprehensively evidence a
larger, more inclusive concept of justice, by postulating rather than justifying the concept of human dignity and the common interest as the
enhancement of human dignity. As value conflicts become more intrac440. See generally H. BARNES, ExISTNTIAusT ETmics 3-123 (1967). "The free individual is restricted factually by his own future, the projects of other free individuals, and
the stubborn resistance of the outside world; he cannot be subject to ethical principles,
for he alone decides whether or not he wishes to attach a value to the ethical." Id. at 49.
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table, it may be that more scholars will find appropriate normative
guidance in not only the values in the common core of legal concepts,
but also in the United Nations Charter,"' the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,"48 and all the other instruments and processes evolving
to enhance the dignity of man.
d. Projection of future trends
Prediction in this field is, as all conflicts scholars know, a hazardous enterprise. Needless to say, writers have been extremely circumspect in predicting trends.44 The inability to predict the outcomes of
decision with reasonable probability is extremely destabilizing to many
areas of multistate human interaction and modern perspectives have
not mightily improved prediction.
e.

Alternatives

Changes in PIL thinking have been radical. Yet a genuinely new
paradigm of or about law has not emerged. Alternative constructs have
been rooted in the past and have wavered about venturing into uncharted seas of the future. The landscape contains alternatives, but
these share the same or remarkably similar jurisprudential bases, and
carry the pitfalls of these perspectives.
Not nearly enough focus is given to both environmental and
predispositional conditions that influence decision. While theorists
have given weight to environmental factors occasionally," the search
for objective law often obfuscates the predispositional dimension in decision. Yet, in a world of complex interlocking, complementary, and
sometimes conflicting identifications, it would seem that a concern for
the conditions that predispose decisional behavior should be a significant intellectual task.
441. See U.N. CHjARTs art. 1, paras. 2 & 3, art. 13, pars. 1(b), art. 55, art. 56. The
preamble states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal

rights of men and women and of nations large and small.. .

."

Id. Preamble.

442. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. Doe. A/810 at 71 (1948).
443. See, e.g., Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the
Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. Rav. 1063 (1979). "Fundamental to developing a
coherent theory of interests is the concept of the purpose or 'function' of rules." Id. at

1064.
444.

See M. McDouGAL, H. LAsswMAu & L. CHEN, supra note 438, at 38-44.
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Appraisal of Past Theories

The fundamental problem posed by PIL is the rational allocation
of law-making and law-applying competence of concerned bodies politic to assure that such allocations are done in the common interest. In
the broad sense, one is concerned with the allocation among bodies
politic, including states, of the "competence to make and apply law to
' 5
the transnational or transgroup events that affect them."44 The actual
exercise of such competence should invariably reflect a subtle, but realistic calculation of the "differential impact of transnational activities,
irrespective of the state or non-state character of the actors, upon the
4
members, resources, and institutions of different states." " To realistically appraise past trends in theory requires that one evaluate such
theory in the light of both the nature of the problem posed in PIL as
well as the desired objectives of the response thereto.
The historical experience of PIL perspectives reflects legal developments that are both universalist and parochial. Universalist perspectives have, in general, tended to be sensitive to the reality and utility
of transgroup perspectives. Parochial perspectives have often sought a
closer alignment with the operations and practices of a particular body
politic and have tended to undermine a sensitivity to the broader
outlook.
The Roman law, as it ultimately matured, built not only upon the
rigid and parochial jus civile, but also on the broader perspective reflected in the jus gentium and the jus naturale.The PIL-type problem
must have emerged in Roman law because of internal conflicts between
Peregrenes and Romans.44 Although precise linkages are hard to trace,
and although the Peregrene Praetor's edict does not survive, the evidence of recourse to inclusive standards of the jus gentium and jus
naturale is pervasive in Roman legal culture. Deference to inclusive
standards for the solution of choice of law problems are also to be
found in the work of the Statutists and in Story's concern for promoting inclusive common interests.
The evolution of PIL as a discipline emerged more clearly in the
European context as nation-states became more identifiable and discrete. As the resulting power complexities involving emerging nationstates became more acute, legal doctrines emerged that sought to ra445.

McDougal & Jasper, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Some Sug-

gested Amendments, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL Busir'ss 6 (M. Landweher ed. 1981).
446. Id.
447. See, e.g., F. VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 354-57 (2d ed. 1880 &
photo. reprint 1972).
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tionalize the control over the fundamental bases of power of such
groups. Two of the most obvious bases of such power are territory and
people. The search of legal scholars thereafter was for doctrines that
would secure a reasonable accomodation between conflicting claims of
more than a single body politic to make and apply law for events occuring or impacting in their territory, or with respect to persons in
some affiliation with them. The famous classification prescriptions of
the Glossators, real statutes [territory], personal statutes [persons],
and mixed statutes [persons and territory], were a significant doctrinal
effort to develop a legal myth for the law-making and law-applying
process cutting across state or group lines. 44 8 The seventeenth century
saw the demise of Christian Universalism under the authority of Rome.
The Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 44 gave a juridical imprimatur
to the claims to group autonomy and self-determination on the continent of Europe. The outcomes of Westphalia and the events leading up
to it were the modern nation-state buttressed by the legal myth of sovereignty and the political myth of independence. The impact of the
truncation of the European political landscape meant an increased decentralization in the allocation of law-making and law-applying power
among sovereign nation-states. While the need for transatate perspectives of authority and control increased as a result of these legal and
political developments, the impulse to parochialism also flourished as
power became more widely distributed. The Statist paradigm of Westphalia generated much narrower and parochial perspectives about PIL
and, in extreme forms, sought to deny the reality and, indeed, the utility of transstate perspectives of authority and control.
The Dutch school did not discard the notion of transstate law, but
did circumscribe its doctrinal evolution at the altar of self-determination and political independence. The deference to the principle of comity, comitas gentium, kept alive a thread of universalist values.
The monumental contribution of Joseph Story on this side of the
Atlantic represents almost an historic anomaly. The nineteenth century saw the more concrete formalization of a kind of European state
rechtgemeinschaft, which was accelerated by the Congress of Vienna
and the Concerts of Europe.
The emergence and triumph of legal positivism as the predominant law-view, however, served to undercut Justice Story's contribution, especially as to the aspect supported by his natural law inclinations and his sensitivity to broader normative standards loosely
associated with universalist values. The fundamental problem posed by
448.
449.

See supra note 3.
Peace of Westphalia, 1648, 1 Parry's T.S. 1.
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such a perspective in the eyes of a legal positivist is simple: Universals
cannot be stated. They comprise statements that are not scientifically
verifiable, and are therefore meaningless.
The view closely associated with positivism that came to prevail in
England and the United States was the so-called vested rights approach. This perspective rested on the assumption that law is closely
identified with the notion of state-sovereignty. In its doctrine and
method, however, it sought to provide a transstate perspective of such
formal abstraction that its process lost sight of the social facts of the
transstate process and revealed itself as a poor response to the
problems generated in PIL.
The Legal Realists, working in the PIL context, spent much of
their energy demolishing the vested rights perspective and demonstrated the nature of the problems, and challenges, that required a response from the decision-making process. While they suggested that a
social science perspective required the formulation of theories about
rather than of law, they suggested only vague outlines about where to
go. The focus on decision, policy and function, however, still contained
the seeds of a newer paradigm.
During the post-World War II period three predominant approaches to jurisprudence emerged in the wake of the American Realist
Movement. The first is the refinement of the analytical approach in
terms of ordinary language analysis under the influence of J.L. Austin' 50 and Professor H.L.A. Hart.'5 1 The second was the effort to redefine the central jurisprudential questions in terms of role and function
by Professors Hart and Sacks in their casebook, The Legal Process:
The Making and Application of Law." This approach to the legal
process had a major influence on leading conflict of laws writers in the
United States, especially Professors Cavers and Currie. The work of
these scholars has significantly advanced the understanding of the institutional roles of the various actors and has contributed much to
one's understanding of the subject. Yet the limits of this perspective
have served to restrict the evolution of a broader outlook of an international-comparative vantage point.
The third jurisprudential perspective is that of the policy-sciences
associated with Professors McDougal, Lasswell and their collaborators.'5 3 Their work on the public order of the world community has
450. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, supra note 106.
451. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1962); Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence,70 L.Q. Rev. 37 (1954).
452. H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING &
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent.

453.

ed. 1958).

See, e.g., McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principlesof Con-
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sought to bridge the gap between so-called public and private international law, although with exceptions, they have been most influential in
the general international law area. New social facts in the earth-space
system, new technologies, accelerating patterns of interaction in trade,
education and all other areas of value-significance have profoundly
changed the character of the problems posed in this field. To this
should be added the development in the international law areas where
the individual is increasingly recognized factually and juridically as an
integral part of the global system. More importantly, the normative
significance of the development of human rights standards has provided a new reality and a new and bolder challenge for PIL. This requires new thinking: a new paradigm.
A theory about PIL should be realistic and comprehensive. Such a
theory would maintain a concern for the appropriate observational
standpoint; it would seek to describe a concept of community in terms
larger than the nation-state; the conception of law would be cast in
broader terms to embrace the core features of control as well as the
central symbols of authority that operate in the system. Additional
criticisms raised in this survey concern the following: the clarification
of kinds of decision, the performance of intellectual tasks, the classification and clarification of policy, and the task of postulating preferred
public order goals. The limited perspective implicit in past theoretical
formulations has evidenced a critical lack of appreciation for the potentialities inherent in the PIL framework for a better world order.
A decision made in the PIL context sensitizes participants at all
levels to an ongoing educational and deparochializational process
which intensifies as decisions are operationalized and diffused into the
social patterns of affected bodies politic. PIL is thus an important instrument for effectuating ordered social change in a turbulent world.
tent and Procedurefor Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387
(1974); McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw Upon National Law: A Policy Oriented Perspective, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157 (M. McDougal ed. 1960);
McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Future, 50 MIss. L.J. 259 (1979); McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power and Policy: A Conception, 82 RECURIL DES COuES 137 (1953);
McDougal & Lasswell, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 So. CAL. L. Rcv. 362 (1972);
McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188
(1968); Reisman, A Theory about Law from the Policy Perspective, in LAW AND POLICY
75 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976).
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AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

A.

Recommendations

A new paradigm about PIL is one that would initially seek to
deparochialize the subject. In other words, in the quest for realism, one
develops the central components of social interaction on a global scale.
The central features of a new paradigm would therefore describe:
(1) The broad outlines of the world social process. This context
should enable one to describe, in greater detail, the central contextual
features of the many specialized value processes of world society.
These value processes include, among others, the domestic relations
[affection] process and the wealth operating [international transactions] process.
(2) The processes of claims to principles of transnational and
transgroup jurisdiction: claims to law-making and law-applying power
in the context of each value process.
(3) The unique features of the transnational constitutive process
and the decisional process that responds to claim assertion.
(4) The goals and policies that epitomize the common interest of
mankind and the manner in which they relate to diverse contexts and
claims.
(5) The trends in decision and conditioning factors that determine the allocation of indulgences and deprivations.
(6) Potential alternatives for the greater realization of human
dignity goals where actual practice is divergent from such normative
goals.
B. Process of Interaction in PIL
Earlier in this study, the central importance of contextual background of PIL was stressed. In the broadest possible sense, that background is the world social process. An economic way to touch the salient aspects of this process is through the use of a phase analysis. Social
interaction essentially involves human beings pursuing values, sometimes cross-culturally, through institutions, based on resources. The
global or world social process background of PIL involves, inter alia,
participants in "groups." The relevant background therefore contains
the core ingredients of a consociative process. The world social process
with its consociative elements incorporates innumerable arenas and
sub-arenas of interaction. It encapsulates a wide variety of participants
whose perspectives are amazingly diverse. These include various symbols of identification; diverse expectations about authority, control and
decision; and many demands for access to the shaping and sharing of
all desired goods, services, and honors. The situational context of par-
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ticipants in this global process of consociation incorporates features of
space and time which relate to patterns of psychic stress ranging along
a continuum from "normal" to "crisis" level. Participants in the social
process will seek bases of power or control from which preferred outcomes may be generated. Base values might include power, wealth, respect, rectitude, skill, well-being, enlightenment, affection, and perhaps, loyalty. These values may also be pursued through institutions
based on territorial or other resources serving as bases of power.
The strategies available to participants utilizing various base values, resources and institutions include the diplomatic, the symbolic,
the economic, and even the coercive or military. To the extent that
participants in this consociative process effectuate value outcomes, further problems for the process will in time result from the production,
conservation, distribution, and consumption of values. The time factor
forces one to estimate both long and short term results emanating from
the specific forms of interaction in the particular arenas of consociation. Results must be predicted in terms of the production and distribution of values serving the common interest of mankind.
An outline of the elements of the social process context of PIL
includes the following:
1. Participants
a.

Groups
(i) Territorial Communities
Nation-states
Federal states
Protectorates
Colonies
Trust territories
Non-self-governing territories
Provinces
Internal states
Sui generis territorial communities
(ii)

(iii)

Intergovernmental Organizations
Universal
Hemispheric
Regional
Functional
Symbolic Factor Communities
Racial-Ethnic
Religious-ideologic
Traditional-historical (e.g., language identification)
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Kinship symbols
-consanguineous kin (symbol-blood ties)
-descent
-patrilineal symbolism
-matrilineal symbolism
-clan-sib
-name symbolism
-common ancestor symbolism
-phratries (a number of clans-symbol, brotherhood)
-tribes (various authority symbols)
Functional Communities-Participant interaction heavily emphasizing value realization and best classified
in terms of goal orientation.
Individuals
(iv)

b.

men
women
homosexuals
transvestites
children (infants, minors)
transsexuals
2.

Values
Power, e.g., decisionmakers-formal, informal
Wealth, e.g., business groups, multi-national corporations, etc.
Rectitude, e.g., church groups
Respect, e.g., class or caste groupings
Enlightenment, e.g., scholars groups (APSA, AALS)
Affection, e.g., affection groups (family)
Skill, e.g., professional groups (labor unions, American Bar Association)
Well-being, e.g., nurses, social workers, non-governmental organizations
Loyalty, e.g., groups with primary and secondary identification as
defined by symbols of positive sentiment

3.

Perspectives

Perspectives indicate the pattern of identifications, demands, and
expectations of participants. Participants in society make demands for
values on themselves and others. These demands are conditioned by
environmental and predispositional expectations that transcend a single body politic and may involve numerous bodies politic. Perspectives
in this arena are best characterized as symbolic events. They may be

19821

CONFLICTS THEORY IN CONFLICT

refined in terms of identification symbols, demand symbols and expectation symbols.
4. Identifications
Because PIL claims involve multiple "groups," the signficance of
perspectives of identification to all participants is important. The relevant key forms of identity to the PIL background are as follows:
(a) Primary ego identifications. These identifications are the "I"
and "we" identification events.
(b) Self-identification. These occur when the symbols of other
egos are included with the primary ego.
(c) Non-self ego symbols. These occur when the symbol events
have reference to "other selves" (not-self other).
(d) Attributed identifications.
The importance of complex systems of identification lies in the
following datum: Basic patterns of identification invariably involve individuals in a core nexus with a body politic of primary affiliation.
Such a nexus invariably establishes a complex relationship between
participant and group, involving variable obligations, as well as variable rights and protections sustained by the "group" as a base of power
in a "multigroup" process. Another level of the complexity of identification is sustained when the facts of modern life disclose intense patterns of interdependence and interdetermination in the world social
process. A salient outcome of the system of identification is that the
"same" participant may actually have multiple group identities for different social, political, and economic roles. Finally, a most significant
level of complexity of the system of identification is the problem of the
relative inclusivity and exclusivity of the perspective. This problem in
turn may be substantially conditioned by the moral or normative
structure of the social context.
The importance of this latter perspective of identification in the
PIL context cannot be gainsaid. Parties make claims about the allocation of prescriptive and applicative competencies on the basis of "who
they are," in the broadest sense of these terms. Decisionmakers respond to such claims having to come to terms with their own pattern of
identification. The challenges of universalist or, at least, inclusive perspectives of identity and the dangers of parochial, exclusive perspectives of identity are of extraordinary importance to PIL because the
problems of PIL, viewed empirically, are ones that involve both the
perspectives and the operations of more than a single group or body
politic. The nature of the problem requires patterns of identification
that are more inclusive. The opportunity to make human rights per-
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spectives a component of the system of identification also represents
an ongoing challenge.
5.

Demands

The demands to which PIL is a response usually involve claims
that an indirect or secondary law-making competence be exercised.
These demands, when dissected, involve claims about a kind of dual
law-making function in decision. Such assertions involve claims to
power and to values other than power.
The statement of a demand in PIL includes, for most participants,
a demand for transnational recognition and effect. Demand symbols
are most often preferences by participants for values in the social process. These values (wealth, affection, rectitude, skill, well-being, respect, enlightenment, and power) may be organized in relation to any
phase of the social process (participation, perspectives, situations, bases, strategies, and outcomes). In this process of interaction, each value
will be demanded by the "self as a whole" and also on behalf of each
"sub-self," such as the "affection group" or "corporate group" or even
"political group."
6.

Expectations

The contents of consciousness are empirical. The task of the policy-oriented lawyer in the PIL arena is to ascertain as accurately as
possible the relevant expectations of key participants in the relevant
social process context. The task is, in effect, to explore all salient features of the social process, the constitutive process, and all the protected features of the public order of the multi-state process.
7.

Situations

A situation is the arena or zone within which interactions occur.
Situations will include arenas that are "organized and unorganized,"
arenas involving value interaction for shaping and sharing purposes
that are either inclusive or exclusive in nature, arenas involving crisis
or intercrisis events, as well as their ecological or spatial and temporal
dimensions.
a. Ecological or spatial situations
The ecological or spatial dimension involved in PIL has a considerable influence upon the decision-making process in this arena.
Events concerning value interaction are located both in "space" and in
"time." Since the spatial reach of PIL prescriptions affect the global
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consociation process, one can project the total situational context of
the PIL decisionmaker as the "world." The relevance of the spatial
ecological dimension is reinforced by two further points related to past
decision. First, organized territorial entities such as nation states are
still of primary importance in PIL. These organized territorial communities acting through their respective elites have principally subscribed,
at least in theory, to the concepts of "territorial soverignty," "legislative jurisdiction," and "vested rights," all of which are generally identified with formalistic positivism. Second, these symbols developed in
large part without explicit reliance upon the functional dimension in
general or policy realization in particular. Therefore, it is important to
keep in perspective the symbolic reference gleaned from spatial features of the situational context (or arena), and the power this symbol
has manifested by compelling policy outcomes alleged to be value-free.
b.

Institutional arenas

Organized (in varying degrees of territoriality and pluralism).
These include various institutional arrangements that operate on a formal level and may or may not be spatially delimited. These specifically
include legistlative, executive, judicial, and administrative institutions
at all levels of the consociation process.
Unorganized (in differing degrees of territoriality and pluralism).
These arenas revolve around the multifarious informal practices and
procedures of reciprocity and retaliation. Reciprocity refers to the establishment of a relationship of dependence or contingency between
parties who are mutually able either to inflict losses upon each other
or, through a balancing of interests, to maintain a course which will
accrue to the greatest benefit of both. In order to secure stability in
their expectations about authority, control, and decision, participants
in the PIL process enter into the arena of "unorganized" situations
with tacit expectations. These include a recognition of the necessity for
mutual tolerance and self-restraint.
c.

Temporal dimension

The temporal features of the PIL process of consociation incorporate events that have duration and continuity while other events occupy scattered time frames and may be described as occasional, or infrequent events. It is significant that the power process in the
consociation process is neither abstract nor timeless; it is part of the
social process in time and the essential reality of time is duration.
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d. Crisis level
An important aspect of situations entered into by participants is
expectation of crisis. The simplest way to perceive the concept of crisis
is to visualize a continuum ranging from low to high expectation of
crisis. The intensity of crisis will be contingent upon the scope of institutionalization and organization.
e.

Access
Access to arenas are open or compulsory in the PIL context.

8.

Outcomes

Outcomes achieved by participants in the process of interaction
have an aggregate impact upon shaping and sharing of values in the
global arena. It is therefore important to know the extent to which participants are able to secure the important value objectives of power,
wealth, skill, affection, enlightenment, well-being, rectitude, and respect within spheres appropriate to the different arenas of interaction,
production, conservation, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services and related value demands.
9.

Effects

In the PIL arena one is concerned with the long term effects on
the process of consociation itself, which extends beyond the arena of
interaction of the immediate participants. One is concerned with how
various bodies politic and communities consociate to promote or constrict the realization of all exclusive and inclusive demands for application and prescription of policy.
C.

Process of Claim Relevant to PIL

The process of claim effectually is an outcome of the process of
interaction. Here again, specification of claims in PIL may be usefully
delineated by the use of relevant aspects of a phase analysis.
1.

Claimants

All those who were identified as active participants in the social
process outline are potential claimants. What distinguishes a claimant
in practical terms, however, is that he seeks, in the manipulation of
various power arenas specialized to transgroup decision, a preferred
means by which he may optimalize his value position. In general, it is
possible to clarify further who claimants are by making the distinction
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between formal and informal claimants.
a.

Formal claimants

Formal claimants are duly constituted officials who both demand
and exercise competences necessary and proper for performing a myriad of authority functions over value exchanges which cut across group
and state lines. These include executive, juridical, legislative, and administrative actors.
b. Informal claimants
Claims to authority asserted by duly constituted state officials are
invariably animated by, among others, individuals, pressure groups,
lobbies, and private associations who invoke some kind of decisional
response from a formally constituted decisionmaker, whether judicial,
administrative, legislative, executive, or diplomatic activity. These parties invariably demand that authoritative decisionmakers themselves
assert claims to competency over parties or events and thereby indirectly consolidate or extend their own base values. When one examines
the aggregate content of these claims to and through officials made by
various parties, one finds that such claims extend the aggregate base
values at the disposal of the state or group in whose arenas the various
parties are interacting.
2. Perspectives
The demands of parties in PIL usually incorporate a dual aspect.
First, the claim involves a claim to power: a claim that a decisionmaker
exercise a direct law-making and law-applying competence, or a claim
that the decisionmaker defer to the law-making and law-applying competence of another body politic. Second, there is that aspect of the
claim that factually incorporates a demand that a particular value allocation be made with respect to the parties involved in the dispute. PIL
claims are, therefore, part and parcel of the general claims that state
and group actors make with respect to all value categories. The kinds
of demands that states and group actors assert can be illustrated as
follows:
Power is sought by states in advancing claims to enforce and
regulate criminal laws in their territorial base subjecting nationals, domiciliaries, and residents, and in regulation and protection of nationals interacting outside the territorial base, or
enforcing criminal prescriptions over aliens injuring the interests of nationals or whose acts affect the security and social
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order of the claimant state.
Wealth is a goal in claims of states to control events which
affect their fiscal integrity, to control dispositions of property
situated within their territorial base or owned and controlled
by domiciliaries and nationals, to control the making and performance of agreements, and to regulate and control business
activities.
Well-being is a fundamental goal in claims to control the effects of acts interfering with the health of nationals or domiciliaries, etc.
Respect is involved in claims to secure protection against official discrimination, to secure recognition and respect of judicial
and legislative acts of state, to obtain jurisdictional immunity,
to control solemnities and forms traditionally prescribed for
the consummation of particular legal relations, etc.
Skill is sought in claims to control, regulate, or restrict professional activities, and in authority to prescribe the effects and
consequences of infractions of regulations or other unskillful
operations.
Affection (solidarity) is at stake in claims to control the activities of members of a social group, in claims designed to create a
broader focus of identification between persons and a social
group and to control the effects of the activities of such persons either permanently or temporarily.
Rectitude is demanded in claims for authority to prescribe and
apply policies in accordance with idiosyncratic concepts of justice, fairness, due process, and the like, or to protect unique
conceptions of individual responsibility or transcendental
belief. 4
The ostensible or manifest claimants to authority in PIL are the
state or the group. Less formally, and perhaps more realistically, various organized or unorganized power holders demand that their state or
group representatives assert claims to authority, in a transgroup context, in order to protect and, perhaps, extend both their private as well
as community interests to which the "privately" asserted interests have
some relation in the aggregate. To the extent that state actors are
claimants, the above-quoted general value categories provide a useful
specification of the areas over which states will assert competencies to
apply and prescribe policy. These areas include the making and appli454.

See generally M.

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

McDouGAL,

(1980).

H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
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cation of law to specific conflicts about transgroup allocation of values.
From this perspective, the nature of the PIL claim (whether the claimants be "formal" or "informal" actors) will invariably include a claim
to power, and often such claim to power will effectually be used, as
may some other value, as a base for realizing an in-fact value indulgence other than power. The main claims include:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

claims relating to power;
claims relating to agreements, exchanges, and deprivations with
respect to all values;
claims relating to associations seeking scope values other than
power (primarily);
claims relating to family relations; and
claims relating to the control and management of resources.

The basic paradigm of PIL claims include assertions of prescriptive and applicative competence. These claims involve demands as to
both primary and secondary assertions of competence. A primary assertion of competence refers to a direct law-making and law-applying
competence; a secondary assertion of competence refers to an indirect
assertion of competence. As indicated, by prescription one refers to a
law-making competence to project and establish policy. By application,
one refers to the resolution of a specific dispute with respect to the
relevant basic community policies and comprehensive complementary
standards to secure the in-fact capacity for reasonable adjudication.
3.

Specific Claims

a.

Claims for competence to prescribe policy (primary and secondary)

Some of the unique features of the competence to prescribe policy
in PIL have been outlined above. As suggested, various bodies politic
and groups have made, and continue to make, within the course of the
process of consociation, demands about people, values, or events that
are connected, or have a "significant relationship" or "center of gravity" with that group. Such factors primarily affect the spatial parameters of particular groups, substantially affecting the groups' value
processes. In this context, "spatial" takes on a psycho-social, rather
than a rigidly territorial character. A detailed specification of claims
would involve the development of essential contextual features of any
specific value-process: the wealth process, the affection process and so
forth. Hence, if one were dealing with domestic relations (affection process) in the PIL context, one would be concerned with claims for the
allocation of prescriptive competencies over all relevant phases of that
process; in other words, claims where the parties demand access to the
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shaping and sharing of the values of affection (affection demanded as a
scope or desired value).
For example, the affection process allocates prescriptive competencies regarding all significant phases of the social process where affection is sought as the scope or desired value and where its lawful characterization might be demanded as a precondition, or base, for the
accretion of affection across group lines or as a scope value and as a
base for the realization of all other demanded values. Such values
might include: inheritance, immigration, naturalization, wrongful
death, legitimacy, worker's compensation, social security, tax benefits,
and immunity from prosecution policies. Essentially, claims in PIL are
made with respect to every phase of every value process. Claims relating to any phase of the affection process may be made with reference
to the following:
1. participants
2. perspectives
3. base values
4. strategies
5. situations
6. outcomes
7. effects.
The same may be illustrated at ever increasing levels of microdetail
through every other phase of every value process: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, respect, and rectitude.
b. Claims to competence for primary application
Claims to apply usually arise from the intense degree of effective
power over the parties or the subject matter at issue or both. For example, the claim to "judicial jurisdiction" is exercised in posse or in
esse by representatives of the activated group or state. Contrary assertions refer to the absence of control or the absence of an adequate authority base for the application function, e.g., an absence of a minimum contact; absence of notification and lack of mutual convenience;
or absence of rectitude due process values.
These claims are often misleadingly designated as claims relating
to adjudicatory competence or judicial jurisdiction. The designation is
clearly underinclusive. Such claims traditionally involve a high degree
of control over the person, thing, or subject matter and have been encapsuled in the Latin symbols in personam, in rem, and the hybrid
formulation quasi-in-rem. The origins of these competencies appear to
have been associated with the exercise of effective control over parties
or subject matter, whether this be exercised in posse or in esse by the
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chief actors of the concerned body politic or group. These assertions,
especially in the light of the minimum contacts doctrine promulgated
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,4"5 and the merely symbolic
exercise of transgroup control (the summons) have tended to accentu-

ate such factors as due process 4" to the litigants, and the feasibility
and reasonableness of the forum in discharging expeditiously the decision-making function-forum non conveniens. In America particularly,
the trend in decision has been to move away from the symbolic power
inferences incorporated in Pennoyer v. Neff,'57 to a more functional
allocation of applicative competencies among the various states with

high deference given to the rectitude value.'"5 This trend has been accentuated by the development of the so-called "long-arm" statutes
whose only limitation seems to be contained in a kind of functional

rationality evidenced in convenience factors, and by the fairness demands contained in the mandate of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. How far these shifts from "control" to "authority"

will be diffused into the global arena is difficult to estimate. The intensified interactions by individuals and associations on a global scale,
however, serve to reinforce such developments and might result in a
pattern of claim assertion along essentially functional, rather than for-

mal lines.
c.

Claims to competence for secondary application

These claims are lodged with decisionmakers asking that deference
be given to the acts of another group which shared a competence over
the parties or subject matter. These claims make reference to:

1. judicial and arbitral awards, i.e., the recognition of foreign
judgments and awards, decrees, etc.;
455. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
456. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In this
case the Supreme Couit examined the sufficiency of notice by publication to the beneficiaries of a common trust. The Court found that such notice was adequate as to those
beneficiaries whose names and addresses were unknown to the trustee, since this was the
most practicable and effective method under the circumstances. In contrast, however, the
Court found that in regard to those beneficiaries who were known to the trustee, notification by publication was insufficient under the fourteenth amendment. It was found that
since substantial property rights were involved, the fourteenth amendment required personal mailings to the beneficiaries in this category.
457. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Pennoyer court spoke in terms of territoriality, placing
great symbolic significance in the physical presence of a defendant within the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit was brought. See id. at 722-23.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 179 & 281.
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executive acts (act of state); and
legislative acts.
D.

Process of Authoritative Decision in PIL

The PIL context of interaction incorporates a world process of authoritative decision. The purpose of this process of effective power is to
resolve PIL claims and counterclaims for perhaps exclusive or inclusive
prescription or associated with human rights perspectives as evidenced
in various conventions, declarations, and other instruments codifying
human dignity, in situations where the facts or events are related to
more than a single group or single body politic.
The process of authoritative decision in PIL may be described as
follows: Relevant decision-making participants, using bases of power
appropriate to the structure of decision, implement the objectives of
various communities and use diverse strategies or instruments of policy
to arrive at outcomes in the context of specific claims to the allocation
of competencies in the prescription and application of policy. This has
important effects for the participants (claimants) in terms of their access to indulgences or deprivations, for the respective communities
with which they share a significant connection, and for the total arena
of which these participants are a part. This all occurs within the framework of changing conditions of contemporary social and power
processes within a global PIL process of consociation.
1. Participants
Decisionmakers at all levels of the power process include, inter
alia: judges, administrators (local, national, transnational), lawyers,
diplomats, arbitrators, legislators, multi-national business executives,
private associations, parties, pressure groups, and religious and ideological purveyors of rectitude symbols.
2.

Objectives

The objectives of the power process are as follows:
a. to facilitate the optimum shaping and sharing of demanded values
and to harmonize such demands with inclusive prescription of connected communities, as these approach shared expectations about
human dignity.
b. (i) to promote commonality of interests of all participants, including exclusive and inclusive competence for control over value shaping
and sharing.
(ii) to optimize claims reflecting common interests and to minimize claims reflecting special interests.
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c. to balance common interests of different but connected bodies politic where such interests are divergent, as they relate to functional competence, irrespective of whether these common interests are of an exclusive or an inclusive character, with a preference for the values that
most closely approximate the human dignity postulate.
3. Perspectives
a. Identifications
In transnational arenas, identification symbols will vary in scope
and intensity from culture to culture, class to class, and individual to
individual. The range of identifications with the self and whatever the
self includes or excludes, incorporates national or community symbols
as well as transnational symbols cutting across "national," "tribal," or
neoexclusivist community lines, to include identification with classes;
with symbols of ideological-religious identification, such as socialism,
capitalism, Judaism, Islam, Christianity, etc.; and with professional
and skill associations, etc. Symbols of parochialism attendant on nationalism or symbols which transcend national loyalty and provincialism have always proliferated in the arena of PIL consociation. Symbols
of a national weltanschauung on the one hand, and symbols of a type
of Romanistic Canonical universalism on the other, are good indices of
the way expectations about authority and control have influenced decisionmakers. To the extent that judges are visible instruments of the
codification of customary expectations in PIL, the transmission of skill
and other values attendant upon the judicial role may accelerate a less
parochial outlook in decisionmakers in this arena. But the facts of contemporary life are contradictory. There is evidence of trends that seem
to accelerate a functional homogeneity in theory and practice because
of increasing interdependence and interdetermination. Yet the trend to
a pluralistic, diverse and sometimes parochial syndrome, is also apparent. In addition, recruitment to the structures of decision tends to reflect class and culture patterns, the similarity of which appears to transcend national boundaries. Examples include such institutions as the
Yale or Harvard Law School graduate program, the School of Oriental
and African Studies (London) and many others of varying complexity
and variety.
b. Demands
Basic demands in this process include:
(i) maintenance of structures which facilitate value exchange
among various bodies politic; and
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(ii) facilitating maximum value shaping and sharing between various groups and bodies politic in the world arena.
c.

Expectations

Decisionmakers in this arena promote, through decision, continuing shared expectations about stability and change. Expectations about
stability include accomodation of value indulgences or deprivations
upon the basis of reciprocity, deference, and mutual tolerance. The
purpose of this accomodation is: (1) to establish a global equilibrium in
value exchange; (2) to effectuate change where such change is essential
to the retention of equilibrium; and (3) to avoid disequilibrium inconsistent with the postulates of a preferred public order. Decisionmakers
have, in past practice, given deference to the minimum order expectations of all affected bodies politic as, indeed, they have attempted to
optimize value realization in accord with expectations of participants
and values attendant upon human dignity.
These outcomes have often been achieved because concerned decisionmakers and scholars have had a very subtle, and sometimes quite
sophisticated, though rather inarticulate, sense of the possible limits of
decision controls transcending discrete groups. Indeed, the most signficant contribution that past decision has provided is a quite stable pattern of aggregate expectations incorporating the minimum order dimension where brutum fulmen4 59 is rarely resorted to. The stabilized
global pattern of minimum order expectations has and continues to
provide a great many theorists and decisionmakers with a deep sense
of a unifying universality.
4.

Situations

Situational value context bears importance for the PIL frame.
Here is provided, in outline form, the kinds of value-situational contexts relevant to this perspective:
a.

Institutional arenas
legislative
executive
administrative
judicial
diplomatic
paradiplomatic

459. Brutum fulmen is a judgment void upon its face, which is in effect no judgment
at all, and by which no rights are vested, and from which none can be obtained. Dollert
v. Pratt-Hewitt Oil Corp., 179 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
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Spatial arenas

Spatial arenas include those prescribed by the relational context of
the social process and the psycho-social limits that define these
situations.
c.

Temporal arenas

PIL involves a process of decision transcending discrete groups
that are spatially and temporally delimited. The intertemporal aspects
are complex, varied and no less real in the day to day business of making and applying law. Under the situations apsect of a phase analysis,
the arenas one is concerned with are those having a duration through
time, i.e., those that are continuous. One cannot, however, exclude the
arenas where a high degree of voluntarism is extant, and where occasional ad hoc arenas are framed by and for the manipulation of the
time artifact.
d.

Arenas for crises events

The acid test of any decision-making apparatus is whether and
how it responds to crises events. When the cross-cultural aspects of a
PIL problem assume a crisis dimension, the responsibility for the amelioration of cross-group confrontations is important. Here the PIL
decisionmaker is uniquely located to sustain and enhance the public
order. The kinds of crises arenas that are creatively structured to handle a claim relating to any phase of a value process having an urgent
character are of fundamental importance in stabilizing expectations
about control and authority across group and state lines.
e.

Access to arenas

Access to arenas is often variable when one moves from one politically organized group to another. Access may be relatively open to foreigners and nationals or relatively restricted and closed.
5.

Base Values

a.

Authority as a Base Value

Earlier it was shown how decision-making in different phases of
the PIL process was involved in the manipulation of the operative
symbology of power (control) and authority.
Traditionally, at least in the context of Euro-centric PIL, the confluence of Roman law, Canonical Universalism, and common scholars'
language served to create and sustain a quite inclusive paradigm under
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the rubric of the universality of Christendom. More exclusive symbols
of authority that emerged coterminously with the nation-state system
sustained much of the more inclusive symbology by the ascription of a
fictional consent theory attributable to their "sovereign" community
systems. What is and remains significant, however, is the extraordinary
deference decisionmakers have manifestly accorded the latinized symbols in PIL decision, and just how powerfully decisionmakers have
from time to time manipulated these symbols to achieve what were
deemed in context to be desirable outcomes.
b.

Control

Territorialism is still an important base of power in PIL and an
important factor in the allocation of values across group lines. Recent
trends in the global system of power relations have tended to replace
static territorialistic power conceptions where events and their projected impacts de futuro involve other aggregates of power. The necessity for what Mr. Kissinger calls contingency analysis"4 0 is becoming
more a reality for those charged with decision capacities in PIL.
c.

Rectitude as a power base

In the past, rectitude has been used as a power base where elites
and mid-elites were able to preempt all the symbols of moral rectitude
to facilitate the movement of goods and peoples across group lines and
protect the "foreigner" in such value exchanges. Rectitude symbols
have been used to further both parochialism and universalism, and
even aberrant versions of universalism became associated with the
worst aspects of colonialism. The protection of aboriginal natives often
meant, in practice, their extermination and symbols such as the "white
man's burden" were sometimes understood to literally imply an undue
burden. The rectitude symbols should not be ignored as they can be
used for good or ill. Lawyers adept at symbol manipulation and committed to the goals of a public order of human dignity should find
them a useful tool for structuring the global social process in desirable
ways.
6.

Strategies

The policy-sciences have isolated four principal strategems most
commonly evidenced in the context of transgroup public order interactions. These are as follows:
460.

See generally supra note 354.
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a. The Ideological Instrument. This has been a primary base of authority in PIL, especially the religious-inspired symbols evidenced in
the ecclesiastical and canonical courts. Modern secular ideologies have
projected ideological symbols of variable significance and impacts to
the attention of decisionmakers.
b. Diplomatic Instrument. Diplomacy and negotiation still represent
one of the most frequently resorted to instruments for allocating values
in the PIL frame.
c. Economic and d. Military Instruments.
These strategies have been a stimulus toward according high tolerances to alien perspectives. The potentialities inherent in both of these
instruments are important factors in sustaining expectations of reciprocity and deference as a primary expectation of transgroup behavior.
7.

Outcomes (Decision Functions)

The outcomes of PIL decision involve all value processes having a
transgroup aspect. 4 61 PIL outcomes deal with the allocation of values
across state and group lines; they sustain or create regimes that directly and indirectly bear upon the allocation of values globally, regionally, and locally; they create and reinforce expectations about the PIL
decision process. The central outcomes of the decision process are, of
course, the decision functions themselves. These include intelligence,
promotion, prescription, application, invocation, termination, and appraisal. Special emphasis is given to intelligence, promotion, and
prescription.
a.

Intelligence

The recent developments in PIL away from the formalistic perspective have underscored the importance of comparative data about
all value processes that can be integrated into an essentially cross-cultural decision arena. These outcomes have also been influenced by re461.

The outcomes of the process of prescription of PIL involve a rich variety of

sources, including governmental and non-governmental actors and transnational organizations. The private law-making process includes not only the actions of domestic tribunals, but also the formulation of specialized codes to control transnational activities. For
an illustration of the documentary sources that deal with the economic aspects of both
public and private international law, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, InternationalEconomic
"Soft Law," in REcUEIL DES COURS (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, vol.2, 1979). Other sources of PIL include the proceedings and conferences of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Additionally, documentary sources
dealing with international law and international human rights also have a bearing on the
private international law-making enterprise.
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gional, hemispheric, and global human rights developments and the
peremptory character of these standards for transgroup decision. In
short, there is emerging an enormous output of work of a comparative
and cross-group character that is of specific relevance to the crystallization of preferred inclusive policies of a peremptory character. While
these outcomes are not systematically coordinated, they provide an impressive corpus of intelligence that has perforce to make its way into
the structure of PIL decision, if rationality remains an important goal
of practical decision-making.
b.

Promotion

The development of inclusive standards for PIL, especially the
human rights aspect, is a fundamentally important component of decision. Therefore, the explicit recognition and articulation of human
rights prescription in the structure of a PIL decision has a significantly
important promotional aspect. It promotes human rights by making
such prescription the sustaining basis and goal of decision. Such outcomes often serve as the trigger for less formalized pressure groups and
variously organized actors to legitimize their agitation for social change
in the direction of human rights perspectives.
c.

Prescription

The prescribing function plays a quite complex role within the
structure of a PIL decision. 4 The authority component of the prescribing function has often demanded that reference be made to inclusive standards. Specifically, prescription here would include reference
to: (1) comparative, substantive prescription, including diverse perspectives about custom; (2) decision practices, i.e., judicial, administrative, and diplomatic practices of private decision in arenas of private
autonomy; (3) peremptory international law (conventions or customary); and (4) scholarly dissertations.
8.

Effects

a.

Long term public order considerations.

462. Take, for example, the prescribing function relating to the international economic order. It is obvious that the prescribing process in the sphere of economic regulation is in a great state of flux and development. Whether one wishes to designate contentious economic expectations as "soft" law, and less contentious expectations as "hard"
law, is not so crucial as the recognition that the relationship between these ideas represents a dynamic "prescriptive" process of substantial importance to PIL. See SeidlHohenveldern, supra note 461.
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b. Immediate changes in the value situation of participants and how
this affects the aggregate value of connected communities and the
broader community in the short and long term.
9.

Factors Affecting a Decisionmaker in the Process of Consociation

a. Problems transcend prescription of body politic.
b. Problems are multi-cultural and demand multiple and inclusive
identifications.
c. Role expectation and change and the complexities dependent upon
this for transgroup decision.
d. Problems of transgroup prescription and effects.
e. Problems of: (i) culture (xenophobia, parochialism); (ii) class (social stratification); (iii) personality (predisposition, environmental); (iv)
interest (role perception).
These factors also incorporate such things as the past experiences
of the decisionmaker, e.g., his experiences with democracy or totalitarianism, his experiences with colonialism or its opposite, his experiences
with capitalism or socialism or the "middle way" (the welfare state).
These experiences may, for example, reflect the degree to which he embraces voluntaristic or coercive practices and may reflect further upon
the degree to which he optimizes his personal indices of capability.
E. Basic Policies of PIL
Earlier in this study, it was maintained that PIL and public international law were indispensable and complementary aspects of a larger,
more inclusive world process of authoritative decision. This conclusion
has important consequences for the classification of basic public order
priorities of the world community."" Goal clarification is, of course, a
463. Viewed in the light of traditional and contemporary expectations, the basic policy objectives of the choice of law process would seem to require that prescriptions (rules,
principles, standards or methods) clarify and "possibly" advance the policies, purposes,
and values underlying the particular problem that the court or other decision-specialist
is called upon to decide. In the context of the court system, other objectives have been
articulated as requiring integration into the decision process. Thus, the choice of law
principle or methodology must allow the forum the reality, or at least the appearance of
altruism. The principles or methodologies must also ensure that the forum is not parochial or chauvinistic, or stated more positively, the prescription must account for reciprocal tolerances. The avowedly traditional concerns of "justice" are also deemed important
objectives for a choice of law principle or method. These traditional concerns include the
need for uniformity of result regardless of who the decisionmaker or the parties are; that
the application of these prescriptions should be made simple rather than complex; and
finally, that the administration of the system should be cost effective. See von Mehren,
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significant and vitally important intellectual function in PIL as it is in
other areas of authoritative decision.46 4 The scholar's contribution can
Recent Trends in Choice of Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 946 (1975).
Compare Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1968); Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972).
For a general orientation to the problems of objectivity and subjectivity in social
sciences, see generally, G. MYRDAL, OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 48-49 (1969); J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1948); Gouldner, Anti-Minotant: The Myth of Value-Free Sociology, 9
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 199 (1962). On the problems of the "is" and the "ought", see D. HUME,
A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (1777).
464. See H. BATIFFOL, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIr INTERNATIONAL PRIvfl
(1956). Batiffol views PIL as an aspect of national law, but the goals of the field are
designed to coordinate the conflicts of concerned jurisdictions with reference to "natural
law, social facts and doctrinal concepts of the ends of justice as defined by individual,
national and international values." Yntema, The Objectives of Private International
Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721, 724 (1957). Professor Yntema summarizes the historically articulated objectives of PIL as follows:
[U]niformity of legal consequences, minimization of conflict of laws, predictability of legal consequences, validation of transactions, relative significance of contracts, recognition of the "stronger" law, cooperation among states, respect for
interests of other states, justice of the end results, respect for policies of domestic law, internal harmony of the substantive rules to be applied, location or nature of the transaction, private utility, homogeneity of national law, ultlimate
recourse to the lex fori, and the like ....
Id. at 734-35. Yntema continued:
Instead of attempting to consider all these formulations in detail, it is suggested
that the central policy considerations peculiar to conflicts law can be subsumed
under two heads: security, which is the first principle of utility in Bentham's and
most other schemes of legislation, and comparative justice of the end result,
namely, its consonance with the results of comparative research, an objective
that derives from the basically equitable purpose of conflicts law to individualize
the treatment of foreign cases. These are obviously intermediate standards, the
purpose of which is to ensure effective realization of more basic human interests
and values in conflicts situations.
Id. at 735. Professor Yntema sees implicit in the conditions of power in a multistate
system the PIL objective of security as one of the chief goals of the system. He explains
the needs for security as follows:
The principle or policy of security is simply that, so far as possible and
proper, a given situation should have equal legal treatment everywhere. Security
in law has two faces: on the one hand, it implies the rule of law, or in other
words the orderly settlement of disputes in accordance with general rules; on the
other hand, it implies equality in the application of the rules so that the same
case will receive the same treatment everywhere. For the purposes of conflicts
law, the objective of security seeks to maximize conformity in defining the legal
and socioeconomic consequences of transactions and events by the selection and
application of the corresponding law. Looked at from a jurisdictional viewpoint,
which it may be repeated is in a degree fictional in the present context, the
principle implies reciprocity and respect for the interests of the states concerned; in particular, it requires deference to the effective law, namely, that of
the state which is in position to control. Without such cooperation in regard to
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be important in influencing the character of the public order in terms
of its approximation to human rights standards. The three key questions that suggest themselves in this context are as follows: For whom
is goal clarification undertaken; what primary identifications animate
the clarifier; what identifications ought to animate the clarifier's
perspective?
PIL goal clarification is directed at the audience whose value exchanges cut across state and group lines; the target audience is mankind. The scholar is both observer and part of this target audience. He
clarifies policy on behalf of himself and others as part of the world
community. His recommended identifications are with the whole of
mankind and, more specifically, with the common interests of the
global whole.
These common interests are distinguished from special interests,
and it is recommended that identification with special interests be rejected in favor of the common interest in a shared public order of
human dignity. Common interests may be usefully divided between inclusive and exclusive interests, as these concepts, in turn, relate to opthe policies the respective states enforce, there will be anarchy in the choice of
law instead of the certainty business and commerce demand. Looked at from the
viewpoint of the individuals affected, regularity in the application of law is
needed to ensure the protection of their just interests and to enable them to
anticipate the consequences of their conduct, so that they can plan their affairs
accordingly. In specific areas of legal regulation where security is especially important, for example, with respect to commercial instruments, legal rates of interest on loans, marriage contracts, the form of testamentary dispositions, and
the validity of trusts, special techniques have been developed by reference to the
more favourable law to ensure validation of transactions. In sum, the first purpose of conflicts law, as of all law, is to introduce order, or at least that minimum
which is necessary if basic human values are not to be unduly sacrificed or subjected to discrimination.
Id. at 735-36. The complement to the importance of the system of PIL meeting the goals
of "security," are the concerns of "comparative justice," according to Professor Yntema.
The nature of comparative justice is explained as follows:
As has been indicated, the attainment of security as a conflicts policy supposes
that the conflicts rules administered in the different legal systems under consideration should be sufficiently ascertained. This is by no means universally true,
since the cases are sporadic and new problems constantly arise. Moreover, the
elaboration of law through judicial legislation is a slow process, which frequently
hovers for some time between competing theories. Meanwhile, with changes in
conditions of life or in the evolution of legal doctrine, the old solutions may
become inappropriate or their over-technical application may produce harsh results. In such situations, comparative justice in the individual decision, by
which is meant consideration of the desirable result as indicated by comparative
study of the underlying policies of the domestic substantive laws, suggests itself
as a criterion for the solution of conflicts cases.
Id. at 737.
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timum and minimum order priorities.
The clarification of basic community policy in PIL in terms of inclusive interests (optimum and minimum order) and exclusive interests
(optimum and minimum order) places greater emphasis on value interactions that presuppose a framework of, at least, minimum public order. The emphasis of the PIL paradigm is not that of basic security
and the control of unauthorized violence. For example, it is difficult, if
not fanciful, to assume that a contemporary feminine "face" could, like
Helen of Troy, launch a thousand ships. Hence, it is unlikely that
claims, for instance, relating to the affection process and decisional responses thereto, might trench upon the maintenance of the transgroup
inclusive interest in maintaining minimum order. Yet minimum order
is the essential precondition for value exchanges to occur across state
lines. The broad inclusive goals of PIL from the policy-science point of
view follow.
1.

Criteria for Guiding Choice in Comprehensive Policy-Centered PIL

One of the great traditional tasks of jursiprudence has been the
clarification and implementation of what theorists have seen as the
common interest. 6 5 Often what passed for the common interest was
merely the rationalization of the interests of the predominant group, or
elite or class. Still, the concern that law secure and promote the common interest remains a major theme of contemporary theory of or
about law."'
The jurisprudence of the policy-sciences sees as a key normative
dimension of law the explicit clarification and use of the common interest. It is thought that the perspective of the observer lends clarity of
perspective to the articulation of the common interest. It is also
thought that the ambiguity of roles in the observer as citizen adds the
dimension of empathy and identification with man in society and to
the common interest, as secured outcomes of social process. No ob465. The concept of common interests comes close to that of the public interest. For
an informative discussion of the concept of the public interest in its many dimensions,
see especially the essay by Lasswell, The Public Interest: ProposingPrinciples of Content and Procedure, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962). For an explanation
of the concept of common interest, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra
note 444, at 408-15.

466. Theorists as diverse as J. MARITAIN,
MORALITY OF LAW

(1969); H.

MAN AND THE STATE

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

(1951); L.

(1962); R.

FULLER, THE

DWORKIN, TAKING

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. POUND, OUTLINES OF JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943); P. SELZNICK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1959); J. STONE, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1966); H. HART

& A.
LAW

SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF

(tent. ed. 1958); M.

MCDOUGAL,

H.

LASSWELL & L. CHEN,

supra note 444.
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server, no matter how detached, is insulated from social processes or
from processes that interstimulate relationships between social actors.
The key then is for the observer to be both detached and responsible
for his own conduct as a seeker of illumination for himself and others.
The natural law tradition and similar traditions have accorded guidance to the extent to which an observer-participant might identify with
humankind in the aggregate (if indeed one has the moral and psychological power to do so). Policy-scientists contend that the content of
the common interest must start with the condition and dignity of
man. 467 The common interest postulated by the policy scientist is that
the realization of human dignity is included in a recommended pattern
of identification which is optimally inclusive of the self and all "others"
(mankind as a whole).468 Viewed in this perspective, all matters of
choice affect the common interest and the human dignity this implies.
Throughout life, man is confronted by the inevitability of choice.
Some choices are good, others are bad. All choices allocate values-desired goods, desired services, or deserved honors. Politics and
law are concerned with choice and decision; they are concerned with
what is loosely styled the authoritative allocation of values, including
the value of power itself. For a theorist committed to a common interest in human dignity, there is the recognition that all decisions allocate
weal and woe. Hence, the concern arises that the allocation of values be
as consonant with the common interest in human rights as possible.
Viewed in this broad perspective, the potential for a truly functional,
problem-oriented, contextual, multi-disciplinary, goal-guided PIL is
enormous. A key task on the agenda of a new orientation to PIL is to
clarify the concept of common interest in terms of functional categories
that enable one to ground broadly based abstractions in concrete realities. The reference to the common interest here is meant to differentiate it from the notion of special interests. The assumption is that special interests serve to promote human dignity for the few rather than
the many. It is, however, a characteristic of practical politics that actors try to preempt the symbols of common interests while the content
and process of the perspective remains committed to the orbit of special interest concerns. One of the great challenges in clarifying the
objectives of PIL is to adequately address the question of which asserted interests are consonant with special interests and which are consonant with common interests. A decisionmaker should seek to invariably honor asserted interests that are common rather than special
interests.
467.
468.

See generally M.
Id.

McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 444.
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Functional categories of common interest in PIL

The common interest can conveniently be divided into those interests shared by all of the communities of the world and those which are
not.4 6' For convenience, these are labeled inclusive interests and exclusive interests. Exclusive interests tend to be peculiar to particular societies or bodies politic. The inclusive and exclusive interests can be further divided in terms of the different aspects of the public order to
which they refer. These are concepts of optimal order and minimum
order. From the perpective of comparative justice and human rights,
the inclusive interest in maintaining the conditions of peace and security (minimum order) and securing the greatest shaping and sharing of
all demanded values (optimal order in the world community) is ultimately a goal shared by both so-called public and private international
law. It is the sphere of optimal order, however, that has traditionally
been the goal of PIL.
If an outsider were to view the prescriptive outcomes of the international legal process, he would identify functionally defined aspects of
behavior in terms of codes of conduct. Prescriptions involving largely
private motives may be designated as supervisory codes. Prescriptions
involving community intervention to retain equilibrium may be designated the regulative code. Prescriptions covering police power and
other state functions may be designated the enterprisory code. Prescriptions that establish institutions of power and decision are called
the constitutive code. Prescriptions that seek to control and regulate
what is loosely called criminal behavior are called the corrective
code.47 It is particularly with prescriptions dealing mainly, though not
exclusively, with supervisory, regulatory and constitutive codes, that
form the prescriptive basis of PIL. The central concern is that these
formal and informal prescriptive codes be made more consonant with
standards envisioned in the clarification of the policies of a public order of human dignity in practical circumstances.
PIL is a branch of law that challenges the capacity to clarify abstract conceptions of justice-optimum order-and ground these abstractions in practical litigation contexts. What criteria might be invoked to assist in this enterprise?
b.

The accomodation of interests in PIL

A truly functional PIL must inevitably come to terms with John
Dewey's controversial thesis that valuation can and indeed must be, for
469. Id. at 409-10.
470. R. ARENS & H. LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER 218-36 (1953).
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social purposes, an empirical process, and in this sense, ethics has a
"scientific" side to it.4 7 ' The idea of grounding value judgments is historically embedded in the technique of law. Take a simple example to
illustrate the point. A normative proposition such as, "one may not
profit from one's inequity," may in "grounded" terms mean a murderer
cannot inherit from the estate of his victim. How the abstraction is
"grounded" in the specific instances is a technique embedded in the
craft-skills and folklore of lawyering. Yet as problems become more
diffuse and the normative standards that are to guide conduct more
opaque, the relevance of articulated criteria to guide the grounding of
choice in the common interest becomes a crucial task for the legal theorist. Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Chen have stated the issue
precisely in the human rights context: "The basic challenge is to make
continual reference of the part to the whole in a contextual consideraof overriding goals and
tion of every particular question in the 4 light
7' 2
characteristics of the larger community.
This task is particularly relevant to modern PIL. Theorists operating from widely disparate perspectives have suggested that PIL be
tempered by concerns for comparative justice, for deference to principles of preference, for restrained and enlightened prescription, and for
decisions to be made on the principle of comparative impairment. In
addition, decisions should approximate reasonable expectations of litigants and communities through the sense of altruism.
The outcomes of PIL ought to be evaluated and defined by functional consequences with concerns for the potential of PIL to secure, in
particular instances, the vindication of the better rule of enlightened
justice, and for the recent emergence of perspectives that seek to condition PIL by the vindication of multi-state law, multi-state rules, and
multi-state conceptions of justice. Finally, the emerging perspective
should secure in a methodologically disciplined way, a local to global
focus. These perspectives seek the prescription and application of international standards of justice to the system of international law.
They also seek a doctrinally secure profile for the individual and the
private association in the multi-state, transnational, legal environment.
In short, these perspectives seek to deparochialize PIL as never before
and to insure that inclusive policies associated with the public order of
human dignity will be a central component of the perspective and
techniques of PIL. These above perspectives implicitly acknowledge in
471.

See J.

DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION: INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED

SCIENCES (1939).

See also E.

PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW

495-500 (1953).
472. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.

CHEN,

supra note 444, at 415.
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different ways and with different emphases that intellectually coherent
procedures be invented to assist in the determination of what the common interest is and to make the prescription of the common interest
applicable to particular instances. The following three salient intellectual tools may be used to lend assistance in this enterprise.
c.

Ascertaining community expectation in specific prescriptions

Traditionally, the rules of PIL appeared in large measure as devices for distilling community expectations in particular contexts. The
confusion appeared to have three principal aspects. First, the rules became so formalized and abstracted from reality that honoring expectations about control in a multi-state setting became extremely unrealistic. Second, expectations about the authority content of the rules were
undermined when it was shown that quite often the consequence of
rule application involved obvious patterns of unfair surprise and
anachronism. The third major flaw with the traditional view was its
tendency to obscure the content of prescription. It has been acknowledged that the traditional view was blindly committed to jurisdiction
selection without regard to the content of prescription. 47 3 Again, such
process served to insulate PIL from clarifying the content of prescription in terms of community expectations that the prescription is meant
to incorporate.
Modern PIL analysis has sought to displace the traditional transstate rules and perspectives because of their normative ambiguity and
incompleteness. The focus of modern analysis has been keyed more to
the content of prescription and less to the expectations regarding control and authority in a multi-state setting. While this represents a
technical advance on what had gone before, the system retains the fundamental problem of ascertaining community expectations in a multistate setting. What must be brought to bear, methodologically, on the
process is the acknowledgement, in functional analysis, that prescription is a process of communication, and that "[t]he adequate performance of this task demands a disciplined, systematic survey and assessment of all features of the process of communication and its context
47 4
which may affect expectation.

473.

See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.

474. M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & W. Reisman, The Prescribing Function 20 (May 3,
1974) (unpublished manuscript available in office of New York Law School Journal of
International and Comparative Law).
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Supplementing of prescriptions and community expectations

Perhaps more than in any other area of law, PIL is replete with
incomplete and ambiguous rules, principles, and other forms of communication. In this sense it shares with other areas of law, though perhaps in an acute form, the inevitability of the legal vacuum-the gaps,
ambiguities, open-endedness and penumbras of uncertainty of the legal
precept. The idea of supplementing such ambiguity has, of course,
been part of the major intellectual contribution of modern American
conflicts thinking. For example, there is Professor Yntema's concern
with the vindication of principles of comparative justice in this field;""
or Professor Currie's concern that in cases of true conflict a court
should exercise a more restrained and enlightened perspective on its
own impulse to parochialism."' Justice Traynor has provided a complex mode of analysis linking altruism with the reconstruction of rational community expectations in a multi-state setting. 4" Similarly,
475.

See, e.g., Yntema, The Historic Basis of Private InternationalLaw, 2 AM. J.

COMP. L. 297 (1953); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE
L.J. 468 (1927).
476. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).

477.

See, e.g., Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlight-

ened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 TEx. L. REV. 657 (1959). But see Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA
L. REV. 644 (1968) on the problem of clarifying the normative basis of PIL. Professor
Rosenberg correctly sees a tension between the principle of reciprocal tolerances and the
concern for justice in the instant case. But the pitfalls of not seeing the significance of
the double law-making function in the choice of law process is apparent in his criticism
of the policy-centered theories of writers influenced by Brainerd Currie. Rosenberg's critique appears to confuse the relationship of choice and process on the one hand, and the
role and function of reciprocal tolerances on the other. In effect, Professor Rosenberg
seems to pose a false, or at best, artificial dilemma between the notions of "perfect justice" and reciprocal tolerances. Rosenberg requires that "perfect justice" (as he sees it)
should be sacrificed at the altar of the smooth running of the federal system. The Rosenberg position is as follows:
[A] choice-of-law rule need not achieve perfect justice every time it is invoked in order to be preferable to the no-rule approach. The idea that judges
can be turned loose in the three-dimensional chess games we have made of these
cases, and can be told to do hand-tailored justice, case by case, free from the
constraints or guidelines of rules, is a vain and dangerous illusion. It tries to
dispose of law's ancient dilemma-the one or the many?-by exhorting courts to
think deeply and decide justly. It elevates local substantive law policies to complete dominance and shockingly neglects policies concerned with making the
federal system function smoothly. Above all, the idea that we need only a
method, not rules, overlooks the key point: the present concern [multistate highway accidents] is with high-volume problems in the administration of justice,
not in its inspired divination.
Id. at 664.
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Professor Weintraub's functional view has generated preferred rules
for true conflicts in several specific areas of law,"78 and Professor
Cavers has explicitly provided principles of preference to guide choice
in selected problem areas of the field.""9 In addition, Professor Leflar
has provided a distinctive, realist sense of the choice-of-law process by
maintaining that a court applying the better rule is prescribing in ways
consonant with community expectations.4 80 The most important point
to note is that all of these writers, and others, have considered as a
central task of modern PIL, that incomplete and ambiguous prescriptions need to be supplemented in order to make the choice-of-law process more reasonable and, thereby, to not only reinforce standards of
reasonableness, but to create them. It is here recommended that the
prescriptions of PIL, with their gaps and ambiguities, be supplemented
with more general basic community policies emerging from the top and
established at the bottom. These policies should be developed with reference to emerging normative standards concerned with human rights
and human dignity, and expectations implicit in the common core of
legal phenomena that control and regulate the life of the individual in
the community.
e.

Integrating expectations in particular prescriptions; supplementing
incomplete prescriptions with more general community policies

The fundamental point to underscore is the creative challenge of
decision. This challenge requires not only the recognition that responsibility for total policy in the community rests with decisionmakers,
but also that basic civic responsibility requires that decisionmakers
honor values implicit in the common core of legal culture, as well as
emergent expectations about justice and human rights. There seems to
be no reason why decisionmakers at the lowest rungs of the domestic
ladder should not be influenced and conditioned, for example, by the
imaginative distillation of the more general principles implicit in international jus cogens.
The above three principles underscore the importance of the academic contribution to PIL for it is in academia that "intellectual strategies and procedures" have been and are being invented to minimize
the establishment of anachronistic law, of arbitrary law, and of unfair
surprise. It is through the invention of such strategies and procedures
478.
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that one might hope to guide decision-making wherein particulars and
wholes are rationally connected in ways that consistently and consciously approximate the common interest in human dignity. To increase the emergence of a rational choice-of-law process, a procedure to
guide choice in particular contexts is required.
The last of these strategies remains to be considered. Contemporary theorists have intuitively and sometimes explicitly used at least
some of the principles recommended here, but their systematic conceptualization has not been apparent in the literature of PIL.
2.

Principles of Content

A pervasive problem of choice-of-law has been the task of determining what principles of content are to form the rule of decision. The
trends in modern decisions have often vacillated between reification
and nihilism. The result has been the articulation of transstate rules
incompatible with realism or the assertion of a no-rules formula
equally incompatible with multi-state reality. The need to systematically articulate principles relating to the prescribing process is
apparent.
a.

Ascertaining prescription

Prescription is a communication process. To understand communication accurately and realistically, one must view the communication
in context. It is particularly important that prescription viewed in context yield shared expectations about the reach of its content, the definition of its authority, and the framework of control. An important index of shared expectation is the measure of presumptive deference
given to the communicator and target communicatees during the entire
prescribing process. The particular challenge for decision is to ensure
that these expectations are compatible with human rights and dignity.
b.

Supplementing expectations

Prescriptions are never complete. They are even less complete in
the international environment. Gaps, ambiguities and contradictions
abound. Supplementation is intrinsic to prescription.
c.

Integrating expectations

Integrating expectations is the craft skill that shapes the result
and in many ways shapes consequences and expectations. Many conditions may influence the capacity of a decisionmaker to integrate expectations of prescription with postulated goals of human dignity. The

N.Y.J.

INT'L & COMp. L.

[Vol. 3

process is as unending as it is challenging.
3.

Principles Relating to the Process of Claim

One of the most important functions that scholars can bring to
bear on PIL is the process of claim-classification. The need to eschew
broad classifications and the need to appreciate claims in fact as the
predicate of classifications are vitally important if decision is to respond to claim in terms of realistic expectations.
4.

Principles Relating to the Process of Decision

Again, the process of adjudication has not developed with clear-cut
distinctions between different decision-making functions. It should be
recognized that courts are not the only agencies charged with making
and applying PIL. The need to articulate the functional categories of
decision-making from invocation to termination can throw a particular
light on many of the unique and obscure features of the PIL puzzle. It
can also assure, in a more scientific way, that PIL decisions will aspire
to rationality and that this rationality might consciously aspire to promote the common interest.
5.

Principles of Procedure

a.

The contextual principle

It is essential that claims, responses to claims, and decisional outcomes be viewed in context. In a field such as PIL, it can easily be
shown that many contextual features of a problem subliminally define
and condition outcomes. There can be no realistic and comprehensive
theory about PIL without honoring the principle of contextuality.
b.

The principle of economy

Temporal and material resources are a limiting factor upon the
fullest appreciation of the contextual location of a problem. The principle of economy is simple: do as much as available resources allow.
c.

The principle of provisional focus

This principle has represented difficult practical implementation
under traditional PIL perspectives. In practice, cases have turned on
what in traditional law is called characterization, a process that involves provisional classifications. These classifications have often been
outcome determinative. The principle of provisional focus requires that
one minimize a priori classification and focus more resolutely upon
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claims in fact; a full range of provisional prescriptions must be brought
to the attention of the decisionmaker before adverting to a premature
conclusion.
d. The principle of clarified focus
This principle requires that the problem be placed in a larger context than that envisioned by the contestants themselves. The standpoint of the observer can be particularly useful in relating the
problems and potential solutions to a prescribing mechanism that
closely approximates the common interest.
e. The principle of observing trends in past experience
Past experience is a key index of community expectations and the
success or failure of a community to honor or not honor those expectations in the process of its authoritative decisions. Often past experience
will distill competing rules and perspectives that may be useful in
framing current and future decisions that expedite community
expectations.
f. The principle of realistic orientation to factors affecting decision
The conditions of decision-making are vital to understanding patterns of past and present decision-making. They are crucial to understanding the future. Practical lawyers have, for generations, understood the aphorism that "horsesense" is realism defined. What is
meant, of course, is that any decisionmaker is, in some degree, influenced or conditioned by environmental and predispositional factors.
These factors may be vital in understanding the differences between
theory and practice, between the law in the books and the law in fact.
g. The principle of observing limits on future probabilities
The future is pregnant with alternatives. If a choice exists in realizing one option rather than another, some estimate of the costs and
benefits of realizable options must be made. The standard of measurement inevitably must be the cost or benefit in terms of a gain or loss of
community values as a whole.
h. The principle of inventing and evaluating alternatives
It is important, particularly in PIL, to assess what costs and impacts a variety of options might have on the social process viewed on a
multi-state basis. Inventing and assessing alternative futures or options
against fundamental community policies and promoting options that
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closely approximate the common interests adds an important, creative
dimension to the choice-of-law process.
F.

Goals of PIL

(1) At the highest level of abstraction, the objective of PIL as an
indispensable complement to those problem areas designated as public
international law, is the realization of a global public order of human
dignity where all values are optimally shaped and shared through the
strategies of persuasion rather than coercion.
(2) At a more operational level, one may see the decision-making
process as actively structuring the social process to achieve the objectives specified in (1) above. In other words, the process of authoritative
decision uniquely geared to the PIL frame should consciously strive for
the development of situational patterns geared to institutionalization,
in global terms, of each goal value. These value-situations may be
structured or patterned according to specialized arenas for the power
process (fora); for the wealth process (markets); for the affection process (affection and friendship circles) and so forth. Value-situations
may also be patterned with sufficient flexibility so as to respond, in
varying degrees of inclusivity and exclusivity, and be reconciliable with
the goals evidenced in the human dignity postulate.
(3) All allocations of competences in PIL (applicative and prescriptive; secondary and primary) should, so far as possible, be done to
optimize preferred outcomes, viz., that advance the realization of a
public order of human dignity.
(4) The allocation of decision-making competencies in PIL
should be further conditioned by the realization that the promotion
through decision, of common interests as distinct from special interests, approximates the accretion and diffusion of values having the
widest relevance for a public order of human dignity.
G.

Presumptive Preferences of a Theory about PIL

(1) For each specific claim in PIL, policy should be clarified so
that, to the extent possible, primary inclusive competences of the international community might be postulated as a standard for the evaluation through time of the outcomes of all global allocations of competence. The reason for this is that the scholar might then be able to
meaningfully recommend principles of content and principles of procedure whereby actual outcomes might more closely reflect the ideals implied in the primary inclusive competence to apply and prescribe
policy.
(2) Deference should be given to an exclusive assertion of compe-
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tence when it is observed that all major impacts of a potential decision
are centered upon the group space of a particular body politic that asserts exclusive control over the claim precipating events. The prescription and application of policy in terms of group space is not here
viewed as being forever static. Rather, it is a product of the shared
perspectives incorporated in processes of interaction at whatever level
of inclusivity or exclusivity. "Spatial" delimitations are a product of
social relations; they are understood to encapsulate the interpersonal
structuring of space in a psycho-social sense in which various resources
play an important role, one such important role being territory. Territory is sometimes symbolized as the basis of a social grouping; it occasionally recedes in symbolic significance so that it is merely an aspect
of the group. The delimitation of a group's spatial parameters in PIL
can be only meaningfully drawn by reference to relevant group expectations in the context of each specific problem involving the allocation
of values and then tested against inclusive community policy and
whatever peremptory norms are extant in the clarification of such
policy.
(3) The third preference for PIL is that its policies facilitate the
flow of people, goods, and services across state lines and accommodate
the establishment of operative modalities to achieve this end; the
group space demanded for the smooth operation of these modalities
(associations, etc.) must be honored by all who wield formal and effective power to the extent that the recognition of transgroup voluntaristic "space" is consistent with inclusive community policy and peremptory norms of the global whole.
(4) All exclusive assertions of competence are not to be deferred
to where tolerance of such a claim results in a violation of a peremptory inclusive international standard of conduct.
(5) While it is presumptively preferred that the application and
diffusion of policies closely identified with inclusive prescription be
made, due deference should also be accorded where exclusive minimum
order interests of a substantially affected body politic are at issue. The
elaborate taxonomy of policy developed by the policy science school
provides the most sophisticated technique for making policy choices in
a transgroup context.
(6) The final presumptive preference is for decisionmakers to
recognize the creative element involved in making and applying policy.
The creative element must be exploited for the advancement of the
optimality principle concerning value accretion and diffusions in the
PIL context.

